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- Yitzhaki, S. (1974). A note on ‘Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis’. Journal of Public Economics 3(2), 201–202. Tables and Figures Table 1: Basic Summary Statistics Variable Mean S.D. Evasion Rate 0.045 0.077 Enforcement Rate 0.012 0.025 Annual Fees 238.122 19.916 Households (Hi) 1,521 5,802 Labor Income 30,496 3,274 Distance (minutes) 40.980 24.408 Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for the evasion rate, annual license fees (nominal Euro values), the enforcement rate, and selected municipality characteristics (see Appendix A1). Number of observations: 2,380. Table 2: Cross-Sectional Estimation Coefficients Clustered SEs Robust SEs log Fees 0.129 [0.087] [0.022] Enforcement −0.273 [0.169] [0.072] log Income −0.017 [0.034] [0.028] Selfemployed 0.215 [0.084] [0.046] Observations 2,378 R2 0.298 Notes: Results from OLS regressions of equation (5). Additional control variables are included.
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