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Tax Evasion on a Social Network. (2018). Rablen, Matthew ; Degl, Duccio Gamannossi.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7063.

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  1. Dynamic Tax Evasion with Habit Formation in Consumption. (2020). LEVAGGI, ROSELLA ; Menoncin, Francesco ; Bernasconi, Michele.
    In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:bla:scandj:v:122:y:2020:i:3:p:966-992.

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  29. Tax evasion and emotions: An empirical test of re-integrative shaming theory. (2014). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Coricelli, Giorgio ; Rusconi, Elena .
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:40:y:2014:i:c:p:49-61.

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  30. Can strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules. (2014). Yim, Andrew ; Tan, Fangfang.
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:40:y:2014:i:c:p:161-174.

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  31. Deterrence vs. gamesmanship: Taxpayer response to targeted audits and endogenous penalties. (2014). Phillips, Mark D..
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:100:y:2014:i:c:p:81-98.

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  32. On the path dependence of tax compliance. (2014). Friehe, Tim ; Bruttel, Lisa.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:65:y:2014:i:c:p:90-107.

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  33. Theft and Deterrence. (2013). Mocan, Naci ; Harbaugh, William ; Visser, Michael.
    In: Journal of Labor Research.
    RePEc:spr:jlabre:v:34:y:2013:i:4:p:389-407.

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  34. Enforcement Leverage with Fixed Inspection Capacity. (2013). Neilson, William ; Liu, Lirong.
    In: Strategic Behavior and the Environment.
    RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000034.

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  35. Applying Behavioral Economics to the Public Sector. (2013). Alm, James ; Bourdeaux, Carolyn J..
    In: Hacienda Pública Española.
    RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2013:v:206:i:3:p:91-134.

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  36. When You Know Your Neighbor Pays Taxes: Information, Peer Effects, and Tax Compliance. (2013). McKee, Michael ; Alm, James ; Bloomquist, Kim M..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:apl:wpaper:13-22.

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  37. Does tax evasion affect firms’ internal control? Some evidence from an experimental approach. (2012). Barile, Lory .
    In: Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena.
    RePEc:usi:labsit:039.

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  38. Reciprocal Relationships in Tax Compliance Decisions. (2012). Bonein, Aurélie ; BAZART, Cécile.
    In: Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen).
    RePEc:tut:cremwp:201239.

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  39. Behavioral Responses to Taxpayer Audits: Evidence From Random Taxpayer Inquiries. (2012). Ratto, Marisa ; Gemmell, Norman.
    In: National Tax Journal.
    RePEc:ntj:journl:v:65:y:2012:i:1:p:33-57.

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  40. Reciprocal Relationships in Tax Compliance Decisions. (2012). Bonein, Aurélie ; BAZART, Cécile.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:lam:wpaper:12-35.

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  41. Discretionary policy, strategic complementarity and tax evasion. A strategic analysis of the Italian audit mechanism. (2011). Monteleone, Simona ; Chiarini, Bruno.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:prt:dpaper:4_2011.

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  42. Theft and Deterrence. (2011). Mocan, Naci ; Visser, Michael S. ; Harbaugh, William T..
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5813.

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  43. Penalties in the theory of equilibrium tax evasion: Solving King Johns problem. (2010). Pech, Gerald ; Neumarker, Bernhard .
    In: The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:cenwps:012010.

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  44. Deterrence Effects of Auditing Rules: An Experimental Study. (2010). Yim, Andrew ; Tan, Fangfang.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:27859.

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  45. An annotated bibliography of tax compliance and tax compliance costs. (2010). James, Simon ; Edwards, Alison .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:26106.

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  46. Cheating, emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion. (2010). Villeval, Marie Claire ; Montmarquette, Claude ; Coricelli, Giorgio ; Joffily, Mateus.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:13:y:2010:i:2:p:226-247.

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  47. Investigating Behavioral Responses to Positive Inducements for Filing Tax Returns. (2010). McKee, Michael ; Jones, Michael ; Cherry, Todd ; Alm, James.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:apl:wpaper:10-11.

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  48. Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many Inspectees. (2009). Yim, Andrew.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:27856.

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  49. Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many Inspectees. (2009). Yim, Andrew.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:55:y:2009:i:12:p:2000-2018.

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  50. Do fiscal variables affect fiscal expectations? Experiments with real world and lab data. (2009). Paruolo, Paolo ; Kirchkamp, Oliver ; Bernasconi, Michele.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00688186.

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  51. Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior. (2009). McKee, Michael ; Alm, James ; Jackson, Betty R..
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:3-4:p:392-402.

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  52. Do fiscal variables affect fiscal expectations? Experiments with real world and lab data. (2009). Paruolo, Paolo ; Kirchkamp, Oliver ; Bernasconi, Michele.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:70:y:2009:i:1-2:p:253-265.

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  53. Managerial incentives for compliance with environmental information disclosure programs. (2006). Vossler, Christian ; McKee, Michael ; Gilpatric, Scott ; Evans, Mary.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:60386.

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  54. Tax Evasion and Coordination. (2006). Lipatov, Vilen.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:1251.

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  55. Anti-evasion auditing policy in the presence of common income shocks. (2006). Sanchez Villalba, Miguel ; Sanchez-Villalba, Miguel .
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:6543.

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  56. A cross-section approach to measuring the shadow economy. (2006). Hudson, John ; Caplanova, Anetta ; Orviska, Marta ; Medved, Jozef.
    In: Journal of Policy Modeling.
    RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:28:y:2006:i:7:p:713-724.

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  57. Tax framing, Instrumentality and individual differences: Are there two different cultures?. (2006). Lewis, Alan ; Jones, Philip ; Cullis, John .
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:304-320.

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  58. Strong Enforcement by a Weak Authority. (2006). Steiner, Jakub.
    In: ESE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:edn:esedps:149.

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  59. Reglas de selección para la fiscalización de Impuestos a las Ventas. (2004). Arias, Roberto Jose .
    In: Revista de Economía y Estadística.
    RePEc:ief:reveye:v:42:y:2004:i:2:p:29-62.

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  60. Beyond Punishment: a tax compliance experiment with taxpayers in Costa Rica. (2003). Torgler, Benno.
    In: Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review.
    RePEc:ila:anaeco:v:18:y:2003:i:1:p:27-56.

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  61. To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question. (2003). Torgler, Benno.
    In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
    RePEc:eee:soceco:v:32:y:2003:i:3:p:283-302.

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  62. Cross Cultural Comparisions of Tax Compliance Behavior. (2001). McKee, Michael ; Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge ; Cummings, Ronald G..
    In: International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU.
    RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0103.

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