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Voter Motivation and the Quality of Democratic Choice. (2016). Tyran, Jean-Robert ; Mechtenberg, Lydia.
In: Discussion Papers.
RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1613.

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Cited: 5

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Cites: 50

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Cocites: 50

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  1. Participation of charity beneficiaries. (2022). Grieco, Daniela ; Bripi, Francesco.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:199:y:2022:i:c:p:1-17.

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  2. Individual Competence and Committee Decision Making: Experimental Evidence. (2020). McCannon, Bryan ; Walker, Paul.
    In: Southern Economic Journal.
    RePEc:wly:soecon:v:86:y:2020:i:4:p:1531-1558.

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  3. The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting. (2019). Morton, Rebecca ; Tyran, Jean-Robert ; Piovesan, Marco.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:461-481.

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  4. Institutional Choice and Cooperation in Representative Democracies: An Experimental Approach. (2017). Schories, Fanny.
    In: ILE Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:zbw:ilewps:9.

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  5. Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence. (2017). Duffy, John ; Bhattacharya, Sourav ; Kim, Suntak .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:316-338.

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References

References cited by this document

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