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Discovery and Equilibrium in Games with Unawareness. (2018). Schipper, Burkhard.
In: MPRA Paper.
RePEc:pra:mprapa:86300.

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  1. Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games with Unawareness. (2019). Schipper, Burkhard ; Heifetz, Aviad ; Meier, Martin.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cda:wpaper:332.

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References

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  2. Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning. (2014). Schipper, Burkhard ; Woo, Hee Yeul.
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  3. Periodic strategies and rationalizability in perfect information 2-Player strategic form games. (2013). Oikonomou, Vasilis ; Jost, J.
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  4. The Logic of Backward Induction. (2013). Aumann, Robert ; Arieli, Itai .
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  5. Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior. (2013). Schipper, Burkhard ; Heifetz, Aviad ; Meier, Martin.
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  6. Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition. (2012). Schipper, Burkhard ; Woo, Hee Yeul.
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  7. Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games. (2011). Schipper, Burkhard ; Heifetz, Aviad ; Meier, Martin.
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  8. Strategies and interactive beliefs in dynamic games. (2011). Samet, Dov ; Di Tillio, Alfredo ; Battigalli, Pierpaolo.
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  9. An algorithm for proper rationalizability. (2011). Perea, Andres.
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  10. On the beliefs off the path: Equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k. (2010). Zizzo, Daniel ; Tan, Jonathan ; Breitmoser, Yves ; Jonathan H. W. Tan, .
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  12. On the Beliefs off the Path: Equilibrium Refinement due to Quantal Response and Level-k*. (2010). Zizzo, Daniel ; Tan, Jonathan ; Breitmoser, Yves ; Jonathan H. W. Tan, .
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  13. Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior. (2009). Schipper, Burkhard ; Meier, Martin ; Heifetz, Aviad.
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  14. Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior. (2009). Schipper, Burkhard ; Heifetz, Aviad ; Meier, Martin.
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  15. Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information. (2008). Penta, Antonio ; Grillo, Edoardo ; Di Tillio, Alfredo ; Battigalli, Pierpaolo.
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