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Lenders and risky activities: strict liability or negligence rule?. (2021). Mondello, Gerard.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03502612.

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Cocites

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  2. The Equivalence of Strict Liability and Negligence Rule: A Trompe lœil Perspective. (2012). Mondello, Gerard.
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  3. Strict Liability, Capped Strict Liability, and Care Effort under Asymmetric Information. (2012). Mondello, Gerard.
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  4. The Equivalence of Strict Liability and Negligence Rule: A « Trompe lœil » Perspective. (2012). Mondello, Gerard.
    In: Working Papers.
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  5. The influence of financial status on the effectiveness of environmental enforcement. (2012). Segerson, Kathleen ; Earnhart, Dietrich.
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  6. Environmental federalism and environmental liability. (2012). van 't Veld, Klaas ; Shogren, Jason ; van't Veld, Klaas, .
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  7. Vicarious Liability and the Intensity Principle. (2011). Schweizer, Urs.
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  8. On being asset-constrained in litigation contests. (2011). Friehe, Tim.
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  9. Large-scale risks and technological change: What about limited liability?. (2010). JACOB, Julien ; Spaeter, Sandrine.
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  10. Excessive spending by firms to avoid accidents: Is it a concern in practice?. (2009). van 't Veld, Klaas ; Hutchinson, Emma ; van [`]t Veld, Klaas, .
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  11. A revised model of unilateral accidents. (2009). Nussim, Jacob ; Tabbach, Avraham D..
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  12. Strategic Judgment Proofing. (2008). Che, Yeon-Koo ; Spier, Kathryn E..
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  13. How liable should an exporter be?: The case of trade in hazardous goods. (2008). Helm, Carsten.
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  17. Limiting Limited Liability. (2006). Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe.
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  19. When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution?. (2006). Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe ; de Geest, Gerrit .
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  21. Limiting Limited Liability. (2006). .
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  42. Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases. (1999). Austin, David ; Alberini, Anna.
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  45. Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable?. (1998). poitevin, michel ; Gobert, Karine.
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  46. Environmental Risks: Should Banks Be Liable?. (1998). poitevin, michel ; Gobert, Karine.
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  47. Léconomie des organisations : Mythes et réalités. (1997). Boyer, Marcel.
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  48. L’économie des organisations. (1996). Boyer, Marcel.
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  49. Optimal taxation of flow pollutants when firms may also inflict catastrophic environmental damage. (1996). heyes, anthony.
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  50. Environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability. (1994). Strand, Jon.
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