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Market Discipline and Contracts: Theory, Empiric Analysis, Law. (2008). Radygin, Alexander ; Entov, Revold ; Apevalova, Elena ; Alexandr, Radygin.
In: Research Paper Series.
RePEc:gai:rpaper:94.

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