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Learning and self-confirming long-run biases. (2019). Lanzani, G ; Francetich, A ; Battigalli, P ; Marinacci, M.
In: Journal of Economic Theory.
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:183:y:2019:i:c:p:740-785.

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Cited: 7

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Cites: 37

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Cocites: 24

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Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games. (2023). Battigalli, Pierpaolo ; Pin, Paolo ; Panebianco, Fabrizio.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:212:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000960.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Biased learning under ambiguous information. (2022). Chen, Jaden Yang.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:203:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000825.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Institutional investor’ proportions and inactive trading. (2022). Liu, Shancun ; Wang, Jiarui ; Yang, Haijun.
    In: International Review of Financial Analysis.
    RePEc:eee:finana:v:82:y:2022:i:c:s1057521922001685.

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  4. Cultural transmission with incomplete information. (2021). Panebianco, Fabrizio ; della Lena, Sebastiano.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:198:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121001903.

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  5. Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium. (2021). He, Kevin ; Fudenberg, Drew.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:194:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000557.

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  6. Model Uncertainty in Climate Change Economics: A Review and Proposed Framework for Future Research. (2020). Marinacci, Massimo ; Berger, Loïc.
    In: Environmental & Resource Economics.
    RePEc:kap:enreec:v:77:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s10640-020-00503-3.

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  7. Learning what they think vs. learning what they do: The micro-foundations of vicarious learning. (2020). Puranam, Phanish ; Park, Sanghyun.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2007.15264.

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References

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  2. Is Experimentation Invariant to Group Size? A Laboratory Analysis of Innovation Contests. (2021). Hudja, Stanton.
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  3. Robust Experimentation in the Continuous Time Bandit Problem. (2021). Pourbabaee, Farzad.
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  4. Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion. (2020). Wakker, Peter ; Turmunkh, Uyanga ; Li, Chen.
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  5. Cultural Transmission with Incomplete Information: Parental Perceived Efficacy and Group Misrepresentation. (2019). Panebianco, Fabrizio ; della Lena, Sebastiano.
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  6. The K-armed bandit problem with multiple priors. (2019). Li, Jian.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:80:y:2019:i:c:p:22-38.

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  7. Learning and self-confirming long-run biases. (2019). Lanzani, G ; Francetich, A ; Battigalli, P ; Marinacci, M.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:183:y:2019:i:c:p:740-785.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games. (2019). Battigalli, Pierpaolo ; Lanzani, G ; Catonini, E ; Marinacci, M.
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  9. 1. (2019). .
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  10. Market timing under public and private information. (2019). Rud, Olga ; Sharifova, Manizha ; Horowitz, John ; Chernulich, Aleksei ; Rabanal, Jean Paul.
    In: Working Papers.
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  11. Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players. (2018). Mukerji, Sujoy ; Klibanoff, Peter ; Hanany, Eran.
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  12. Bandits in the Lab. (2018). Klein, Nicolas ; Hoelzemann, Johannes.
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  13. Decision irrationalities involving deadly risks. (2018). Viscusi, W ; Deangelis, Scott.
    In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.
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  14. Beliefs, Plans, and Perceived Intentions in Dynamic Games. (2018). Battigalli, Pierpaolo ; de Vito, Nicodemo.
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  15. Capacity expansion under uncertainty in an oligopoly using indirect reinforcement-learning. (2018). Oliveira, Fernando S ; Manuel, .
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  16. Response functions. (2017). Oyarzun, Carlos ; Nguyen, Hien ; Sanjurjo, Adam .
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  17. Paralyzed by Fear: Rigid and Discrete Pricing under Demand Uncertainty. (2016). Vincent, Nicolas ; Valchev, Rosen ; Ilut, Cosmin.
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  18. Paralyzed by Fear: Rigid and Discrete Pricing under Demand Uncertainty. (2016). Valchev, Rosen ; Ilut, Cosmin ; Vincent, Nicolas.
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  19. The Benefits of Forced Experimentation: Striking Evidence from the London Underground Network. (2015). Willems, Tim ; Rauch, Ferdinand ; Larcom, Shaun.
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  20. The benefits of forced experimentation: strikingevidence from the London Underground network. (2015). Willems, Tim ; Rauch, Ferdinand ; Larcom, Shaun.
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  21. The Benefits of Forced Experimentation: Striking Evidence from the London Underground Network. (2015). Willems, Tim ; Rauch, Ferdinand ; Larcom, Shaun.
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  23. Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: The eyes have it!. (2013). Shum, Matthew ; Kayaba, Yutaka .
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  24. Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty. (2012). Marinacci, Massimo ; Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone ; Battigalli, Pierpaolo ; Maccheroni, F.
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