Abstract
We present results of a systematic investigation of leakage of compromising information via electromagnetic (EM) emanations from CMOS devices. These emanations are shown to consist of a multiplicity of signals, each leaking somewhat different information about the underlying computation. We show that not only can EM emanations be used to attack cryptographic devices where the power side-channel is unavailable, they can even be used to break power analysis countermeasures.
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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Agrawal, D., Archambeault, B., Rao, J.R., Rohatgi, P. (2003). The EM Side—Channel(s). In: Kaliski, B.S., Koç, ç.K., Paar, C. (eds) Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2002. CHES 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2523. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36400-5_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36400-5_4
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