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A note on optimal transfer schemes, stable coalition for environmental protection and joint maximization assumption. (). Osmani, Dritan.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:sgc:wpaper:176.

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  2. Balkovic and R. Skalsky (2008), The interdependencies between food and biofuel production in European agriculture - an application of EUFASOM, FNU-i65 (submitted) Schneider, U.A. and P. Smith (2008), Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation and Energy Intensities in Agriculture, FNU-i64 (submitted) Maddison, D. and K. Rehdanz (2008), Carbon Emissions and Economic Growth: Homogeneous Causality in Heterogeneous Panels, FNU- i63 (submitted) Osmani, D. and R.S.J. Tol (2008), Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND, FNU-i62 (submitted) Schneider U.A., P. Havlik, E. Schmid, I. Huck, M.

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  6. Berrittella, M., K. Rehdanz, R.S.J. Tol and J. Zhang (2007), The Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Water Use: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis, FNU-142 (submitted).

  7. Bosello, F., Buchner, B., and Carraro, C. (2003). Equity, development, and climate change control. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2-3):601--611.

  8. Bosello, F., Buchner, B., Carraro, C., and Raggi, D. (2004). Can equity enhance efficiency: Some lessons from climate negotiations. in C. Carraro and V. Fragnelli (Eds.), Game practice and the environment, Cheltenham, UK, Elgar, pages 37-64.

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  10. Botteon, M. and Carraro, C. (2001). Environmental coalitions with heterogeneous countries: Burden-sharing and carbon leakage. in A. Ulph ed., Environmental Policy, International Agreements, and International Trade, Oxford, 0. U.P. Carraro, C., Eyckmans, J., and Finus, M. (2006). Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements. Review of International Organization, 1 :379-396.

  11. Carraro, C. and Siniscalco, D. (1993). Strategies for the international protection of the environment. Journal of Public Economics, 52(3) :309-328.

  12. Carraro, C. and Siniscalco, D. (2001). Transfers, commitments and issue linkage in international environmental negotiations. in A. Ulph (Ed.), Environmental policy, international agreements and international trade, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pages 19-37.

  13. Chander, P. (2007). The gamma-core and coalition formation. International Journal of Game Theory, 35(4) :379-401.

  14. Chander, P. and Tulkens, H. (1995). A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreemnets on transfrontier pollution. International Tax and Public Finance, 2:279-293.

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  16. Chander, P. and Tulkens, H. (2006). Self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: A conceptual discussion. Working Papers FEEM, 34.

  17. Cowie, A., U.A. Schneider and L. Montanarella (2006), Potential synergies between existing multilateral environmental agreements in the implementation of Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry activities, FNU-123 (submitted) Kuik, O.J., B. Buchner, M. Catenacci, A. Goria, E. Karakaya and R.S.J. Tol (2006), Methodological Aspects of Recent Climate Change Damage Cost Studies, FNU-122 (submitted, Climate Policy) Anthoff, D., C. Hepburn and R.S.J. Tol (2006), Equity Weighting and the Marginal Damage Costs of Climate Change, FNU-121 (submitted) Tol, R.S.J. (2006), The Impact of a Carbon Tax on International Tourism, FNU-120 (Transportation Research D: Transport and the Environment, 12 (2), 129-142).

  18. d'Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, J., Gabszeweiz, J., and Weymark, J. A. (1983). On the stability of collusive price leadership. Canadian Journal of Economics, 16:17-25.

  19. de Bruin, K.C., RB. Dellink and R.S.J. Tol (2007), AD-DICE: An Implementation of Adaptation in the DICE Model, FNU-126 (submitted, Climatic Change).

  20. Eyckmans, J. and Finus, M. (2004). An almost ideal sharing scheme for coalition games with externalities. CLIMNEG Working Paper Nr. 62. Leuven, Belgium: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.

  21. Eyckmans, J. and Tulkens, H. (2003). Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem. Resource and Energy Economics, 25:299-327.

  22. Finus, M. (2004). Stability and design of international environmental agreements: The case of global and transboundary pollution. Folmer, H. and T. Tietenberg eds., International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 2003/200~, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pages 82-i 58.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  23. Finus, M., van E. lerland, and Dellink, R. (2006). Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game. Economics of Governance, 7:271-291.

  24. Hammitt, J. K., Lempert, R. J., and Schlesinger, M. E. (1992). A sequential-decision strategy for abating climate change. Nature, 357:315-318.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  25. Hoel, M. and Schneider, K. (1997). Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement. Environmental and Resource Economics, 9:153-170.

  26. Jeppesen, T. and Andersen, P. (1998). Commitment and fairness in environmental games. Hanley, N, Folmer. H. eds., Game Theory and the Environment. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pages 6583.

  27. Ju, Y., Borm, P., and Ruys, P. H. M. (2004). The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games. CentER Discussion Paper 50, Tilburg University.

  28. Keller, K., LI. Miltich, A. Robinson and R.S.J. Tol (2007), How Overconfident Are Current Projections of Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide Emissions?, FNU-124 (submitted, Energy Journal).

  29. Lau, MA. (2006), An analysis of the travel motivation of tourists from the Peoples Republic of China, FNU-108 (submitted). Lau, MA. and R.S.J. Tol (2006), The Chinese are coming An analysis of the preferences of Chinese holiday makers at home and abroad, FNU-107 (submitted, Tourism Management).

  30. Leggett, J., Pepper, W. J., and Swart, R. (1992). Emissions scenarios for the ipcc: An update, in climate change 1992. in Climate Change 1992: The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment, 1 edn, vol. 1 J. T. Houghton, B. A. Callander, S. K. Varney, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  31. Link, P. M. and Tol, R. S. J. (2004). Possible economic impacts of a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation: an application of fund. Portuguese Economic Journal, 3:99-114.

  32. Link, P.M. and Tol, R.S.J. (2006), Economic impacts on key Barents Sea fisheries arising from changes in the strength of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation, FNU-104 (submitted).

  33. Link, P.M. and Tol, R.S.J. (2006), The Economic Impact of a Shutdown of the Thermohaline Circulation: An Application of FUND, FNU-103 (submitted).

  34. Lyons, S., K. Mayor and R.S.J. Tol (2007), Convergence of Consumption Patterns during Macroeconomic Transition: A Model of Demand in Ireland and the OECD, FNU-141 (submitted).

  35. Maier-Reimer, E. and Hasselmann, K. (1987). Transport and storage of carbon dioxide in the ocean: an inorganic ocean circulation carbon cycle model. Climate Dynamics, 2:63-90.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  36. McGinty, M. (2007). International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations. Oxford Economic Papers, 59:45-62.

  37. Nash, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18(2):i55-162.

  38. Obersteiner, T. Sauer, C. Llull, R. Skalsky, J. Balkovic, S. Fritz, B. Dorm, and S. Leduc (2008), Global interdependencies between population, water, food, and environmental policies, FNU-i6i (submitted) Calzadilla, A, K. Rehdanz and R.S.J. Tol (2008), Water Scarcity and the Impact of Improved Irrigation Management: A CGE Analysis, FNU-i60 (submitted) Schleupner, C. and U.A. Schneider (2008), A cost-effective spatial wetland site-selection model for European biotope restoration, FNU-i59 (submitted) Schleupner, C. and U.A. Schneider (2008), Evaluation of European wetland restoration potentials by considering economic costs under different policy options, FNU-i58 (submitted) Bigano, A., J.M. Hamilton and R.S.J. Tol (2008), Climate Change and Tourism in the Mediterranean, FNU-i57 (submitted).

  39. Osmani, D. and R.S.J. Tol (2007), A short note on joint welfare maximization assumption, FNU- 150 (submitted).

  40. Osmani, D. and R.S.J. Tol (2007), Towards Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements: Part Two, Hamburg University and Centre for Atmospheric Science, Hamburg, FNU149 (submitted).

  41. Osmani, D. and Tol, R. S. J. (2005). The case of two self-enforcing international environmental agreements for environmental protection. FNU-82.

  42. Rckmann, C., R.S.J. Tol, U.A. Schneider, and MA. St.John (2006), Rebuilding the Eastern Baltic cod stock under environmental change - Part II: The economic viability of a marine protected area. FNU-106 (submitted) Ronneberger, K., M. Berrittella, F. Bosello and R.S.J. Tol (2006), KLUM@GTAP: Introducing biophysical aspects of land-use decisions into a general equilibrium model. A coupling experiment, FNU- 105 (submitted).

  43. Rehdanz, K (2002), Hedonic Pricing of Climate Change Impacts to Households in Great Britain, FNU-13 (Climatic Change 74).

  44. Rehdanz, K. (2007), Species diversity and human well-being: A spatial econometric approach, FNU- 151 (submitted).

  45. Ronneberger, K., L. Criscuolo, W. Knorr and R.S.J. Tol (2006), KLUM@LPJ: Integrating dynamic land-use decisions into a dynamic global vegetation and crop growth model to assess the impacts of a changing climate. A feasibility study for Europe, FNU- 113 (submitted) Schwoon, M. (2006), Learning-by-doing, Learning Spillovers and the Diffusion of Fuel Cell Vehicles, FNU-112 (submitted). Strzepek, KM., G.W. Yohe, R.S.J. Tol and M. Rosegrant (2006), The Value of the High Aswan Dam to the Egyptian Economy, FNU-111 (submitted, Ecological Economics).

  46. Ruane, F.P. and R.S.J. Tol (2007), Academic Quality, Power and Stability: An Application to Economics in the Republic of Ireland, FNU-148 (submitted).

  47. Rubio, J. S. and Ulph, U. (2006). Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited. Oxford Economic Papers, 58:223-263.

  48. Schleupner, C. (2007), Regional Spatial Planning Assessments for Adaptation to accelerated sea level rise an application to Martiniques coastal zone. FNU-153 (submitted).

  49. Schleupner, C. (2007). Evaluating the Regional Coastal Impact Potential to Erosion and Inundation caused by Extreme Weather Events and Tsunamis. FNU-152 (submitted).

  50. Schneider U.A., J. Balkovic, S. De Cara, 0. Franklin, S. Fritz, P. Havlik, I. Huck, K. Jantke, A.M.I. Kallio, F. Kraxner, A. Moiseyev, M. Obersteiner, CI. Ramos, C. Schleupner, E. Schmid, D. Schwab, R. Skalsky (2008), The European Forest and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model EUFASOM, FNU-156.

  51. Schneider, U.A. and BA. McCarl (2003), Implications of a Carbon Based Energy Tax for U.S. Agriculture, FNU-17 (submitted).

  52. Schneider, U.A. and P. Kumar (2008), Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation through Agriculture, FNU-155.

  53. Schwoon, M. (2006), A Tool to Optimize the Initial Distribution of Hydrogen Filling Stations, FNU-110 (Transportation Research D: Transport and the Environment, 12 (2), 70-82).

  54. Sesabo, J.K, H. Lang and R.S.J. Tol (2006), Perceived Attitude and Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) establishment: Why households characteristics matters in Coastal resources conservation initiatives in Tanzania, FNU-99 (submitted).

  55. Shapley, L. (1953). A value for n-person games. in Kuhn, H., Tucker, A. W. eds., Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  56. Tol, R. S. J. (1999a). Kyoto, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness. An Application of FUND. Energy Journal Special Issue on the Costs of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation, 130-156.

  57. Tol, R. S. J. (1999b). Spatial and temporal efficiency in climate change. An Application of FUND. Environmental and Resource Economics, 58(i):33-49. Tol, R. S. J. (200i). Equitable cost-benefit analysis of climate change. Ecological Economics, 36(i):7i-85.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  58. Tol, R. S. J. (2002a). Estimates of the damage costs of climate change - part i: Benchmark estimates. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2i:47-73.

  59. Tol, R. S. J. (2002b). Estimates of the damage costs of climate change - part 2: Benchmark estimates. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2i:i35-i60.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  60. Tol, R. S. J. (2002c). Welfare specifications and optimal control of climate change. An Application of FUND. Energy Economics, 24:367-376.

  61. Tol, R. S. J. (2006). Multi-gas emission reduction for climate change policy. An Application of FUND. Energy Journal, in Volume: Multi-Greenhouse Gas Mitigation and Climate Policy: Special Issue 3.

  62. Tol, R.S.J. (2000), How Large is the Uncertainty about Climate Change?, FNU-3 (Climatic Change, 56 (3), 265-289).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  63. Tol, R.S.J. (2002), Climate, Development, and Malaria: An Application of FUND, FNU-16 (forthcoming, Climatic Change). Hamilton, J.M. (2003), Climate and the Destination Choice of German Tourists, FNU-15 (revised and submitted).

  64. Tol, R.S.J. (2002), Emission Abatement Versus Development As Strategies To Reduce Vulnerability To Climate Change: An Application Of FUND, FNU-12 (Environment and Development Economics, 10, 615-629).

  65. Tol, R.S.J. (2002), Technology Protocols for Climate Change: An Application of FUND, FNU14 (Climate Policy, 4, 269-287).

  66. Tol, R.S.J. (2006), Carbon Dioxide Emission Scenarios for the USA, FNU-101 (forthcoming, Energy Policy).

  67. Tol, R.S.J. (2006), Integrated Assessment Modelling, FNU-102 (submitted).

  68. Tol, R.S.J. (2007), A Rational, Successive g-Index Applied to Economics Departments in Ireland, FNU-147 (submitted).

  69. Tol, R.S.J. (2007), Of the h-Index and its Alternatives: An Application to the 100 Most Prolific Economists, FNU-146 (submitted).

  70. Tol, R.S.J. (2007), The Matthew Effect Defined and Tested for the 100 Most Prolific Economists, FNU- 143 (submitted).

  71. Tol, R.S.J. (2007), The Social Cost of Carbon: Trends, Outliers and Catastrophes, FNU-144 (submitted).

  72. Tol, R.S.J. and G.W. Yohe (2007), The Stern Review: A Deconstruction, FNU-125 (submitted).

  73. Tol, R.S.J., K.L. Ebi and G.W. Yohe (2006), Infectious Disease, Development, and Climate Change: A Scenario Analysis, FNU-109 (forthcoming, Environment and Development Economics).

  74. Tol, R.S.J., S. Fankhauser, R.G. Richels and J.B. Smith (2000), How Much Damage Will Climate Change Do? Recent Estimates, FNU-2 (World Economics, 1 (4), 179-206) Use, W. and R.SJ. Tol (2000), Impact of Climate on `Iburism Demand, FNU-1 (Climatic Change, 55 (4), 429-449).

  75. Tol, R.S.J.and Verheyen, R. (2001), Liability and Compensation for Climate Change Damages A Legal and Economic Assessment, FNU-9 (Energy Policy, 32 (9), 1109-1130).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  76. Weikart, H-P., Finus, M., and Altamirano-Cabrera, J. C. (2006). The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate coalitions. Oxford Economic Papers, 58(2):209-232.

  77. Yohe, G. and R.S.J. Tol (2001), Indicators for Social and Economic Coping Capacity Moving Toward a Working Definition of Adaptive Capacity, FNU-8 (Global Environmental Change, 12 (1), 25-40).

  78. Yohe, G.W. and R.S.J. Tol (2007), Precaution and a Dismal Theorem: Implications for Climate Policy and Climate Research, FNU- 145 (submitted).

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