Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation

No 6277, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Substantial evidence suggests the behavioral relevance of social preferences and also the importance of social influence effects ("peer effects"). Yet, little is known about how peer effects and social preferences are related. In a three-person gift-exchange experiment we find causal evidence for peer effects in voluntary cooperation: agents' efforts are positively related despite the absence of material payoff interdependencies. We confront this result with major theories of social preferences which predict that efforts are unrelated, or negatively related. Some theories allow for positively-related efforts but cannot explain most observations. Conformism, norm following and considerations of social esteem are candidate explanations.

Keywords: conformism; social preferences; voluntary cooperation; peer effects; reflection problem; gift exchange; social norms; social esteem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-cse, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-hrm, nep-lab, nep-net, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published - revised version published as 'Peer effects and social preferences in voluntary cooperation: A theoretical and experimental analysis' in: Journal of Economic Psychology, 2015, 48, 72 - 88

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Related works:
Working Paper: Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation (2014)
Working Paper: Peer effects and social preferences in voluntary cooperation (2014)
Working Paper: Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation (2011)
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