Exit in Duopoly Under Uncertainty and Incomplete Information

We have shown, by assuming for simplicity that market uncertainty is lower, that in the incomplete information model, there is reversal of exit order in spite of the exclusion of gap equilibrium. Therefore, equilibrium is influenced not only by market uncertainty but also by uncertainty of information about the competitor.

While we assume that the strategy is a continuous and increasing function, there may be a more natural assumption. Also, considering constraint of the distribution function may ensure the uniqueness of the best response.

Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Industrial & Management Systems Engineering, Graduate School of Science and Engineering, Waseda University, 3-4-1 Okubo, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 169-8555, Japan

   Makoto Goto

2. Department of Industrial & Management Systems Engineering, School of Science and Engineering, Waseda University, 3-4-1 Okubo, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 169-8555, Japan

   Takahiro Ono

Editors and Affiliations

1. Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics Dept. Logistics Systems, University of Bremen, Universitätsallee GW1 Block A, 28359, Bremen, Germany

   Hans-Dietrich Haasis

2. Faculty of Business Studies and Economics Chair of Logistics, University of Bremen, PO Box 33 04 40, 28334, Bremen, Germany

   Herbert Kopfer  & Jörn Schönberger  & 

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