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COVID-19 HELICOPTER MONEY, MONETARY POLICY AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS. (2020). masciandaro, donato.
In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp20137.

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  32. How does the FOMC learn about economic revolutions? evidence from the New Economy Era, 1994-2001. (2011). Kliesen, Kevin ; Anderson, Richard.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2011-041.

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  33. The Political Business Cycle: New Evidence from the Nixon Tapes. (2011). Butkiewicz, James ; Abrams, Burton.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:dlw:wpaper:11-05..

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  34. Do Departures from Democratic Accountability Compromise the Stability of Public Finances? Keynesianism, Central Banking, and Minority Governments in the Canadian System of Party Government, 1867 – 2. (2011). Winer, Stanley ; Ferris, J. Stephen ; Grofman, Bernard.
    In: Carleton Economic Papers.
    RePEc:car:carecp:11-09.

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  35. Discreet Commitments and Discretion of Policymakers with Private Information. (2010). Mertens, Elmar.
    In: 2010 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed010:763.

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  36. Audit the Federal Reserve?. (2010). Barnett, William.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:20261.

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  37. Reading the Recent Monetary History of the U.S., 1959-2007. (2010). Rubio-Ramirez, Juan F ; Guerron, Pablo ; Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus ; Guerron-Quintana, Pablo A..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15929.

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  38. Falling Behind the Curve: A Positive Analysis of Stop-Start Monetary Policies and the Great Inflation. (2010). Taylor, John ; Levin, Andrew.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15630.

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  39. Central Banking in the Twentieth Century. (2010). Singleton, John.
    In: Cambridge Books.
    RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521899093.

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  40. Reading the Recent Monetary History of the U.S., 1959-2007. (2010). Rubio-Ramirez, Juan F ; Guerron, Pablo ; Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus ; Guerron-Quintana, Pablo A..
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7812.

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  41. POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL. (2010). Milani, Fabio.
    In: Economic Inquiry.
    RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:48:y:2010:i:4:p:896-915.

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  42. Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion?. (2008). Mertens, Elmar.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:szg:worpap:0802.

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  43. The Supply Shock Explanation of the Great Stagflation Revisited. (2008). Blinder, Alan ; Rudd, Jeremy B.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:cepsud:176blinder.pdf.

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  44. The Supply Shock Explanation of the Great Stagflation Revisited. (2008). Rudd, Jeremy B ; Blinder, Alan S.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pri:cepsud:176.

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  45. The Supply-Shock Explanation of the Great Stagflation Revisited. (2008). Blinder, Alan ; Rudd, Jeremy B..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14563.

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  46. Electoral politics and monetary policy: does the Bank of Canada contribute to a political business cycle?. (2008). Ferris, J. Stephen.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:135:y:2008:i:3:p:449-468.

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  47. A rejoinder to “A commentary on ‘Does the Fed contribute to a political business cycle?’ ”. (2008). Abrams, Burton.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:134:y:2008:i:3:p:489-490.

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  48. A commentary on “Does the Fed contribute to a political business cycle?”. (2007). Tempelman, Jerry.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:433-436.

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  49. Political Business Cycles in the New Keynesian Model. (2007). Milani, Fabio.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:irv:wpaper:070805.

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  50. The Political Economy of Wage and Price Controls: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes. (2007). Butkiewicz, James ; Abrams, Burton.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:dlw:wpaper:07-10..

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