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Economizing the Uneconomic: Markets for Reliable, Sustainable, and Price Efficient Electricity. (2021). Teneketzis, Demosthenis ; Rasouli, Mohammad.
In: Sustainability.
RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:8:p:4197-:d:533014.

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  46. Toward Natural Implementation.. (1996). Saijo, Tatsuyoshi ; Yamato, Takehiko ; Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu.
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  49. Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism. (1991). Tian, Guoqiang.
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