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Tractability in Incentive Contracting. (2010). Gabaix, Xavier ; Edmans, Alex.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:ecl:upafin:10-13.

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Cited: 2

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Cites: 40

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Cocites: 50

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  1. Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications. (2006). Pavan, Alessandro ; Angeletos, George-Marios.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1496.

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  2. Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition on Uniform-Price Auctions. (2002). Pavan, Alessandro ; LiCalz, Marco .
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1495.

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References

References cited by this document

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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer. (2015). Gabaix, Xavier ; Edmans, Alex.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21131.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer. (2015). Gabaix, Xavier ; Edmans, Alex.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10566.

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  3. On the value of randomization. (2014). Laroque, Guy ; Gauthier, Stephane.
    In: Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers).
    RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00969344.

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  4. Solomonic separation: Risk decisions as productivity indicators. (2013). Zeckhauser, Richard ; Wagner, Alexander ; Miller, Nolan.
    In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.
    RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:46:y:2013:i:3:p:265-297.

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  5. The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money. (2013). Fluet, Claude ; Fagart, Marie-Cecile.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:1:p:7-16.

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  6. Stochastic Mechanisms and Quasi-Linear Preferences. (2012). Schottmüller, Christoph ; boone, jan ; Schottmuller, C..
    In: Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:tiu:tiucen:444d6df2-1c12-4efe-94df-45f014115956.

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  7. Risk-sharing Contracts with Asymmetric Information. (2012). HENRIET, Dominique ; Bourlès, Renaud ; Renaud Bourlès, .
    In: The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review.
    RePEc:pal:genrir:v:37:y:2012:i:1:p:27-56.

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  8. Solomonic Separation: Risk Decisions as Productivity Indicators. (2012). Zeckhauser, Richard ; Wagner, Alexander ; Miller, Nolan .
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  9. Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions. (2012). MARTIMORT, David ; Koessler, Frederic.
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  10. Solomonic Separation: Risk Decisions as Productivity Indicators. (2012). Zeckhauser, Richard ; Wagner, Alexander ; Miller, Nolan .
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp12-057.

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  11. Risk-sharing with self-insurance: the role of cooperation. (2011). Pignataro, Giuseppe ; HENRIET, Dominique ; Bourlès, Renaud ; Barigozzi, Francesca.
    In: Working Papers.
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  12. On the strategic use of risk and undesirable goods in multidimensional screening. (2011). Lachapelle, A. ; Santambrogio, F..
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:698-705.

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  13. Optimal Taxation under Income Uncertainty. (2011). Dai, Xianhua .
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  14. Improving Compliance With Preventive Care: Cooperation in Mutual Health Insurance. (2011). Pignataro, Giuseppe ; HENRIET, Dominique ; Bourlès, Renaud ; Barigozzi, Francesca.
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  15. Tractability in Incentive Contracting. (2010). Gabaix, Xavier ; Edmans, Alex.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ecl:upafin:10-13.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Moral Hazard and Efficiency in General Equilibrium with Anonymous Trading. (2010). Acemoglu, Daron ; Simsek, Alp.
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  17. Government Information Transparency. (2010). Vanin, Paolo ; Esteban, Joan ; Albornoz, Facundo.
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  18. Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market. (2009). Nishimura, Yukihiro.
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  19. The role of optimal threats in auction design. (2009). Skreta, Vasiliki ; Figueroa, Nicolas.
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  20. Government Information Transparency. (2009). Vanin, Paolo ; Esteban, Joan ; Albornoz, Facundo.
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  21. Competitive Markets with Endogenous Health Risks. (2008). Piccolo, Salvatore ; Bennardo, Alberto.
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  24. Optimal Insurance with Adverse Selection. (2008). Schlee, Edward ; Chade, Hector.
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  25. The Role of the Agents Outside Options in Principal-Agent Relationships. (2008). Sonderegger, Silvia ; Rasul, Imran.
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  26. Occupational Choice and the Quality of Entrepreneurs. (2007). Inci, Eren.
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  27. On the role of patience in an insurance market with asymmetric information. (2006). Wambach, Achim ; Sonnenholzner, Michael .
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  28. Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice. (2005). Cohen, Alma ; Einav, Liran.
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  32. Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm. (2004). Prescott, Edward.
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  36. A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency. (2001). Jerez, Belén.
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  40. General Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information: a Dual Approach. (2000). Jerez, Belén.
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  41. A primer on moral-hazard models. (1999). Prescott, Edward.
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  42. Information and time-of-usage decisions in the bottleneck model with stochastic capacity and demand. (1999). Lindsey, Charles ; de Palma, André ; Arnott, Richard.
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  43. Government borrowing using bonds with randomly determined returns: Welfare improving randomization in the context of deficit finance. (1998). Villamil, Anne ; Smith, Bruce.
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  44. Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer. (1998). Osano, Hiroshi.
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  45. Does sunspot monetary policy matter?. (1995). Gottardi, Piero.
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  46. Randomization and Social Policy Evaluation. (1991). Heckman, James.
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  47. Randomization in Optimal Income Tax Schedules. (1990). Stiglitz, Joseph ; Hamilton, Jonathan ; Brito, Dagobert ; SLUTSKY, Steven M..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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  48. Dynamic Optimal Income Taxation with Government Commitment. (1990). Stiglitz, Joseph ; Hamilton, Jonathan ; Brito, Dagobert ; SLUTSKY, Steven M..
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  49. Information and Multi-Period Optimal Income Taxation with Government Commitment. (1987). Stiglitz, Joseph ; Hamilton, Jonathan ; Brito, Dagobert ; SLUTSKY, Steven M..
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