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Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium. (2012). Mezzetti, Claudio ; Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, .
In: Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1146.

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Cited: 22

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Cites: 20

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Cocites: 50

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  1. Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information. (2022). Lombardi, Michele ; Jain, Ritesh.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:99:y:2022:i:c:s0304406821001610.

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  2. Nash implementation by stochastic mechanisms: a simple full characterization. (2022). Xiong, Siyang.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2211.05431.

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  3. Implementation with farsighted agents. (2021). Lombardi, Michele ; Korpela, Ville ; Vartiainen, Hannu.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp140.

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  4. Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions. (2021). Yi, Jianxin.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:91:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-020-09790-0.

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  5. A solution to the two-person implementation problem. (2021). Nuñez, Matias ; Laslier, Jean-François ; Sanver, Remzi M.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03498370.

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  6. A solution to the two-person implementation problem. (2021). Nuñez, Matias ; Laslier, Jean-François ; Sanver, Remzi M ; Nuez, Matias.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:194:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000788.

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  7. Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures. (2021). Korpela, Ville ; Lombardi, Michele ; Vartiainen, Hannu.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:128:y:2021:i:c:p:202-212.

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  8. Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences. (2021). Jain, Ritesh.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:47-66.

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  9. Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs. (2020). Tercieux, Olivier ; Takahashi, Satoru.
    In: PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint).
    RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02875199.

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  10. Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs. (2020). Tercieux, Olivier ; Takahashi, Satoru.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02875199.

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  11. Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs. (2020). Tercieux, Olivier ; Takahashi, Satoru.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0022053118302758.

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  12. Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions. (2020). Kunimoto, Takashi ; Saran, Rene ; Serrano, Roberto.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2020-23.

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  13. Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences. (2019). Jain, Ritesh.
    In: IEAS Working Paper : academic research.
    RePEc:sin:wpaper:19-a002.

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  14. Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms: Complete information. (2019). Lombardi, Michele ; Jain, Ritesh.
    In: IEAS Working Paper : academic research.
    RePEc:sin:wpaper:19-a001.

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  15. Implementation with foresighted agents. (2019). Vartiainen, Hannu ; Lombardi, Michele ; Korpela, Ville.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:102496.

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  16. Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences. (2019). Serrano, Roberto ; Kunimoto, Takashi.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:44:y:2019:i:4:p:1326-1344.

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  17. A solution to the two-person implementation problem. (2019). Laslier, Jean-François ; Sanver, Remzi M ; Nunez, Matias.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02173504.

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  18. A solution to the two-person implementation problem. (2019). Nuñez, Matias ; Laslier, Jean-François ; Sanver, Remzi M ; Nunez, Matias.
    In: PSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-02173504.

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  19. Bayesian implementation with verifiable information. (2019). Peralta, Esteban.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:116:y:2019:i:c:p:65-72.

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  20. Repeated Nash implementation. (2017). Mezzetti, Claudio ; Renou, Ludovic.
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:1988.

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  21. Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information. (2016). Saran, Rene.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:165:y:2016:i:c:p:517-564.

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  22. Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences. (2016). Serrano, Roberto ; Kunimoto, Takashi.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bro:econwp:2016-4.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Abreu Dilip and Hitoshi Matsushima, 1992, âVirtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information,âEconometrica, 60, pp. 993-1008.

  2. Aumann Robert J. and Adam Brandenburger, 1995, âEpistemic Condition for Nash Equilibrium, âEconometrica, 64, pp. 1161-1180.
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  3. Barbera Salvador, Anna Bogomolnaia, and Hans van der Stel, 1998, âStrategy-proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers,â Mathematical Social Sciences, 35, pp. 89-103.

  4. Bergemann Dirk, Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux, 2011, âRationalizable Implementation, âJournal of Economic Theory, 146, pp. 1253-1274.

  5. Bochet Olivier and FranÃois Maniquet, 2010, âVirtual Nash Implementation with Admissible Support,âJournal of Mathematical Economics, 46, pp. 99-108.

  6. Bochet Olivier, 2007, âNash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms,âSocial Choice and Welfare, 28, pp. 111-125.

  7. Cabrales Antonio and Roberto Serrano, 2011, âImplementation in Adaptive BetterResponse Dynamics: Towards a General Theory of Bounded Rationality in Mechanisms,â Games and Economic Behavior, 73, pp. 360-374.

  8. Camerer Colin, 2003, âBehavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction,â Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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  9. Danilov Vladimir, 1992, âImplementation via Nash Equilibria,â Econometrica, 60, pp. 43-56.

  10. Dutta Bhaskar and Arunava Sen, 1991, âA Necessary and Su cient Condition for TwoPerson Nash Implementation,âReview of Economic Studies, 58, pp. 121-28.

  11. Gibbard Allan, 1977, âManipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance,â Econometrica, 45, pp. 665-681.

  12. Harsanyi John C., 1973, âGames with Randomly Disturbed Payos: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points,âInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2, pp. 1-23.
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  13. Maskin Eric and Tomas SjÃstrÃm, 2002, âImplementation Theory,âin Amartya Sen and Kotaro Suzumura (eds), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 1, Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 237-288.
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  14. Maskin Eric, 1999, âNash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,âReview of Economic Studies, 66, pp. 23-38.

  15. Matsushima Hitoshi, 1998, âA New Approach to the Implementation Problem,âJournal of Economic Theory, 45, pp. 128-144.

  16. Moore John and Rafael Repullo, 1990, âNash Implementation: A Full Characterization,â Econometrica, 58, pp. 1083â1099.

  17. Sanver M. Remzi, 2006, âNash Implementing Non-Monotonic Social Choice Rules by Awards,âEconomic Theory, 28, pp. 453-460.

  18. Serrano Roberto and Rajiv Vohra, 2010, âMultiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: a Uniâed Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation,âJournal of Mathematical Economics, 46, pp. 775-785.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  19. SjÃstrÃm Tomas, 1991, âOn the Necessary and Su cient Conditions for Nash Implementation, âSocial Choice and Welfare, 8, pp. 333-340.
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  20. Vartiainen Hannu, 2007, âSubgame Perfect Implementation of Voting Rules via Randomized Mechanisms,âSocial Choice and Welfare, 29, pp. 353-367.

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  2. Full implementation in backward induction. (2015). Chen, Yi-Chun ; Sun, Yifei.
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  11. Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules. (2013). Kawasaki, Ryo ; Yamamura, Hirofumi.
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