Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation

Christian Thöni and Simon Gaechter
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Simon Gächter

No 4741, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Social preferences and social influence effects (“peer effects”) are well documented, but little is known about how peers shape social preferences. Settings where social preferences matter are often situations where peer effects are likely too. In a gift-exchange experiment with independent payoffs between two agents we find causal evidence for peer effects. Efforts are positively correlated but with a kink: agents follow a low-performing but not a high-performing peer. This contradicts major theories of social preferences which predict that efforts are unrelated, or negatively related. Some theories allow for positively-related efforts but cannot explain most observations. Conformism, norm following and social esteem are candidate explanations.

Keywords: social preferences; voluntary cooperation; peer effects; reflection problem; gift-exchange; conformism; social norms; social esteem; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Peer effects and social preferences in voluntary cooperation (2014)
Working Paper: Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation (2012)
Working Paper: Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4741

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