Abstract
As the core operation of many public key cryptosystems, group exponentiation is central to cryptography. Attacks on its implementation in embedded device setting is hence of great concern. Recently, implementations resisting both simple side-channel analysis and fault attacks were proposed. In this paper, we go further and present an algorithm that also inherently thwarts differential side-channel attacks in finite abelian groups with only limited time and storage overhead.
This work was performed when the first author was with Gemalto.
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Fumaroli, G., Vigilant, D. (2006). Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation. In: Breveglieri, L., Koren, I., Naccache, D., Seifert, JP. (eds) Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography. FDTC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4236. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11889700_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11889700_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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