[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
create a website
Multimarket Linkages, Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs. (2017). Yotov, Yoto ; Syropoulos, Constantinos ; Agnosteva, Delina.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6829.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 1

Citations received by this document

Cites: 39

References cited by this document

Cocites: 58

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Preferential trade liberalization with endogenous cartel discipline: Implications for trade and welfare. (2024). Yotov, Yoto ; Syropoulos, Constantinos ; Agnosteva, Delina E.
    In: Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique.
    RePEc:wly:canjec:v:57:y:2024:i:4:p:1109-1136.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. [1] Akinbosoye, O., Bond, E.W. and C. Syropoulos. 2012. “On the Stability of Multimarket Collusion in Price-Setting Supergames,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 30(2), pp. 253-264.

  2. [10] Bos, I. and J.E. Harrington, Jr. 2010. “Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 41(1), pp. 92–117.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  3. [11] Brander, J.A. and P. Krugman. 1983. “A Model of Reciprocal Dumping,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 5, pp. 313-323.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  4. [12] Brander, J.A. and J.B. Spencer. 1984. “Trade Warfare: Tariffs and Cartels,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 16, pp. 227-242.

  5. [13] Brenner, S. 2005. “An Empirical Study of the European Corporate Leniency Program,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27(6), pp. 639-645.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  6. [14] Connor, J. M. 2001. “Our Customers are Our Enemies: The Lysine Cartel of 1992-1995,” Review of Industrial Organization, vol. 18(1), pp. 5-21.

  7. [15] Connor, J. M. 2003. “Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement,” Working Paper 03-12, Purdue University, College of Agriculture.

  8. [16] Connor, J. M. and J. Zimmerman. 2005. “Determinants of Cartel Duration: A Cross-Sectional Study of Modern Private International Cartels.” Manuscript.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  9. [17] Connor, J.M., R. M. Abrantes-Metz and A. D. Metz. 2013. “The Determinants of Cartel Duration.” http : //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid = 2263782.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  10. [18] Cox, D. R. 1972. “Regression Models and Life-Tables (with Discussions),” Journal of Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 34, pp. 187-220.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  11. [19] Davidson, C. 1984. “Cartel Stability and Tariff Policy,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 17, pp. 219-237.

  12. [2] Anderson, J. E., and E. van Wincoop. 2004. “Trade Costs,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 42(3), pp. 691-751.

  13. [20] Deltas, G., Salvo, A. and H. Vasconcelos. 2012. “Consumer-Surplus-Enhancing Collusion and Trade,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 43(2), pp. 315-328.

  14. [21] Dick, Andrew R. 1996. “When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?,” The Journal of Law & Economics, vol. 39(1), pp. 241-283.

  15. [22] Fung, K.C. 1992. “Economic Integration as Competitive Discipline,” International Economic Review, vol. 33, pp. 837-847.

  16. [23] Harrington, J. E. 2006. “How Do Cartels Operate?,” Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, http : //assets.wharton.upenn.edu/ harrij/pdf/fnt06.pdf.

  17. [24] Harrington, J. E., K. Huschelrath, U. Laitenberger and F. Smuda. 2015. “The Discontent Cartel Member and Cartel Collapse: The Case of the German Cement Cartelotedblleft,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 42, pp.196-119.

  18. [25] Head, K., and T. Mayer. 2014. “Gravity Equations: Workhorse,Toolkit, and Cookbook,” The Handbook of International Economics, vol. 4, pp. 131-195.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  19. [26] Levenstein, M. C. and V. Y. Suslow. 2006. “What Determines Cartel Success?,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XLIV, pp. 43-95.

  20. [28] Levenstein, M. C. and V. Y. Suslow. 2011. “Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 54(2), pp. 455-492.

  21. [29] Levenstein, M. C., J. Sivadasan and V. Y. Suslow. 2015. “The Effect of Competition on Trade: Evidence from the Collapse of International Cartels,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 39, pp. 56-70.

  22. [3] Ashournia, D., Hansen, P.S., and J.W. Hansen. 2013. “Trade Liberalization and the Degree of Competition in International Duopoly,” Review of International Economics, vol. 21(5).

  23. [30] Lommerud, K.E. and L. Sørgard. 2001. “Trade Liberalization and Cartel Stability,” Review of International Economics, vol. 9, pp. 343-355.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  24. [32] Mayer, T. and S. Zignago. 2011. “Notes on CEPIIs Distances Measures: The GeoDist Database,” Working Papers.

  25. [33] Pinto, B. 1986.“Repeated Games and the ‘Reciprocal Dumping’ Model of Trade,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 20, pp. 357-366.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  26. [34] Röller, L. and F. Steen. 2006. “On the Workings of a Cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian Cement Industry,” American Economic Review, vol. 96(1), pp. 321-338.

  27. [35] Rotemberg, J. J. and G. Saloner. 1989. “Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion,” The Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 22(2), pp. 237-244.

  28. [36] Syropoulos, C. 1992. “Quantitative Restrictions and Tariffs with Endogenous Firm Behavior,” European Economic Review, vol. 36(8), pp. 1627-1646.

  29. [37] Vasconcelos, H. (2005). “Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 36(1), pp. 39-62.

  30. [4] Auqier, A.A. and R.E. Caves. 1979. “Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and Optimal Competition Policy,” The Economic Journal, vol. 89(355), pp. 559-581.

  31. [5] Bejger, S. 2011. “Polish Cement Industry Cartel - Preliminary Examination of Collusion Existence, ” BEH - Business and Economic Horizons, vol. 4(1), pp. 88-107. 52 See Vasconcelos (2005) and Bos and Harrington (2010) for important contributions in this direction.

  32. [6] Bejger, S. 2012. “Cartel in the Indian Cement Industry: An Attempt to Identify It,” Economics Discussion Papers, No. 2012-18, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

  33. [7] Bernheim, D.B. and M.D. Whinston. 1990. “Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 21(1), pp. 1-26.

  34. [8] Bolotova, Y., J. M. Connor and D.J. Miller. 2008. “The Impact of Collusion on Price Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 26, pp. 1290 - 1307.

  35. [9] Bond, E.W. and C. Syropoulos. 2008. “Trade Costs and Multimarket Collusion,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 39(4), pp. 1080-1104.

  36. A25 the total number of cartel members, including the subsidiaries of these firms that have also been addressees to the authorities’ decisions. Thus, FIRMSk denotes the total number of groups of firms that participated in cartel k, while SUBSIDIARIESk denotes the total number of subsidiaries that participated in cartel k. Metz et al. (2013) and Levenstein and Suslow (2010) find the number of cartel members to exert a positive impact on the hazard rate. In Dick (1996) and in Zhou (2012), the number of cartel members is shown to have a negative and statistically significant impact on the hazard of dissolution. Brenner (2005) finds that the number of cartel members affects cartel duration negatively in most of his specifications, but the estimates are not statistically significant.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  37. Collusive Practices. PRCFIXk is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if cartel k’s members fixed prices or agreed upon simultaneous price increases. Dick (1996) finds that PRCFIXk has a positive, but insignificant impact on the risk of cartel death. ALLCTNk is another indicator variable that takes the value of one if cartel k’s members allocated customers 70 Such an estimate was reported by the anti-trust authorities only in a minority of the cases and these numbers usually correspond to a given year only.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  38. International Cartels. The focus of this dataset will be on discovered and prosecuted private international cartels defined by Connor (2006) as “... a conspiracy in restraint of trade that has or is alleged to have one or more corporate or individual participants with headquarters, residency, or nationality outside the jurisdiction of the investigating antitrust authority.”64 Thus far, the cartel dataset covers 173 private international cartels that existed between 1958 and 2010. A total of 48 countries (28 of which are OECD members) have participated in at least one of these cartels.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  39. Moreover, we capture which anti-trust authority was responsible for first uncovering cartel k using five different dummy variables: DSCV R USk, DSCV R EUk, DSCV R CAk, DSCV R JOINTk, DSCV R OTHERk, which take the value of one if cartel k was discovered by, respectively, the US A27 authorities, EU authorities, Canadian authorities, jointly by multiple anti-trust bodies, or other anti-trust authorities (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, for instance). Similarly, Metz et al. (2013) include dummy variables to control for the region of discovery - US, EU, and other in their case - and find them all to decrease the risk of cartel dissolution.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. How unilateral tariffs harm workers under oligopoly. (2023). Rudsinske, Jonas.
    In: The World Economy.
    RePEc:bla:worlde:v:46:y:2023:i:9:p:2732-2754.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Preferential Trade Liberalization with Endogenous Cartel Discipline: Implications for Welfare and Optimal Trade Policies. (2020). Yotov, Yoto ; Syropoulos, Constantinos ; Agnosteva, Delina.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8554.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. .

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Multimarket Linkages, Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs. (2017). Yotov, Yoto ; Syropoulos, Constantinos ; Agnosteva, Delina.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6829.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Multi-market collusion with territorial allocation. (2015). Sinha, Uday ; Bhattacharjea, Aditya.
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:41:y:2015:i:c:p:42-50.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multi-mercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos. (2013). Navarro, Dennis Sanchez .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:48699.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multimercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos. (2013). Navarro, Dennis Sanchez .
    In: ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS SIC.
    RePEc:col:000458:010905.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Non-Equivalent Ad Valorem Equivalents and Gravity. (2013). Pouliot, Sebastien ; Kotchoni, Rachidi ; Larue, Bruno.
    In: 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C..
    RePEc:ags:aaea13:150471.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Wage subsidies and international trade: When does policy coordination pay?. (2012). Spielmann, Christian ; Braun, Sebastian.
    In: Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal.
    RePEc:zbw:ifweej:201230.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Hub and Spoke Trade Agreements under Oligopoly with Asymmetric Costs. (2012). Yildiz, Halis.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:36501.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Multi-market Collusion with Territorial Allocation. (2012). Sinha, Uday ; Bhattacharjea, Aditya.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:cde:cdewps:217.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. On Capturing Rent from a Non-renewable Resource International Monopoly: Prices Versus Quantities. (2011). Rubio, Santiago.
    In: Dynamic Games and Applications.
    RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:1:y:2011:i:4:p:558-580.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Domestic trade protection in vertically-related markets. (2011). Koo, Hui-Wen ; Chen, Tain-Jy ; Wang, Kuang-Cheng A..
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:28:y:2011:i:4:p:1595-1603.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Comparing Cournot and Stackelberg Duopoly. (2010). CHUMAN, EIICHI.
    In: Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:hit:hitjec:v:51:y:2010:i:2:p:59-73.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Wage subsidies and international trade: When does policy coordination pay?. (2010). Spielmann, Christian ; Braun, Sabastian .
    In: Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:1007.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Profit Shifting and Trade Agreements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets. (2009). Staiger, Robert ; Bagwell, Kyle.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14803.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Market Access through Bound Tariffs. (2009). Yalcin, Erdal ; Schröder, Philipp ; Sala, Davide ; Philipp J. H. Schroder, ; Philipp J. H. Schroder, ; Philipp J. H. Schr oder, .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2858.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. The number of firms, international product differentiation and an import tariff. (2007). Wang, Yu-Ter.
    In: Applied Economics Letters.
    RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:14:y:2007:i:14:p:1087-1089.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Strategic trade policy under isoelastic demand and asymmetric production costs. (2007). Serizawa, Nobuko ; Matsumoto, Akio.
    In: The Annals of Regional Science.
    RePEc:spr:anresc:v:41:y:2007:i:3:p:525-543.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly. (2007). Straume, Odd Rune ; Nese, Gjermund.
    In: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade.
    RePEc:kap:jincot:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:31-52.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly. (2007). Straume, Odd ; Nese, Gjermund.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:31-52.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Tariff bindings and bilateral cooperation on export cartels. (2007). Saggi, Kamal ; Hoekman, Bernard.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:83:y:2007:i:1:p:141-156.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Public Ownership and Trade Policy. (2007). Stähler, Frank ; Long, Ngo ; Staehler, Frank .
    In: CIRANO Working Papers.
    RePEc:cir:cirwor:2007s-07.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. Import Demand for Quality in the Japanese Beef Market. (2006). Miljkovic, Dragan ; Jin, Hyun.
    In: Agricultural and Resource Economics Review.
    RePEc:ags:arerjl:10222.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Cost asymmetry, oligopolistic competition and optimal trade and industrial policies. (2005). Sugeta, Hajime ; Chang, Winston.
    In: International Economic Journal.
    RePEc:taf:intecj:v:19:y:2005:i:1:p:95-114.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. FOREIGN MONOPOLIES AND TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS. (2005). Rubio, Santiago ; Alepuz, Maria Dolores.
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2005-38.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies. (2005). Viaene, Jean-Marie ; Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:49:y:2005:i:2:p:359-385.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. How to maximize domestic benefits from foreign investments: the effect of irreversibility and uncertainty. (2005). Pennings, Enrico.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:29:y:2005:i:5:p:873-889.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. Import tariffs, quality investment and welfare. (2005). Kujal, Praveen ; Hernan Gonzalez, Roberto.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:we056116.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly. (2005). Straume, Odd Rune ; Nese, Gjermund ; Staume, Odd Rune.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1439.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Trading market access for competition policy enforcement. (2004). Saggi, Kamal ; Hoekman, Bernard.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3188.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. Trade Policy and Economic Integration in a Cournot Duopoly Model. (2004). Wang, Yu-Ter ; Liu, Bih-Jane ; Tsai, Pan-Long .
    In: The Pakistan Development Review.
    RePEc:pid:journl:v:43:y:2004:i:3:p:239-251.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. EXPORT CARTELS : A Developing Country Perspective. (2004). Bhattacharjea, Aditya.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:cde:cdewps:120.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Competition Policy in Small Distant Open Economies: Some Lessons from the Economics Literature. (2003). Evans, Lew ; Hughes, Patrick.
    In: Treasury Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:nzt:nztwps:03/31.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Trading Market Access for Competition Policy Enforcement. (2003). Saggi, Kamal ; Hoekman, Bernard.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4110.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Market Entry Regulation and International Competition. (2003). Stähler, Frank ; Staehler, Frank ; Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_979.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. An empirical test of the rent-shifting hypothesis: the case of state trading enterprises. (2002). Stiegert, Kyle ; Hamilton, Stephen.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:58:y:2002:i:1:p:135-157.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Persistent protection in an international exit game. (2002). Wen, Quan ; Benarroch, Michael ; Anis, Aslam H..
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:56:y:2002:i:2:p:465-487.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. IMPERFECT SUBSTITUTES, DEFERRED PRODUCER PAYMENT SYSTEM, AND STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF LEADERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL MALTING BARLEY MARKETS. (2002). Stiegert, Kyle ; Marsh, Thomas ; dong, fengxia.
    In: 2002 Annual Meeting, July 28-31, 2002, Long Beach, California.
    RePEc:ags:waealb:36625.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. Antidumping policy under imperfect competition. (2001). Crowley, Meredith.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-01-21.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. Trade and Industrial Policy of Transition Economies. (2001). Viaene, Jean-Marie ; Moraga, Jose-Luis.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_446.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Import Quotas, Export Promotion and Intra-Industry Trade. (2001). Bhattacharjea, Aditya.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:cde:cdewps:96.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. Trade Bloc Formation Under Imperfect Competition.. (2000). Conconi, Paola.
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
    RePEc:wrk:warwec:571.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. The Rise of Environmentalism, Pollution Taxes and Intra-Industry Trade. (2000). Aidt, Toke.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:cam:camdae:0017.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. Rent-shifting export subsidies with an imported intermediate product. (1999). Spencer, Barbara ; Ishikawa, Jota.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:48:y:1999:i:2:p:199-232.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy. (1997). Collie, David.
    In: International Economic Journal.
    RePEc:taf:intecj:v:11:y:1997:i:3:p:35-46.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. Cost heterogeneity, industry concentration and strategic trade policies. (1997). Soubeyran, Antoine ; Long, Ngo ; Ngo, Van Long.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:43:y:1997:i:1-2:p:207-220.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. Demand elasticities, asymmetry and strategic trade policy. (1997). bandyopadhyay, subhayu.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:42:y:1997:i:1-2:p:167-177.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. Assessing the effects of tariff reform on U.S. food manufacturing industries: the role of imperfect competition and intermediate inputs. (1996). Hertel, Thomas ; Lanclos, Kent D. ; Devadoss, Stephen .
    In: Agricultural Economics.
    RePEc:eee:agecon:v:14:y:1996:i:3:p:201-212.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. Strategic tariffs and endogenous market structures: Trade and industrial policies under imperfect competition. (1995). Bhattacharjea, Aditya.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:47:y:1995:i:2:p:287-312.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  51. Optimal trade policy in the presence of changing market structure. (1993). Herander, Mark.
    In: Open Economies Review.
    RePEc:kap:openec:v:4:y:1993:i:3:p:235-245.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  52. The State of the North American and Japanese Motor Vehicle Industries: A Partially Calibrated Model to Examine the Impacts of Trade Policy Changes. (1992). Waverman, leonard ; Fuss, Melvyn ; Murphy, Steven.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4225.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  53. Monopoly and Trade Policy. (1990). Kowalczyk, Carsten.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3475.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  54. Making Altruism Pay in Auction Quotas. (1990). Krishna, Kala.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3230.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  55. Symmetric Pass-Through of Tariffs and Exchange Rates Under Imperfect Competition: An Empirical Test. (1987). Feenstra, Robert.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2453.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  56. How to Maximize Domestic Benefits from Irreversible Foreign Investments. (). Pennings, Enrico.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:205.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  58. Too much cocited documents. This list is not complete

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2025-02-04 18:44:26 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.