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The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems. (1998). Winer, Stanley ; Hettich, Walter ; Warskett, George .
In: International Tax and Public Finance.
RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:5:y:1998:i:2:p:123-151.

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Cited: 19

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Cites: 33

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations

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  1. The influence of generalized and arbitrary institutional inefficiencies on the ownership decision in cross-border acquisitions. (2021). Li, Dan ; Ferreira, Manuel Portugal ; Falaster, Christian.
    In: Journal of International Business Studies.
    RePEc:pal:jintbs:v:52:y:2021:i:9:d:10.1057_s41267-021-00434-1.

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  2. The role of tax system complexity on foreign direct investment allocation. (2020). Rizzo, Leonzio ; Esteller -Mor, Alejandro ; Secomandi, Riccardo ; Esteller-Mor, Alejandro .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:udf:wpaper:2020029.

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  3. .

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  5. The Political Economy of Taxation in Europe. (2017). Profeta, Paola ; Scabrosetti, Simona.
    In: Hacienda Pública Española.
    RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2017:v:220:i:1:p:139-172.

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  6. Tax differentiation, lobbying, and welfare. (2014). Colombo, Luca ; Brusco, Sandro ; Galmarini, Umberto.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:42:y:2014:i:4:p:977-1006.

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  7. On the political economics of tax reforms: survey and empirical assessment. (2012). Profeta, Paola ; Nicodème, Gaëtan ; Castanheira, Micael ; Nicodeme, Gaetan.
    In: International Tax and Public Finance.
    RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:19:y:2012:i:4:p:598-624.

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  8. On the Political Economics of Tax Reforms. (2011). Profeta, Paola ; Nicodème, Gaëtan ; Castanheira, Micael ; Gaetan J. A. Nicodeme, ; Gaetan J. A. Nicodeme, .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3538.

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  9. A Duopoly Model of Political Agency with Applications to Anti-Corruption Reform. (2009). Evrenk, Haldun.
    In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:40.

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  10. Mackerels in the Moonlight: A Duopoly Model of Political Agency. (2008). Evrenk, Haldun.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-4.

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  11. State-Local Revenue Diversification, Stability, and Growth: Time Series Evidence. (2005). Schunk, Donald ; Porca, Sanela .
    In: The Review of Regional Studies.
    RePEc:rre:publsh:v:35:y:2005:i:3:p:246-65.

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  12. The Effect of Sales Tax Rates on Food Exemptions. (2004). Agostini, Claudio.
    In: ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers.
    RePEc:ila:ilades:inv155.

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  13. The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters. (2004). Winer, Stanley ; Hettich, Walter .
    In: Carleton Economic Papers.
    RePEc:car:carecp:02-11.

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  14. Incentive Targeting, Influence Peddling, and Foreign Direct Investment. (2000). Valev, Neven ; Mudd, Shannon ; Edmiston, Kelly.
    In: International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU.
    RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0007.

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  15. Political and institutional determinants of the tax mix : an empirical investigation for OECD countries. (1999). Volkerink, Bjrn ; de Haan, Jakob.
    In: Research Report.
    RePEc:gro:rugsom:99e05.

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  16. What Is Missed If We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation. (1998). Hettich, Walter .
    In: National Tax Journal.
    RePEc:ntj:journl:v:51:y:1998:i:n._2:p:373-89.

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  17. What Is Missed if We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation. (1998). Winer, Stanley ; Hettich, Walter .
    In: National Tax Journal.
    RePEc:ntj:journl:v:51:y:1998:i:2:p:373-89.

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  18. The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case. (1998). Sole, A..
    In: Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:bar:bedcje:199841.

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References

References cited by this document

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  4. The Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods. (2014). Dotti, Valerio.
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  6. The Influence of Special Interests and Party Activists on Electoral Competition. (2012). Martineau, Nicolas-Guillaume.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
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  7. The Influence of Special Interests and Party Activists on Electoral Competition. (2012). Martineau, Nicolas-Guillaume.
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  8. Campaign allocations under probabilistic voting. (2011). Slutsky, Steven ; Fletcher, Deborah .
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  9. Bad Government Can Be Good Politics: Political Reputation, Negative Campaigning, and Strategic Shirking. (2010). Fletcher, Deborah ; Slutsky, Steven .
    In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
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  10. Centrists Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints. (2008). Ergun, Selim.
    In: ThE Papers.
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  11. Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters. (2007). Patty, John .
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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  12. Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections. (2007). Franck, Raphael ; Epstein, Gil.
    In: Public Choice.
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  13. Generic Difference of Expected Vote Share and Probability of Victory Maximization in Simple Plurality Elections with Probabilistic Voters. (2005). Patty, John W..
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  14. Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models. (2005). Patty, John Wiggs.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  15. How to gerrymander: A formal analysis. (1998). Sherstyuk, Katerina.
    In: Public Choice.
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  16. The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems. (1998). Winer, Stanley ; Hettich, Walter ; Warskett, George .
    In: International Tax and Public Finance.
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  17. The spatial theory of elections: an analysis of voters predictive dimensions and recovery of the underlying issue space. (1994). Tanner, Thomas Cole.
    In: ISU General Staff Papers.
    RePEc:isu:genstf:1994010108000018174.

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  18. A general probabilistic spatial theory of elections. (1989). Hinich, Melvin ; Enelow, James .
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:61:y:1989:i:2:p:101-113.

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  19. Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies. (1984). Samuelson, Larry.
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  20. Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking. (1982). Koford, Kenneth .
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  21. Voter preferences, simple electoral games, and equilibria in two-candidate contests. (1981). Dutter, Lee .
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  22. Dynamic models of the voters decision calculus: Incorporating retrospective considerations into rational-choice models of individual voting behavior. (1979). Zechman, Martin .
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