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A political economy model of immigration quotas. (2000). Amegashie, J. Atsu.
In: Discussion Papers.
RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp00-19.

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References

References cited by this document

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  5. Amegashie, J.A. (2000b). An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium. Economics Letters, forthcoming.

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  19. Green, A. and Green, D. (1996). The economic goals of Canadas immigration policy: past and present. RJIM, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Working paper series, 96-04.

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  21. Hillman, A.L., and Riley, J. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1: 17-39.

  22. Kooreman, P., and Schoonbeek, L. (1997). The specification of the probability functions in Tullocks rent-seeking contest. Economics Letters 56: 59-6 1.

  23. Myers, G.M., and Papageorgiou, Y. Y. (2000a). Immigration control and the welfare state. Journal of Public Economics 75: 183-207.

  24. Nitzan, 5. (1994). Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy 10: 41-60.

  25. Skarpedas, 5. (1996). Contest success functions. Economic Theory 7: 283-290.
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Cocites

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    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
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  2. Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests. (2022). Lu, Yuanzhu ; Zhou, Lixue ; Wang, Zhewei.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  3. Liquidity constraints and the formation of unbalanced contests. (2020). Grossmann, Martin ; Hottiger, Dieter.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:73:y:2020:i:c:s0167718720300813.

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  4. Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest. (2018). Mercier, Jean-François.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
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  5. Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology. (2017). Lu, Jingfeng ; Shen, BO ; Wang, Zhewei.
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  6. Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests. (2016). Wang, Zhewei ; Lu, Jingfeng.
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  7. A contest success function for rankings. (2016). Vesperoni, Alberto.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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  8. Accuracy in contests: players’ perspective. (2015). Yildirim, Mustafa.
    In: Review of Economic Design.
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  9. Axiomatizing Multi-Prize Nested Lottery Contests: A Complete and Strict Ranking Perspective. (2015). Wang, Zhewei ; Lu, Jingfeng.
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  10. Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation. (2015). Epstein, Gil ; Mealem, Yosef .
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  11. Axiomatizing multi-prize nested lottery contests: A complete and strict ranking perspective. (2015). Lu, Jingfeng ; Wang, Zhewei.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
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  12. Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments revisited. (2014). Kräkel, Matthias ; Krakel, Matthias.
    In: Economic Theory Bulletin.
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  13. Axiomatizing Multi-Prize Contests: A Perspective from Complete Ranking of Players. (2014). Lu, Jingfeng ; Wang, Zhewei.
    In: SDU Working Papers.
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  14. An elimination contest with non-sunk bids. (2014). Chiappinelli, Olga.
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  15. Incentives and selection in promotion contests: Is it possible to kill two birds with one stone?. (2014). Sunde, Uwe ; Stracke, Rudi ; Kerschbamer, Rudolf ; Hochtl, Wolfgang .
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  16. “Reverse” nested lottery contests. (2014). Wang, Zhewei ; Lu, Jingfeng ; Fu, Qiang.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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  17. Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions. (2014). Sela, Aner ; Segev, Ella .
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  18. Reverse Nested Lottery Contests. (2013). Wang, Zhewei ; Lu, Jingfeng.
    In: SDU Working Papers.
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  19. Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation. (2013). Epstein, Gil ; Mealem, Yosef .
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  20. Accuracy in Contests: Players Perspective. (2013). Yildirim, Mustafa.
    In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
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  21. On Elimination in Contests: A Perspective on Output Maximization. (2013). Jiao, Qian .
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  22. Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation. (2013). Epstein, Gil ; Mealem, Yosef .
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  23. Orchestrating Contests with Heterogeneous Participants. (2012). Stracke, Rudi.
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  24. Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking. (2012). Lu, Jingfeng ; Fu, Qiang.
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  25. The optimal multi-stage contest. (2012). Lu, Jingfeng ; Fu, Qiang.
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  26. How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking. (2012). Staal, Klaas ; Munster, Johannes.
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  27. Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions. (2012). Sela, Aner ; Segev, Ella .
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  28. MULTI-STAGE SEQUENTIAL ALL-PAY AUCTIONS. (2012). Sela, Aner ; Segev, Ella .
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  29. Foreclosure in contests. (2011). Sand, Jan ; Foros, Øystein ; Clark, Derek .
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  30. Endogenous Liquidity Constraints in a Dynamic Contest. (2011). Grossmann, Martin.
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  31. Political culture and discrimination in contests. (2011). Epstein, Gil ; Mealem, Yosef ; Nitzan, Shmuel.
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  36. The beauty of bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests. (2009). Lu, Jingfeng ; Fu, Qiang.
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  38. Unifying Contests: from Noisy Ranking to Ratio-Form Contest Success Functions. (2007). Lu, Jingfeng ; Fu, Qiang.
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  39. Unifying Contests: from Noisy Ranking to Ratio-Form Contest Success Functions. (2007). Lu, Jingfeng ; Fu, Qiang.
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  47. A political economy model of immigration quotas. (2000). Amegashie, J. Atsu.
    In: Discussion Papers.
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    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

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