Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories"

Abstract: This paper analyzes the meaning of comparing the economic performance of strict liability and negligence rule in a unilateral standard accident model under Knightian uncertainty. It focuses on the cost expectation of major harm on which the injurers form beliefs. It shows first that, when the Court agree with the regulator, whatever the liability regime, the first best level of care is never reached but under both regimes the tortfeasors define the same level of care. Second, when, judge and regulator disagree, it is impossible to discriminate among liability standards because the issue depends on the injurer's optimism degree.

Keywords: uncertainty; accident model; strict liability; negligence rule; ambiguity theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00929948
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in 2013

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Working Paper: Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories (2013)
Working Paper: Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00929948

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