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The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games. (2014). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Hofbauer, Josef ; Balkenborg, Dieter .
In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
RePEc:bie:wpaper:466.

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  1. The refined best reply correspondence and backward induction. (2016). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Hofbauer, Josef ; Balkenborg, Dieter .
    In: Graz Economics Papers.
    RePEc:grz:wpaper:2016-11.

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  2. Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics. (2016). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Hofbauer, Josef ; Balkenborg, Dieter.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:451.

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  3. Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics. (2013). Kuzmics, Christoph ; Hofbauer, Josef ; Balkenborg, Dieter .
    In: Theoretical Economics.
    RePEc:the:publsh:652.

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