Arguments in support of federalism

Federalism


•Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism

See also: Arguments opposed to federalism

This page presents an overview of the main areas of inquiry and disagreement related to the history, theory, and practice of federalism. In the context of the United States, federalism refers to a system of government that divides power between the federal government and state governments, or between two or more state governments. For more information on federalism, click here.

Ballotpedia has tracked six arguments related to the nature of federalism, 10 arguments opposing federalism, and the following nine arguments supporting federalism:

If federalism is right or necessary, then why?

Click here to view arguments opposing federalism. Click here to view arguments about the nature of federalism.

If federalism is right or necessary, then why?

Argument: Federalism allows states to act as laboratories of democracy

This argument posits that the freedom of states to experiment with policy without central intervention allows for the creation of innovative policies.

Claim: A decentralized system allows for new programs and policies to be tested on a smaller scale

This claim suggests that a decentralized system of government allows for new social and economic programs or policies to be tested on a smaller scale before implementing them in other states or at the national level. According to this claim, the decentralized method implies less risk and creates an environment where states can learn from each other.

Law professor Deborah Jones Merrit wrote, “Finally, as Justice Brandeis observed more than fifty years ago, each of the states ‘serve[s] as a laboratory’ that may ‘try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’ State governments repeatedly have proved the truth of this statement by pioneering new social and economic programs. Unemployment compensation, minimum-wage laws, public financing of political campaigns, no-fault insurance, hospital cost containment, and prohibitions against discrimination in housing and employment all originated in state legislatures. When these programs proved their worth on the state level, they expanded into nationwide programs. Many scholars point to the continued existence of strong state governments as a principal source of governmental innovations.”^[1]

Law professor Russell Pannier wrote, “A side benefit of allocating independent political power to states is that each state can learn from the results of other states' choices. Each state is a forum for legal and social experimentation.”^[2]

Alexander T. Tabarrok wrote, “In a decentralized system ideas can be tried at the local level, there learning occurs, ideas are improved and then begin to diffuse throughout the rest of the country. This idea is more than theoretical. Airline deregulation began at the state level and was adopted nationally when it was noticed that in-state trips in large states that had deregulated were much cheaper than trips of the same distance that crossed state lines. Welfare reform and school choice are two other examples of recent policies that began at the state level. The lessons learned need not always be positive lessons. Other states and countries owe California a great debt, for example, for its demonstration of how not to deregulate electricity.”^[3]

Claim: Federalism makes it possible for policies to account for local needs and conditions

This claim suggests that federalism allows state and local governments to take local needs and conditions into account when implementing policies. According to this claim, localized policies are often superior to national policies the federal government enacts.

Law professor Michael W. McConnell wrote, “The first, and most axiomatic, advantage of decentralized government is that local laws can be adapted to local conditions and local tastes, while a national government must take a uniform - and hence less desirable - approach. So long as preferences for government policies are unevenly distributed among the various localities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decision-making than by a single national authority.”^[4]

Claim: Federalism incentivizes local governments to be innovative

This claim suggests that federalism incentivizes local governments to be more innovative and to adopt popular policies to attract taxpayers.

McConnell continued, “A final reason why federalism has been thought to advance the public good is that state and local governmental units will have greater opportunity and incentive to pioneer useful changes. A consolidated national government has all the drawbacks of a monopoly: it stifles choice and lacks the goad of competition. Lower levels of government are more likely to depart from established consensus simply because they are smaller and more numerous. Elementary statistical theory holds that a greater number of independent observations will produce more instances of deviation from the mean. If innovation is desirable, it follows that decentralization is desirable. This statistical proposition is strengthened, moreover, by the political reality that a smaller unit of government is more likely to have a population with preferences that depart from the majority's. It is, therefore, more likely to try an approach that could not command a national majority. Perhaps more important is that smaller units of government have an incentive, beyond the mere political process, to adopt popular policies. If a community can attract additional taxpayers, each citizen's share of the overhead costs of government is proportionately reduced.”^[4]

Argument: Federalism enhances democracy

This argument posits that federalism enhances democracy because it allows decision-making to occur at the local level.

Claim: Decision-making at a lower level of government allows elected officials to directly respond to the needs of citizens

This claim suggests that granting decision-making authority to elected officials at the local level makes elected representatives more responsive to the needs of citizens, which enhances democracy.

Yale Law School Graduate Fellow Jason Mazzone wrote, “[D]emocracy is enhanced when decisionmaking occurs at a more local level because elected representatives become more responsive to the needs of individuals and citizens are able to participate more meaningfully in self-governance.”^[5]

Claim: Federalism protects liberty by allowing people to live under government that is tailored to their backgrounds

This claim suggests that federalism allows individuals to live within smaller units of government that implement diverse policies that are more tailored to their political interests.

The late economist James M. Buchanan wrote, “If, however, we now introduce prospects for heterogeneity in the inclusive constituency, the argument for federalization is surely strengthened. Small units, defined geographically or territorially, are likely to be more homogeneous in makeup than larger units, and the individual is more likely to share preferences for political action with his or her peers than would be the case where political interaction must include persons who are considered to be ‘foreign,’ whether the lines here be drawn racially, ethnically, religiously, economically, or otherwise. If the end objective is the minimization of politically orchestrated coercion, the individual will, personally, feel under less potential threat in a community of similarly situated peers than in a large community that embodies groups with differing characteristics.”^[6]

Alexander T. Tabarrok, a professor of economics, wrote, “The diversity of preference view says that even in the long run, policies will differ across jurisdictions because people have different preferences. What is best for Rhode Island is not necessarily what is best for California, and what is best for San Jose is not necessarily what is best for San Francisco. By decentralizing power one can better match preferences with policies.”^[3]

Law professor Deborah Jones Merritt wrote, “The third advantage of independent state governments stems from the political and cultural diversity they provide. Acting through their state and local governments, citizens in each region create the type of social and political climate they prefer. Alaska spends $8,627 per pupil for elementary and secondary education, while Utah spends only $2,053.41 Some states have enacted stringent pollution control laws and high industrial taxes, while Louisiana advertises itself as the ‘Right-to-Profit State.’ The city of Santa Monica in California has established social welfare programs that critics dub ‘a form of socialism’. For a nation composed of diverse interest groups, this opportunity to express different social and cultural values is essential.”^[7]

Pietro S. Nivola, a professor of economics, wrote, “The larger point here is that when top-heavy federal regulations indiscriminately narrow local options, they risk stifling local innovations and foreclosing solutions that fit local circumstances. The result can be enormously wasteful.”^[8]

Former Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia wrote, “The decision concerning which level of government should have the last word is, therefore, a pragmatic one, to be determined by the practicalities of the matter. To be sure, decision at a lower level of government tends to maximize overall satisfaction, by permitting diversity instead of submerging large regional majorities beneath a narrow national vote. But that is a practical rather than a transcendental concern, to be laid beside other practical concerns such as the need for national rather than local enforcement of certain prescriptions. It justifies a predisposition towards state and local control - but not, I think, the degree of generalized hostility towards national law which has become a common feature of conservative thought.”^[9]

Claim: Smaller units of government allow communities to implement policies that may not appeal to the national majority

This claim suggests that state and local governments allow communities to test and implement policies that appeal to constituents, rather than implementing policies to appeal to the masses.

Law professor Michael W. McConnell wrote, “A final reason why federalism has been thought to advance the public good is that state and local governmental units will have greater opportunity and incentive to pioneer useful changes. A consolidated national government has all the drawbacks of a monopoly: it stifles choice and lacks the goad of competition. Lower levels of government are more likely to depart from established consensus simply because they are smaller and more numerous. Elementary statistical theory holds that a greater number of independent observations will produce more instances of deviation from the mean. If innovation is desirable, it follows that decentralization is desirable. This statistical proposition is strengthened, moreover, by the political reality that a smaller unit of government is more likely to have a population with preferences that depart from the majority's. It is, therefore, more likely to try an approach that could not command a national majority. Perhaps more important is that smaller units of government have an incentive, beyond the mere political process, to adopt popular policies. If a community can attract additional taxpayers, each citizen's share of the overhead costs of government is proportionately reduced.”^[4]

Claim: Local politics are less contentious than national politics due to greater homogeneity

This claim suggests that popular political campaigns are often less contentious when issues are addressed at the local level as opposed to national responses to the issue.

Michael S. Greve wrote, “A more decentralized politics is a calmer, more responsible politics. The Leave-Us-Aloners' campaigns often turned shrill and ideological because national policy elites and institutions had decided to nationalize the issue (think gun control), to stamp out local experiments (think school choice), or to prohibit any state experimentation (think abortion). Greater judicial tolerance for federalist solutions has relieved those frustrations. It demonstrates to the Leave-Us-Aloners that the Court need not be their implacable enemy. In turn, responsible (if hard-fought) Leave-Us-Alone campaigns in the states demonstrate to the Supreme Court that populist constituencies can after all be trusted.”^[10]

Argument: Federalism allows for and promotes healthy competition between states

The existence of federalism allows for and promotes competition between states, which is a positive outcome according to this argument. The federal right of individuals and businesses to leave a state or locality in search of more accommodative policies forces lower levels of government to innovate competitive policies that attract citizens and capital from other areas. The national government, according to this argument, is a monopoly that does not have to compete or quickly improve.

Claim: Federalism allows people and businesses to vote with their feet

This argument posits that the right to exit under federalism allows individuals and corporations to move to a different jurisdiction if they are dissatisfied with the regulations in their current jurisdiction.

Law professor Michael S. Greves wrote, “It is often much wiser to offer citizens a choice among jurisdictions and to force the jurisdictions to compete by protecting the private right that matters - the right to exit. Sometimes, exit rights are an acceptable, second-best alternative to property rights; in other instances, they may be genuinely superior. Citizen choice and exit rights will not always and everywhere produce the same results as would libertarian property rights, and as just seen, federalism and private markets coexist in a certain tension. Both, however, follow the same general objective of constraining an otherwise boundless political process.”^[10]

James M. Buchanan wrote, “The principle of federalism emerges directly from the market analogy. The politicized sphere of activity, in itself, may be arranged or organized so as to allow for the workings of competition, which is the flip side of the availability of exit, to become operative. The domain of authority for the central government, which we assume here is coincident in temtory and membership with the economic exchange nexus, may be severely limited, while remaining political authority is residually assigned to the several ‘state’ units, each of which is smaller in territory and membership than the economy. Under such a federalized political structure, persons, singly and/or in groups, would be guaranteed the liberties of trade, investment, and migration across the inclusive area of the economy. Analogously to the market, persons retain an exit option; at relatively low cost, at least some persons can shift among the separate political jurisdictions. Again analogously to the market, the separate producing units (in this case, the separate state governments) would be forced to compete, one with another, in their offers of publicly provided services. The federalized structure, through the forces of interstate competition, effectively limits the power of the separate political units to extract surplus value from the citizenry.”^[6]

Law professor Richard A. Epstein wrote, “The great virtue of federalism is that it introduces an important measure of competition between governments. Federalism works best where it is possible to vote with your feet. The state that exploits its productive individuals runs the risk that they will take their business elsewhere. The exit threat therefore enforces the competitive regime.”^[11]

Epstein continued, “At present, major firms that do business in many states may pick a single state of incorporation. Incorporation is generally regarded as a good for the state of incorporation for the tax revenues it generates and the general business it provides. The battle between different states often centers on the inducements each could offer to promoters of new businesses to incorporate within their jurisdiction. Firms that do not like incorporation in one state can leave and reincorporate somewhere else. In some circles, this competition between states has been deplored as a ‘race to the bottom,’ on the ground that the managers will seek out that jurisdiction that is most favorable to their interests and, by implication, most adverse to the interests of prospective shareholders. On balance, however, incorporation is an area in which the exit right operates as a powerful instrument for the public welfare.”^[11]

Alexander T. Tabarrok wrote, “Oppression at the federal level is difficult to escape. Oppression by the states can be countered by mobility. The more powers that are devolved to lower levels, the easier it becomes pick and choose policies by moving. Gays may move to cities like San Francisco where they are better tolerated, and indeed if enough of them move they can become a political force. In this respect, the idea is similar to the diversity of preferences notion except there the emphasis was on the idea that federalism allows pre-existing diversities to be recognized. Whereas here the idea is that you can move to a city or town that better reflects your preferences. One sometimes hears, for example, that federalism was more important in the 18th century when the people of Virginia really were quite different than the people of New England. Today, so the argument goes, now that people are much more likely to move from one state to another the differences are less clear and so federalism is less important. While this argument makes some sense from the diversity of preference view, it makes no sense at all from the perspective of mobility because it is mobility that generates differences in preferences and competitive federalism works better the more mobile citizens are.”^[3]

Claim: The right to exit encourages states to compete in their policy offerings to attract citizens and businesses

This claim suggests that federalism encourages states to innovate and compete to minimize government burdens and maximize the value it provides to citizens.

James M. Buchanan wrote, “The principle of federalism emerges directly from the market analogy. The politicized sphere of activity, in itself, may be arranged or organized so as to allow for the workings of competition, which is the flip side of the availability of exit, to become operative. The domain of authority for the central government, which we assume here is coincident in temtory and membership with the economic exchange nexus, may be severely limited, while remaining political authority is residually assigned to the several ‘state’ units, each of which is smaller in territory and membership than the economy. Under such a federalized political structure, persons, singly and/or in groups, would be guaranteed the liberties of trade, investment, and migration across the inclusive area of the economy. Analogously to the market, persons retain an exit option; at relatively low cost, at least some persons can shift among the separate political jurisdictions. Again analogously to the market, the separate producing units (in this case, the separate state governments) would be forced to compete, one with another, in their offers of publicly provided services. The federalized structure, through the forces of interstate competition, effectively limits the power of the separate political units to extract surplus value from the citizenry.”^[6]

Law professor Michael W. McConnell wrote, “Three important advantages of decentralized decision-making emerge from an examination of the founders' arguments and the modern literature. First, decentralized decision-making is better able to reflect the diversity of interests and preferences of individuals in different parts of the nation. Second, allocation of decision-making authority to a level of government no larger than necessary will prevent mutually disadvantageous attempts by communities to take advantage of their neighbors. And third, decentralization allows for innovation and competition in government.”^[4]

McConnell continued, “A final reason why federalism has been thought to advance the public good is that state and local governmental units will have greater opportunity and incentive to pioneer useful changes. A consolidated national government has all the drawbacks of a monopoly: it stifles choice and lacks the goad of competition. Lower levels of government are more likely to depart from established consensus simply because they are smaller and more numerous. Elementary statistical theory holds that a greater number of independent observations will produce more instances of deviation from the mean. If innovation is desirable, it follows that decentralization is desirable. This statistical proposition is strengthened, moreover, by the political reality that a smaller unit of government is more likely to have a population with preferences that depart from the majority's. It is, therefore, more likely to try an approach that could not command a national majority. Perhaps more important is that smaller units of government have an incentive, beyond the mere political process, to adopt popular policies. If a community can attract additional taxpayers, each citizen's share of the overhead costs of government is proportionately reduced.”^[4]

Claim: Federalism incentivizes a “race to the top”

This claim posits that the “race for the bottom” view of competition does not sufficiently analyze state competition and fails to account for market forces. Competition, according to this claim, incentivizes states to implement rules that maximize the values of shareholders, thus creating a “race for the top.”

Law professor Lucian Arye Bebchuk wrote, “The problem with the race for the bottom analysis is its failure to consider the existence of market constraints on managers' behavior. Cary viewed corporate law as the sole source of protection for shareholders. As critics of the race for the bottom view were quick to point out, however, market forces must be taken into account in any analysis of state charter competition.”^[12]

Law professor Richard A. Epstein wrote, “At present, major firms that do business in many states may pick a single state of incorporation. Incorporation is generally regarded as a good for the state of incorporation for the tax revenues it generates and the general business it provides. The battle between different states often centers on the inducements each could offer to promoters of new businesses to incorporate within their jurisdiction. Firms that do not like incorporation in one state can leave and reincorporate somewhere else. In some circles, this competition between states has been deplored as a ‘race to the bottom,’ on the ground that the managers will seek out that jurisdiction that is most favorable to their interests and, by implication, most adverse to the interests of prospective shareholders. On balance, however, incorporation is an area in which the exit right operates as a powerful instrument for the public welfare.”^[11]

Epstein continued, “The ‘race to the bottom’ claim is flawed because it misses the central point that the protection individual investors receive under a system of federalism is derived from their ability to withhold their consent. If the state incorporation laws allow the officers and directors of a corporation effectively to expropriate the wealth of shareholders, then, in the first instance, the original promoters of the new venture will have to bear the costs of those inferior rules. The rules are a matter of public knowledge, and if they are skewed in the way in which proponents of the race to the bottom believe, then initial investors (including institutional investors with great sophistication) will demand at incorporation more favorable terms to compensate themselves for the additional legal risks they are asked to assume. As that additional compensation will cost the promoters of the new venture more than compliance to a superior set of rules, the promoters will modify by contract any rules that facilitate the exploitation of shareholders. I am skeptical that there should be any mandatory terms within corporate charters, but if such are required, then competition between states within a federal system should spur states to identify those restrictions that are required and to reject those that are superfluous. The empirical evidence seems to be in accord with this optimistic view, for those businesses that announce an intention to shift their state of incorporation to Delaware see significant advances in the value of their shares. In this situation, therefore, the exit right offers incentives for states to find the right mix between contractual freedom and state regulation.”^[11]

Epstein continued, “Professor Bebchuk in his recent contribution on this issue notes that a shift in the place of doing corporate business could lead to risks to minority shareholders or to various creditors, both by tort and by contract. As regards dissident shareholders, the risk is surely there when majority vote and not unanimous consent is all that is necessary for reincorporation to take place. An additional requirement that no identifiable class of shareholders be left worse off after the reincorporation - a just compensation requirement for minority shareholders - could go a long way to prevent the abuses that might otherwise be allowable under majority voting. As regarding creditors, it is likely to be only the rare situation in which the reincorporation will benefit shareholders as a group, but at the same time will subject outside creditors (who otherwise benefit from the increased asset cushion) to greater risks than they sustained previously. If most shareholders are risk averse, it is unlikely they will support, even by a simple majority vote, any reincorporation in another state that increases the volatility of their holdings, the scenario most likely to prejudice any creditors. Since any federal law is so unlikely to represent a sensible response to any question of corporate governance, it seems best to rely on competition across states, notwithstanding the occasional case in which it might work more harm than good.”^[11]

Argument: Federalism prevents waste

This argument posits that federalism prevents the waste of funds and resources by allowing states to determine the best solutions for their local circumstances.

Claim: Federalism allows states to innovate solutions based on local circumstances, which prevents waste that federal regulations often create

This claim suggests that federalism allows states and cities to make determine what is best for in them.

Pietro S. Nivola wrote, “The larger point here is that when top-heavy federal regulations indiscriminately narrow local options, they risk stifling local innovations and foreclosing solutions that fit local circumstances. The result can be enormously wasteful.”^[8]

Argument: Federalism protects individual rights

This argument says that the existence of federalism and a decentralized government protects individuals’ rights. States can more effectively protect individuals’ liberties and provide an institutional check on abuses of federal power.

Claim: Federalism protects individual liberties of trade, investment, and migration

This claim suggests that state competition and the right to exit, in conjunction with federalism, grant individuals the liberty of trade, investment, and migration between jurisdictions.

James M. Buchanan wrote, “The principle of federalism emerges directly from the market analogy. The politicized sphere of activity, in itself, may be arranged or organized so as to allow for the workings of competition, which is the flip side of the availability of exit, to become operative. The domain of authority for the central government, which we assume here is coincident in temtory and membership with the economic exchange nexus, may be severely limited, while remaining political authority is residually assigned to the several ‘state’ units, each of which is smaller in territory and membership than the economy. Under such a federalized political structure, persons, singly and/or in groups, would be guaranteed the liberties of trade, investment, and migration across the inclusive area of the economy. Analogously to the market, persons retain an exit option; at relatively low cost, at least some persons can shift among the separate political jurisdictions. Again analogously to the market, the separate producing units (in this case, the separate state governments) would be forced to compete, one with another, in their offers of publicly provided services. The federalized structure, through the forces of interstate competition, effectively limits the power of the separate political units to extract surplus value from the citizenry."^[6]

Claim: Federalism allows states to create laws based on local conditions

This claim suggests that a decentralized government allows states to implement laws based on local conditions and the needs of citizens. This allows states to take an approach that is more appealing to individuals’ rights and needs, as opposed to a uniform federal approach.

Law professor Michael W. McConnell wrote, “The first, and most axiomatic, advantage of decentralized government is that local laws can be adapted to local conditions and local tastes, while a national government must take a uniform - and hence less desirable - approach. So long as preferences for government policies are unevenly distributed among the various localities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decision-making than by a single national authority.”^[4]

Claim: Federalism limits the power of the federal government to regulate individuals’ lives

This claim suggests that a decentralized government allows states to balance federal regulations and prevent federal overreach into individuals’ rights.

Law professor Deborah Jones Merritt wrote, “First, like Madison and Hamilton, twentieth century commentators stress the ability of independent state governnments to check the oppressive power of a strong central government. The federal government, with its broad constitutional authority, its army of administrative agencies, and its vast financial resources, possesses almost unlimited power to regulate the lives of its citizens. The individual voter has little hope of influencing the course of this federal leviathan. Given these realities, state governments provide an institutional check on potential abuses of federal power.”^[7]

Law professor Russell Pannier wrote, “1) The objective of reducing the risk of arbitrary and morally unjustifiable political coercion is desirable. 2) Maintaining a federalist legal system is a necessary, or at least useful, means of reducing the risk of arbitrary and morally unjustifiable political coercion. 3) Hence, a federalist legal system ought to be maintained.”^[2]

James M. Buchanan wrote, “I suggest that a coherent classical liberal must be generally supportive of federal political structures, because any division of authority must, necessarily, tend to limit the potential range of political coercion. Those persons and groups who oppose the devolution of authority from the central government to the states in the United States and those who oppose any limits on the separate single nation-states in modern Europe are, by these commitments, placing other values above those of the liberty and sovereignty of individuals.”^[13]

Argument: Federalism supports stronger communities

This argument posits that federalism promotes stronger community networks and engagement by allowing citizens to actively participate in state and local government. State and local governments also have the power to create laws that directly benefit local conditions, which further promotes a sense of community.

Claim: Federalism is good because it encourages social reciprocity

This claim suggests that federalism encourages generalized reciprocity, which means that members of a community will grant favors to one another with no expectation of receiving a favor in return. According to the claim, federalism promotes the existence of citizen groups and civic networks, which foster generalized reciprocity.

Yale Law School Graduate Fellow Jason Mazzone wrote, “The types of small-scale citizen groups that federalism promotes also embody strong norms of generalized reciprocity. Individuals who are actively involved in these small-scale associations are more trusting of others and more likely to engage in reciprocal behavior.”^[5]

Mazzone continued, “Through participation in civic networks, individuals learn to listen carefully to the viewpoints of others, to reserve judgment until appropriate, and to provide feedback. Individuals not only learn the importance of negotiation and compromise, and of patience and control, but also the usefulness of obtaining a consensus. They learn to respect others despite differences of opinion, and they discover ways to maintain civility despite disagreement. Such habits often promote reciprocal behavior in other settings with other individuals.”^[5]

Mazzone continued, “[P]articipation in the small-scale associations of federalism is likely to promote reciprocity by allowing citizens to identify with each other and increase their sense of solidarity. Research demonstrates that interacting with other people creates the sense that individuals are part of a collectivity with shared interests.”^[5]

Mazzone continued, “[A]ctive participation in the small-scale associations of federalism promotes generalized reciprocity results from the important effects of face-to-face communication. A large body of research demonstrates that individuals who communicate with one another are more likely to trust each other and, therefore, more likely to engage in cooperative behavior.”^[5]

Mazzone continued by stating that another “reason that the associations promoted by federalism enhance norms of generalized reciprocity is that active participation by large numbers of citizens in these associations sends the important message that citizens can be trusted to influence politics and to pursue their own agendas.”^[5]

Claim: Federalism allows states to create laws that benefit communities and specific local conditions

This claim suggests that federalism benefits communities by allowing states to create laws specific to local conditions and needs.

Law professor Michael W. McConnell wrote, “The first, and most axiomatic, advantage of decentralized government is that local laws can be adapted to local conditions and local tastes, while a national government must take a uniform-and hence less desirable-approach. So long as preferences for government policies are unevenly distributed among the various localities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decision-making than by a single national authority.”^[4]

Law professor Deborah Jones Merrit wrote, “The third advantage of independent state governments stems from the political and cultural diversity they provide. Acting through their state and local governments, citizens in each region create the type of social and political climate they prefer. Alaska spends $8,627 per pupil for elementary and secondary education, while Utah spends only $2,053.41 Some states have enacted stringent pollution control laws and high industrial taxes, while Louisiana advertises itself as the ‘Right-to-Profit State.’ The city of Santa Monica in California has established social welfare programs that critics dub ‘a form of socialism. For a nation composed of diverse interest groups, this opportunity to express different social and cultural values is essential.”^[7]

Claim: Federalism promotes citizen participation in the political process

This claim suggests that federalism encourages active participation in the political process of state and local governments. This involvement promotes voter confidence, citizen engagement in politics, and accountability.

Merritt continued, “The second major advantage of federalism lies in the ability of state and local governments to draw citizens into the political process. The greater accessibility and smaller scale of local government allows individuals to participate actively in governmental decisionmaking. This participation, in turn, provides myriad benefits: it trains citizens in the techniques of democracy, fosters accountability among elected representatives, and enhances voter confidence in the democratic.”^[7]

Argument: Federalism reduces corruption

This argument states that federalism offers protections and institutional checks that prevent governmental corruption.

Claim: Federalism matches economic and political jurisdictions

This claim suggests that federalism and the practice of devolving power to the lowest competent level of government helps match economic and political jurisdictions and reduce pork-barrel legislation.

Alexander T. Tabarrok wrote, “If there are more voters in the central jurisdiction, then they can foist some of the taxes for the fire station on taxpayers in the outer jurisdiction. Since the benefits of the firehouse go solely to the central jurisdiction but the costs are spread across both jurisdictions, the central jurisdiction is being subsidized and thus has an incentive to spend more on firehouses than is justified by the actual benefits.”^[3]

Argument: Federalism allows people to be more active in and closer to the governing process

This argument posits that federalism creates more opportunities for individuals and smaller organizations to actively participate in politics through the division of power between the federal government and state governments.

Claim: Federalism creates more opportunities for non-white people to be civically active

This claim suggests that non-white citizens are afforded more opportunities to be civically active through small civic associations, which can more easily influence lower levels of government.

Yale Law School Graduate Fellow Jason Mazzone wrote, “For Black citizens, small-scale associations like church groups are particularly important sites for acquiring civic skills. In the workplace, educated White citizens disproportionately occupy the high-level positions that impart civic skills. In small civic associations, by contrast, Black citizens have the same opportunities as White citizens to develop and practice civic skills. In church groups, in particular, Black citizens and citizens of other minority groups are able to practice civic skills more frequently than White citizens.”^[5]

Claim: Federalism allows smaller organizations to have influence over powerful political groups

This claim suggests that smaller organizations have more power to pursue their political agendas under federalism, which prevents larger political groups from gaining too much power.

Mazonne wrote, “By requiring even the most powerful groups to forego influence over some sites of political power, federalism provides opportunities for smaller, weaker organizations to compete for influence and pursue their agendas. In a federalist system, it is easier for smaller organizations to mount opposition to even powerful groups because their resources will be more diffused.”^[5]

Mazzone continued, “As a result of organizations choosing where to seek political influence, there will be additional opportunities for them to influence policy. Under a federal system, it is unlikely that any single group will be able to capture all or even most of the political power at both the state and the national level. All groups will need to make decisions about where to focus their resources. Thus, federalism provides opportunities for political influence to groups that would likely be very weak under a nationalist system."^[5]

Mazzone continued, “The social capital argument for federalism … points to the importance of competition between the national government and the states over the appropriate division of governmental power. Ongoing power struggles between the national and state governments provide constant opportunities for citizen groups to exert influence. When the division of power is clearly defined, citizen groups pursuing their agendas are able to direct their resources at the appropriate target. An ambiguous division of power, however, creates uncertainty regarding which government, national or state, will eventually make the decisions on a particular matter. This ambiguity in turn casts doubt on the merits of pursuing one avenue of influence rather than another––an uncertainty that citizen groups otherwise excluded from political influence can exploit.”^[5]

Claim: Federalism offers more opportunities for individuals to actively participate in politics

This claim suggests that federalism creates more opportunities for individuals to participate and have a direct role in politics.

Mazzone wrote, “[F]ederalism enhances social capital by expanding opportunities for individuals to participate directly in politics through such activities as running for public office.”^[5]

Law professor Deborah Jones Merritt wrote, “The second major advantage of federalism lies in the ability of state and local governments to draw citizens into the political process. The greater accessibility and smaller scale of local government allows individuals to participate actively in governmental decisionmaking. This participation, in turn, provides myriad benefits: it trains citizens in the techniques of democracy, fosters accountability among elected representatives, and enhances voter confidence in the democratic.”^[7]

Claim: Federalism promotes social capital more readily than a nationalist form of government

This claim suggests that social capital is promoted through the division of power between the federal government and state governments, which creates more opportunities for citizen groups and individuals to participate in politics.

Mazzone wrote, “My central claim is that federalism promotes social capital because dividing power between the national government and the states provides greater opportunities for citizen groups to influence politics and for individual citizens to participate in public life. Federalism, therefore, provides a healthy political environment for social capital.”^[5]

Mazzone wrote that dividing authority between the national government and the states “increases the points of political power over which citizens can exert influence in order to achieve their goals. Rather than facing a single governing entity, under a federal system of government, citizen groups can influence political outcomes by directing their resources toward local, state, and national levels. A political environment in which there are multiple sites for influence promotes social capital because such an environment is conducive to a large number of interest groups in which citizens actively participate. Thus, federalism provides opportunities for smaller groups of active citizens to organize and pursue their goals in a variety of settings rather than relegating vast numbers of citizens to passive roles in a large national advocacy group which pursues its members’ interests in Washington.”^[5]

Argument: Federalism creates the greatest opportunity for the maximization of human potential

This argument posits that federalism is the most effective tool for maximizing and recognizing human potential, powers, and capacities.

Claim: A federalist legal order is necessary for the greatest possible realization of human capacities

This claim suggests that a federalist legal order best recognizes human powers and capacities.

Law professor Russell Pannier wrote, “1) Maintaining a legal order in which there exist the conditions for the greatest possible common realization of the essential human powers and capacities is desirable. 2) Maintaining a federalist legal order is a necessary, or at least useful, means of maintaining a legal order in which there exists the greatest possible common realization of the essential human powers and capacities. 3) Hence, a federalist legal order ought to be maintained.”^[2]

Pannier continued, “So, states should be given powers independent of the federal government because in that way smaller associations will be forced to perform functions that would otherwise be performed by the larger association. And this is desirable because in that way a greater number of persons will be encouraged to make choices concerning the conditions of their own lives, thereby freely realizing their own humanity to a greater extent.”^[2]

Pannier continued, “Can the objective of establishing and maintaining a legal order in which there exist the conditions for the greatest possible common realization of the essential human powers and capacities be more efficiently pursued through some means other than a federalist legal system? It seems unlikely. The principle of subsidiarity requires that smaller, rather than larger, associations perform functions whenever possible. Surely, a good way of accomplishing this is breaking down larger associations into smaller ones on the basis of geographical partition. One could try to satisfy the principle of subsidiarity in other ways. For example, one could form smaller associations from people chosen at random, without regard to their geographical locations. But such a method would obviously be inferior to the method of tying the identity of the smaller associations to geographical units.”^[2]

External links

Search Google News for this topic

Footnotes

[guarantee1-1] JSTOR, "The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century," January 1988

[justifying-2] 2.0 ^2.1 ^2.2 ^2.3 ^2.4 William Mitchell Law Review, "Justifying Federalism," 1990

[independent-3] 3.0 ^3.1 ^3.2 ^3.3 Independent Institute, "Arguments for Federalism," September 20, 2001

[evaluating-4] 4.0 ^4.1 ^4.2 ^4.3 ^4.4 ^4.5 ^4.6 University of Chicago Law School, "Federalism: Evaluating The Founders' Design," 1987

[socialcapital-5] 5.00 ^5.01 ^5.02 ^5.03 ^5.04 ^5.05 ^5.06 ^5.07 ^5.08 ^5.09 ^5.10 ^5.11 ^5.12 SSRN, "The Social Capital Argument for Federalism," accessed March 27, 2022

[ideal-6] 6.0 ^6.1 ^6.2 ^6.3 Publius: The Journal of Federalism, "Federalism As an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform," January 1995

[guarantee-7] 7.0 ^7.1 ^7.2 ^7.3 ^7.4 JSTOR, "The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century," January 1988

[federalfuture-8] 8.0 ^8.1 Brookings Institute, "Does Federalism Have a Future?" December 1, 2001

[twoface-9] Chicago Unbound, "The Two Faces of Federalism," 1982

[realfederalism-10] 10.0 ^10.1 Google Books, "Real Federalism," 1999

[lawproblems-11] 11.0 ^11.1 ^11.2 ^11.3 ^11.4 Law and Contemporary Problems, "Exit Rights Under Federalism," 1992

[federalcompetition-12] HeinOnline, "Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law," May 1992

[individualsovereignty-13] Catholic Theological Union, "Federalism and individual sovereignty," 1995

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]