The Political Economy of Entry Barriers

Latchezar Popov and Toshihiko Mukoyama
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Latchezar Popov: The University of Virginia

No 1288, 2013 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study a political economy model of entry barriers. Each period the policymaker determines whether to impose a high barrier on entry, and the special interest groups try to influence the policymaker's decision. Entry is accompanied by creative destruction— when many new firms enter, old firms are more likely to be driven out of the market. Therefore the current incumbents (industry leaders) tend to lobby for a higher entry barrier and potential entrants (industry followers) are likely to lobby for a freer environment for entry. We analyze both static and dynamic versions of the model to examine which environment supports a policy that blocks entry. In the dynamic version of the model, the economy can exhibit various different dynamics, such as multiple steady states and policy-induced cycles.

Date: 2013
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Journal Article: The Political Economy of Entry Barriers (2014)
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