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Political voice on monetary policy: evidence from the parliamentary hearings of the European Central Bank. (2022). Romelli, Davide ; Ferrara, Federico M ; Moschella, Manuela ; Masciandaro, Donato.
In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
RePEc:ehl:lserod:114278.

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  1. ECB communication sentiments: How do they relate to the economic environment and financial markets?. (2024). Kaminskas, Rokas ; Jurkas, Linas.
    In: Journal of Economics and Business.
    RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:131:y:2024:i:c:s0148619524000407.

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  26. Combining topic models with bipartite blockmodelling to uncover the multifaceted nature of social capital. (2021). Daenekindt, Stijn ; Vlegels, Jef.
    In: PLOS ONE.
    RePEc:plo:pone00:0253478.

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  27. Exports vs. Investment: How Public Discourse Shapes Support for External Imbalances. (2021). Haas, Jorg ; Ferrara, Federico Maria ; Sattler, Thomas ; Peterson, Andrew.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02569351.

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  28. The implications of globalisation for the ECB monetary policy strategy. (2021). Schmitz, Martin ; Lastauskas, Povilas ; Kataryniuk, Iván ; JOCHEM, Axel ; Gunnella, Vanessa ; Georgiadis, Georgios ; Fontagné, Lionel ; Feldkircher, Martin ; Everett, Mary ; Carvalho, Daniel ; Labhard, Vincent ; Bricongne, Jean-Charles ; Felettigh, Alberto ; Cova, Pietro ; Dimitropoulou, Dimitra ; Hemmerle, Yannick ; Siena, Daniele ; Osbat, Chiara ; Venditti, Fabrizio ; Kuhnlenz, Markus ; Baumann, Ursel ; Zumer, Tina ; Parraga, Susana ; de Luigi, Clara ; Serafini, Roberta ; Mattias, Nilsson ; Carluccio, Juan ; Korhonen, Iikka ; Wacket, Helmut ; Banerjee, Biswajit ; Eichler, Eric ; Giron, Celestino ; Meinen, Philipp ; de Bandt, Olivier ; del Giudice, Davide ; van Schaik, Ilona ; Mozzanica, Mirco Balatti ; Dorrucci, Ettore ; Coim
  29. Political Voice on Monetary Policy: Evidence from the Parliamentary Hearings of the European Central Bank. (2021). Romelli, Davide ; Moschella, Manuela ; Masciandaro, Donato ; Ferrara, Federico M.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp20159.

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  30. Populism, Political Pressure and Central Bank (in)Dependence. (2020). Passarelli, Francesco ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: Open Economies Review.
    RePEc:kap:openec:v:31:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11079-019-09550-w.

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  31. Exports vs. Investment: How Public Discourse Shapes Support for External Imbalances *. (2020). Sattler, Thomas ; Peterson, Andrew ; Haas, Jorg ; Ferrara, Federico Maria.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02569351.

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  32. Topic modeling and technology forecasting for assessing the commercial viability of healthcare innovations. (2020). Pachamanova, Dessislava ; Erzurumlu, Sinan S.
    In: Technological Forecasting and Social Change.
    RePEc:eee:tefoso:v:156:y:2020:i:c:s0040162519315161.

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  33. EU Cohesion Policy under the Media Spotlight: Exploring Territorial and Temporal Patterns in News Coverage and Tone. (2020). Mendez, Fernando ; Carrascosa, Juan Miguel ; Triga, Vasiliki.
    In: Journal of Common Market Studies.
    RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:58:y:2020:i:4:p:1034-1055.

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  34. ECB HELICOPTER MONEY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ECONOMY ARITHMETICS. (2020). masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp20138.

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  35. COVID-19 HELICOPTER MONEY, MONETARY POLICY AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS. (2020). masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp20137.

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  36. The value of news for economic developments. (2019). Thorsrud, Leif A ; Larsen, Vegard H.
    In: Journal of Econometrics.
    RePEc:eee:econom:v:210:y:2019:i:1:p:203-218.

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  37. WHAT BIRD IS THAT? CENTRAL BANKING AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE LAST FORTY YEARS. (2019). Masciandaro, D.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp19127.

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  38. POPULISM, ECONOMIC POLICIES, POLITICAL PRESSURE AND CENTRAL BANK (IN)DEPENDENCE. (2019). masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp19111.

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  39. Financial Inequality, group entitlements and populism. (2018). masciandaro, donato ; Faveretto, Federico.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1892.

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