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International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 45
Volume 45, Numbers 1-2, March 2016
- "Merale" Neyman: an appreciation. 1-2
- Olivier Gossner, Ori Haimanko
, Eilon Solan
Special issue in honor of Abraham Neyman. 3-9 - Françoise Forges, Ulrich Horst, Antoine Salomon:
Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games. 11-36 - Sergiu Hart
Allocation games with caps: from Captain Lotto to all-pay auctions. 37-61 - Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko
Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps. 63-88 - Johannes Hörner, Larry Samuelson:
Dynamic moral hazard without commitment. 89-136 - John Hillas
Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals. 137-153 - Xiaoxi Li, Xavier Venel:
Recursive games: uniform value, Tauberian theorem and the Mertens conjecture " \(Maxmin=\lim v_n=\lim v_{\uplambda }\) ". 155-189 - Robert Samuel Simon:
The challenge of non-zero-sum stochastic games. 191-204 - Jeroen Kuipers, János Flesch, Gijs Schoenmakers, Koos Vrieze:
Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state. 205-237 - Pradeep Dubey, Siddhartha Sahi:
Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes. 239-267 - Michel Grabisch, Peter Sudhölter
Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints. 269-290 - Panayotis Mertikopoulos
Imitation dynamics with payoff shocks. 291-320 - Fabien Gensbittel:
Continuous-time limit of dynamic games with incomplete information and a more informed player. 321-352 - Bruno Ziliotto:
General limit value in zero-sum stochastic games. 353-374 - Dov Samet:
On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information. 375-387 - Sylvain Sorin, Guillaume Vigeral:
Operator approach to values of stochastic games with varying stage duration. 389-410 - Omer Edhan
Values of vector measure market games and their representations. 411-433 - Yehuda John Levy
Projections and functions of Nash equilibria. 435-459 - Olivier Gossner, Penélope Hernández, Ron Peretz:
The complexity of interacting automata. 461-496
Volume 45, Number 3, August 2016
- Andreas N. Lagerås
Strategic complementarities, network games and endogenous network formation. 497-509 - Ievgen Liubarshchuk
The problem of approach in differential-difference games. 511-522 - János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski
On refinements of subgame perfect \(\epsilon \) -equilibrium. 523-542 - Eric Bahel:
On the core and bargaining set of a veto game. 543-566 - Prasenjit Mondal
On discounted AR-AT semi-Markov games and its complementarity formulations. 567-583 - R. Pablo Arribillaga
Axiomatizing core extensions on NTU games. 585-600 - Emre Dogan
Absence-proofness: Group stability beyond the core. 601-616 - Urban Larsson, Simon Rubinstein-Salzedo
Grundy values of Fibonacci nim. 617-625 - Maxim Ivanov:
Dynamic learning and strategic communication. 627-653 - Özgün Ekici, Onur Kesten:
An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism. 655-674 - Karel Prikry, William D. Sudderth:
Measurability of the value of a parametrized game. 675-683 - Haifeng Fu
Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games: characterization and existence. 685-697 - Youngsub Chun, Nari Park, Duygu Yengin
Coincidence of cooperative game theoretic solutions in the appointment problem. 699-708 - Shiran Rachmilevitch:
Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players. 709-717 - Takuya Iimura, Takahiro Watanabe:
Pure strategy equilibrium in finite weakly unilaterally competitive games. 719-729 - Neil A. McKay, Rebecca Milley, Richard J. Nowakowski:
Misère-play Hackenbush Sprigs. 731-742 - Marilda Sotomayor:
Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept. 743-768
Volume 45, Number 4, November 2016
- Adib Bagh:
Existence of equilibria in constrained discontinuous games. 769-793 - Rainer Buckdahn, Marc Quincampoix
Differential games with asymmetric information and without Isaacs' condition. 795-816 - Dominik Karos:
Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities. 817-838 - Ori Haimanko
Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information. 839-857 - Éric Duchêne, Matthieu Dufour, Silvia Heubach
Building Nim. 859-873 - Ulrich Faigle, Michel Grabisch:
Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems. 875-892 - Kei Kawakami
Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem. 893-931 - Bradley J. Ruffle
First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules. 933-970 - Juan I. Block
Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games. 971-984 - Maxwell Pak, Bing Xu:
Generalized reinforcement learning in perfect-information games. 985-1011 - Francisco Javier Arín Aguirre, Ilya Katsev
A monotonic core solution for convex TU games. 1013-1029 - Patrick Hummel, R. Preston McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids. 1031-1052 - Francesc Llerena
Reduced games and egalitarian solutions. 1053-1069 - Giacomo Bonanno:
AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium. 1071-1094 - Jiuqiang Liu, Huihui Zhang:
Coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a continuum coalition production economy. 1095-1109 - Endre Boros
Sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games in terms of forbidden \(2 \times 2\) subgames. 1111-1131 - Hannu Salonen:
Equilibria and centrality in link formation games. 1133-1151
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