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Why Punish: Social Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Prosocial Norms. (2003). Matthews, Peter ; Carpenter, Jeffrey ; Okomboli Ong'ong'a, .
In: Middlebury College Working Paper Series.
RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0213r.

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Cocites: 50

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  1. How is Labor Distinct From Broccoli? Some Unique Characteristics of Labor and Their Importance for Economic Analysis and Policy. (2003). Prasch, Robert .
    In: Middlebury College Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:03-30.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Acheson J (1988) The lobster gangs of Maine. Hanover, University Press of New England Anderson C, Putterman L (2003) Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. Brown University Department of Economics Working Paper 2003- 15 Axelrod R (1984) An evolutionary approach to norms. American Political Science Review 80: 1095-1111 Binmore K, Samuelson L (1994) An economists perspective on the evolution of norms. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150(1): 45-63 Binmore K, Samuelson L (1999) Evolutionary drift and equilibrium selection.

  2. American Economic Review 93(1): 366-380 Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Ostrom E, Gardner R, Walker J (1994) Rules, games and common-pool resources.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  3. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper, University of Zurich Fehr E, Gaechter 5 (2000) Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review 90(4): 980-994 Gintis H (2000) Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Journal of Theoretical Biology 206: 169-179 Gintis H, Bowles 5, Boyd R, Fehr E (2003) Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. Evolution and Human Behavior 24: 153-172 Gueth W, Kliemt H (1993) Competition or cooperation: On the evolutionary economics of trust, exploitation, and moral attitudes. Metroeconomica 45: 155-187 Isaac R M, Walker J, Thomas 5 (1984) Divergent evidence on free-riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations. Public Choice 43(1): 113-149 Latane B, Darley J (1970) The unresponsive bystander: Why doesnt he help? New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts Masclet D, Noussair C, Tucker 5, Villeval M-C (2003) Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism.

Cocites

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    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
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  2. Large Population Limits for Evolutionary Dynamics with Random Matching. (2012). Molzon, Robert .
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  3. On the Existence and Stability of Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching with Fairness. (2012). Dai, Darong .
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  4. Learning Nash Equilibria. (2012). Dai, Darong .
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  5. Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests. (2011). De Jaegher, Kris ; van Rooij, Robert .
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  6. Why learning doesn’t add up: equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules. (2011). Golman, Russell.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
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  7. The Exact Law of Large Numbers for Independent Random Matching. (2011). Sun, Yeneng ; Duffie, Darrell.
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  8. Strictly Dominated Strategies in the Replicator-Mutator Dynamics. (2011). Izquierdo, Luis.
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  9. On a General class of stochastic co-evolutionary dynamics. (2010). Staudigl, Mathias.
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  10. Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules. (2010). Page, Scott ; Golman, Russell.
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  11. Unobserved punishment supports cooperation. (2010). Pathak, Parag ; Fudenberg, Drew.
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  12. Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability. (2009). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Herold, Florian .
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  13. Chaos in the cobweb model with a new learning dynamic. (2009). Waters, George.
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  14. Doubts and Equilibria. (2008). Jose Ramon Uriarte Ayo, .
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  15. Drift and equilibrium selection with human and computer players. (2008). Caminati, Mauro.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
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  16. Doubts and equilibria. (2008). Uriarte, José ; Cabrales, Antonio.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
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  17. Drift and Equilibrium Selection with Human and Computer Players. (2007). Ricciuti, Roberto ; Innocenti, Alessandro ; Caminati, Mauro.
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  18. Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs. (2007). Sandholm, William ; Hofbauer, Josef.
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  19. Information and endogenous first mover advantages in the ultimatum game: An evolutionary approach. (2007). Poulsen, Anders.
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  20. A behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift. (2007). Uriarte, José.
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  22. Drift effect under timing without observability: Experimental evidence. (2006). Ricciuti, Roberto ; Innocenti, Alessandro ; Caminati, Mauro.
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  23. Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences. (2005). Svendsen, Gert ; Poulsen, Anders.
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  24. Choosing Opponents in Prisoners Dilemma: An Evolutionary Analysis. (2005). Engseld, Peter ; Bergh, Andreas.
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  25. Natural selection and social preferences. (2005). Weibull, Jörgen ; Salomonsson, Marcus.
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  26. A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift. (2005). Jose Ramon Uriarte Ayo, .
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  27. Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics. (2005). Sandholm, William.
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  28. Learning in perturbed asymmetric games. (2005). Hopkins, Ed ; Hofbauer, Josef.
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  29. Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups. (2004). Singh, Nirvikar ; Friedman, Daniel.
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  40. Social Reciprocity. (2002). Matthews, Peter ; Carpenter, Jeffrey.
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  47. Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs. (2001). Sandholm, William ; Hofbauer, Josef.
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  48. Continuous-time evolutionary dynamics: theory and practice. (2000). Ponti, Giovanni.
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  50. Markov evolution with inexact information. (1999). Sandholm, William.
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