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Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium. (2022). Lawarree, Jacques ; Khalil, Fahad ; Henke, Alexander.
In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:31:y:2022:i:3:p:762-783.

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