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Voting rules in insolvency law: a simple-game theoretic approach. (2002). Steffen, Frank ; Braham, Matthew.
In: International Review of Law and Economics.
RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:22:y:2002:i:4:p:421-442.

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Cited: 5

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Cites: 31

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  1. How does legal design affect the initiation of a firms bankruptcy?. (2022). Stef, Nicolae.
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:114:y:2022:i:c:s026499932200164x.

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  2. On compensation schemes for data sharing within the european REACH legislation. (2014). Deschamps, Marc ; Béal, Sylvain.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377925.

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  3. On compensation schemes for data sharing within the european REACH legislation. (2014). Deschamps, Marc ; Béal, Sylvain.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:crb:wpaper:2014-01.

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  4. Severity of the Voting Rules in Bankruptcy. (2013). Stef, Nicolae.
    In: Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center.
    RePEc:lar:wpaper:2013-07.

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  5. Positional Power in Hierarchies. (2007). van den Brink, Rene ; Steffen, Frank ; René van den Brink, .
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20070038.

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References

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  11. The Efficiency of the Bankruptcy Process. An International Comparison. (2005). Wihlborg, Clas ; Buttwill, Klas.
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