- Anticipation controls: Antic: Variable is coded as 1 for transitions from E in the period September 2005 to January 2006. The 2006 UI reform affected those unemployed since February 1, 2006. Therefore, workers who were to lose their jobs on or after February 1, 2006 had an incentive to start an unemployment spell earlier.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. Estimations for 63-64-yearolds not possible due to no observations with transitions from U to E in post-reform period in the age group. +One control for early and full retirement eligibility due to few observations with eligibility. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. Estimations for 63-64-yearolds not possible due to no observations with transitions from U to E in post-reform period in the age group. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Börsch-Supan, Axel and Hendrik Jürges, 2012, Disability, pension reform, and early retirement in Germany, in: Wise, David .A. (ed.) Social security programs and retirement around the world: historical trends in mortality and health, employment, and disability insurance participation, pp. 277-300.
Banerjee, Sudipto and David Blau, 2016, Employment Trends by Age in the United States - Why are older workers different?, Journal of Human Resources 51(1), 163-199.
BGBL.I (Bundesgesetzblatt), various years, www.bgbl.de [last access: Nov. 29, 2016] Blau, David M. and Ryan M. Goodstein, 2010, Can Social Security Explain Trends in Labor Force Participation of Older Men in the United States?, Journal of Human Resources 45(2), 328-363.
Burda, Michael and Jennifer Hunt, 2011, What Explains the German Labor Market Miracle in the Great Recession? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 42(1), 273-335.
Burkhauser, Richard V., Mary C. Daly, and Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2016, Protecting working-age people with disabilities: experiences of four industrialized nations, Journal for Labour Market Research 49(4), 367-386.
Card, David, Raj Chetty, and Andrea Weber, 2007, Cash-on-hand and competing models of intertemporal behavior: new evidence from the labor market, Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4), 1511-1560.
Coile, Courtney, Kevin S. Milligan, and David A. Wise, 2014, Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: Disability Insurance Programs and Retirement - Introduction and Summary, NBER Working Paper 20120, Cambridge, Mass.
Dietz, Martin and Ulrich Walwei, 2011, Germany - No Country for Old Workers?, Zeitschrift für Arbeitsmarktforschung (Journal for Labour Market Research) 44(4), 363-376.
Dlugosz, Stephan, Gesine Stephan, and Ralf A. Wilke, 2014, Fixing the Leak: Unemployment Incidence before and after a Major Reform of Unemployment Benefits in Germany, German Economic Review 15(3), 329-352.
- DRV (Deutsche Rentenversicherung), 2015, Rentenversicherung in Zeitreihen, Oktober 2015, Berlin.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Dustmann, Christian, Bernd Fitzenberger, Uta Schönberg, and Alexandra Spitz-Oener, 2014, From Sick Man of Europe to Economic Superstar: Germany's Resurgent Economy, Journal of Economic Perspectives 28(1), 167-188.
- Eichhorst, Werner and Paul Marx, 2011, Reforming German Labour Market Institutions, Journal of European Social Policy 21(1), 73-87.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Eichhorst, Werner, 2008, Die Agenda 2010 und die Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende, Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 77(1), 38-50.
Engels, Barbara, Johannes Geyer, and Peter Haan, 2016, Pension incentives and early retirement, DIW Discussion Paper No. 1617, DIW Berlin.
Fitzenberger, Bernd and Ralf A. Wilke, 2009, Unemployment Durations in West Germany Before and After the Reform of the Unemployment Compensation System during the 1980s, German Economic Review 11(3), 336-366.
- Following Dlugosz et al. (2014), we consider a short anticipation period. As the UI benefit entitlement duration depends on age and the number of insurance months prior to unemployment, if individuals quit their jobs earlier to avoid the cut in unemployment benefit payout duration they will receive fewer months of unemployment benefits. We chose for September 2005 to January 2006 as the anticipation period based on Figure 1.2. We can see there that job-exits increase from September 2005 onwards reaching a peak in December 2005.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Greene, William H., 2012, Econometric Analysis, 7th edition, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, England.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Hairault, Jean-Olivier, Francois Langot, and Thepthida Sopraseuth, 2010, Distance to Retirement and Older Workers' Employment: The Case for Delaying the Retirement Age, Journal of the European Economic Association 8(5), 1034-1076.
- Hoffmann, Florian and Thomas Lemieux, 2015, Unemployment in the Great Recession: A Comparison of Germany, Canada, and the United States, Journal of Labor Economics 34(1, pt. 2), S95-139.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Hunt, Jennifer, 1995, The Effect of the Unemployment Compensation on Unemployment Duration in Germany, Journal of Labor Economics 13(1), 88-120.
Inderbitzin, Lukas, Stefan Staubli, and Josef Zweimüller, 2016, Extended Unemployment Benefits and Early Retirement: Program Complementarity and Program Substitution, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8(1), 253-288.
Jung, Philip and Moritz Kuhn, 2014, Labour Market Institutions and Workers Flows: Comparing Germany and the US, The Economic Journal 124, 1317-1342. 25 Lalive, Rafael, Jan van Ours, and Josef Zweimüller, 2006, How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies 73(4), 1009-1038.
Lichter, Andreas, 2016, Benefit Duration and Job Search Effort: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, IZA Discussion Paper No. 10264, IZA Bonn.
Lo, Simon M. S., Gesine Stephan, and Ralf A. Wilke, 2017, Competing Risks Copula Models for Unemployment Duration: An Application to a German Hartz Reform, Journal of Econometric Methods 6(1), 1-20.
- Mean 0.9923 0.0034 0.9124 0.0347 no no yes yes 8,615,029 525,562 yes yes yes yes no no Post-reform x60-62 years old Post-reform x63-64 years old Age, gender, education, state of residence yes yes Post-reform x45-46 years old Post-reform x47-51 years old Post-reform x52-54 years old Post-reform x55-56 years old Post-reform x57-59 years old E-E transitions E-U transitions U-U transitions U-E transitions (1) (2) (3) (4) yes yes yes yes Linear and quadratic trends xstate , month and year effects yes yes yes yes 59 Table A.15 Logit coefficients of the reform effects on labor market transitions controlling for retirement, anticipation, and employment benefits: pooled sample without FebruaryJuly 2006 Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ***: p < 1 %; **: p < 5 %; *: p < 10 %.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Mean 4.134.258 198.595 yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no no yes yes yes yes 0,9937 0,0024 0,9194 0,0292 yes yes+ Post-reform x45-46 years old Post-reform x47-51 years old Post-reform x52-54 years old Post-reform x55-56 years old Post-reform x57-59 years old Post-reform x60-62 years old Post-reform x63-64 years old yes yes yes yes Linear and quadratic trends xstate , month and year effects E-E transitions E-U transitions U-U transitions U-E transitions (1) (2) (3) (4) 49 Table A.5 Logit coefficients of the reform effects on labor market transitions controlling for retirement, anticipation, and employment benefits: women Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ***: p < 1 %; **: p < 5 %; *: p < 10 %. Prereform period: Transitions from E=03/2004 –08/2005; Transitions from U=03/2004 –01/2006.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Mortensen, Dale, 1970, Job Search, the Duration of Unemployment and the Phillips Curve, American Economic Review 60(5), 847-862.
Oschmiansky, Frank, 2013, Arbeitslosenversicherung, URL: http://www.bpb.de/politik/innenpolitik/ arbeitsmarktpolitik/155254/arbeitslosenversicherung (last access Febr. 22, 2017) Peracchi, Franco and Finis Welch, 1994, Trends in Labor Force Transitions of Older Men and Women, Journal of Labor Economics 12(2), 210-242.
- Post-reform-0.2649 *** 0.5693 *** -0.0368-0.0644 (0.0734) (0.1168) (0.0486) (0.0592) -0.0104-0.0387-0.3372 *** 0.2190 ** (0.0541) (0.0739) (0.0818) (0.0856) 0.0549-0.1181 ** -0.6791 *** 0.1479 ** (0.0410) (0.0572) (0.0696) (0.0726) -0.0780 0.1116-1.0086 *** 0.3582 *** (0.0533) (0.0789) (0.0873) (0.0970) 0.0233-0.0749-0.9239 *** 0.2482 ** (0.0568) (0.0818) (0.0988) (0.1230) 0.2773 *** -0.3883 *** -0.7747 *** 0.5819 *** (0.0485) (0.0747) (0.0947) (0.1494) 0.1201 *** -0.1055-0.7814 *** 0.9089 *** (0.0439) (0.0947) (0.1131) (0.2668) -0.2128 *** 0.4898 * -0.5166 *** -(0.0720) (0.2878) (0.1693) -Controls: Age, education, state of residence Retirement controls Anticipation controls Unemployment benefit controls N
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Post-reform-0.2774 * 0.8719 *** -0.1141-0.1862 (0.1478) (0.2530) (0.0947) (0.1181) -0.0762-0.0396-0.3439 ** 0.2015 (0.1126) (0.1582) (0.1560) (0.1864) 0.1902 ** -0.4233 *** -0.2767 * -0.0568 (0.0841) (0.1194) (0.1433) (0.1570) -0.1266-0.0813-0.8580 *** 0.5236 *** (0.1089) (0.1634) (0.1869) (0.1974) -0.0907 0.1010-0.3399 * 0.1286 (0.1306) (0.1883) (0.1963) (0.2670) 0.3060 *** -0.5017 *** -0.5329 *** 0.4536 (0.1165) (0.1833) (0.2055) (0.2974) 0.0400-0.2039-0.3321 0.8619 ** (0.0877) (0.1824) (0.2741) (0.4024) 0.0210-0.2274-0.6278 *** 0.9066 (0.0936) (0.3419) (0.2423) (0.8939) Controls: Age, gender, state of residence Retirement controls Anticipation controls Unemployment benefit controls N
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Post-reform-0.3194 ** 0.6929 *** 0.2099 * -0.1015 (0.1625) (0.2600) (0.1250) (0.1562) -0.0793-0.1016-0.2960 0.1617 (0.1323) (0.1902) (0.2024) (0.2480) 0.1194-0.2265-1.0979 *** 0.1850 (0.0996) (0.1389) (0.1730) (0.2004) 0.1439-0.1912-1.3060 *** 0.1853 (0.1191) (0.1769) (0.1973) (0.2502) 0.0412-0.0886-1.2198 *** 0.3059 (0.1259) (0.1870) (0.2447) (0.3108) 0.2585 ** -0.2129-0.7756 *** 0.4847 (0.1054) (0.1585) (0.2210) (0.3873) 0.1479-0.2866-0.8182 *** 0.2585 (0.0986) (0.1948) (0.2621) (0.8444) -0.0272 0.1307-0.9539 *** -(0.1247) (0.4225) (0.3197) -Controls: Age, gender, state of residence Retirement controls Anticipation controls Unemployment benefit controls N
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Post-reform-0.3402 *** 0.6759 *** (0.0529) (0.0843) -0.0287-0.0021 (0.0403) (0.0554) 0.0061-0.0948 ** (0.0305) (0.0426) 0.0438-0.1142 ** (0.0368) (0.0532) -0.0071-0.0649 (0.0410) (0.0600) 0.1901 *** -0.3582 *** (0.0358) (0.0561) 0.0186-0.2495 *** (0.0316) (0.0633) 0.0223 0.0239 (0.0401) (0.1293) Controls: Retirement controls Anticipation controls Unemployment benefit controls N
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Post-reform-0.3508 *** 0.6853 *** -0.0484-0.1133 *** (0.0528) (0.0841) (0.0364) (0.0434) -0.0216-0.0204-0.2958 *** 0.1558 ** (0.0404) (0.0555) (0.0616) (0.0655) 0.0183-0.1229 *** -0.6186 *** 0.1008 * (0.0305) (0.0425) (0.0515) (0.0538) 0.0590-0.1229 ** -0.9303 *** 0.2950 *** (0.0367) (0.0530) (0.0625) (0.0686) 0.0038-0.0671-0.7713 *** 0.2209 ** (0.0410) (0.0597) (0.0703) (0.0864) 0.2038 *** -0.3613 *** -0.6814 *** 0.5397 *** (0.0358) (0.0558) (0.0683) (0.1038) 0.0397-0.2808 *** -0.6280 *** 0.6047 *** (0.0313) (0.0626) (0.0817) (0.1773) 0.0710 * -0.0766-0.4915 *** 0.0127 (0.0391) (0.1286) (0.1052) (0.4538) Controls: Retirement controls Anticipation controls Unemployment benefit controls N
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Post-reform-0.3998 *** 0.6957 *** -0.0420-0.1266 *** (0.0473) (0.0703) (0.0304) (0.0360) 0.0148-0.0502-0.2541 *** 0.1063 * (0.0376) (0.0511) (0.0537) (0.0581) 0.0485 * -0.1247 *** -0.4893 *** 0.0581 (0.0270) (0.0364) (0.0430) (0.0440) 0.1115 *** -0.1808 *** -0.7354 *** 0.1920 *** (0.0321) (0.0442) (0.0507) (0.0543) 0.0366-0.1223 ** -0.6305 *** 0.1265 * (0.0379) (0.0539) (0.0605) (0.0721) 0.2264 *** -0.3324 *** -0.6322 *** 0.4952 *** (0.0319) (0.0474) (0.0572) (0.0786) 0.0428-0.2170 *** -0.5229 *** 0.5909 *** (0.0288) (0.0552) (0.0683) (0.1278) 0.0876 ** -0.1148-0.3629 *** 0.5933 ** (0.0368) (0.1165) (0.0963) (0.2955) Controls: Retirement controls Anticipation controls Unemployment benefit controls N
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Post-reform-0.4127 *** 0.7996 *** -0.1200 ** -0.1574 ** (0.0763) (0.1217) (0.0549) (0.0644) -0.0339-0.0048-0.2465 *** 0.0763 (0.0607) (0.0841) (0.0939) (0.1020) 0.0011-0.1719 *** -0.5937 *** 0.0908 (0.0460) (0.0645) (0.0774) (0.0812) 0.1093 ** -0.2925 *** -0.8724 *** 0.2563 ** (0.0530) (0.0770) (0.0931) (0.1005) -0.0634-0.0198-0.5994 *** 0.1790 (0.0597) (0.0878) (0.1006) (0.1218) 0.0648-0.2666 *** -0.4190 *** 0.3601 ** (0.0574) (0.0917) (0.1002) (0.1528) -0.0936 ** -0.3698 *** -0.4425 *** 0.3785 (0.0456) (0.0863) (0.1160) (0.2362) 0.1431 *** -0.2754 * -0.3594 *** 0.4029 (0.0502) (0.1508) (0.1347) (0.4797) Controls: Age, education, state of residence Retirement controls Anticipation controls Unemployment benefit controls N
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Pre-reform period: Transitions from E=03/2004 –08/2005; Transitions from U=03/2004 – 01/2006. Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. No controls for early and full retirement due to few observations with eligibility for retirement. +One control for early and full retirement eligibility due to few observations with eligibility. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Pre-reform period: Transitions from E=03/2004 –08/2005; Transitions from U=03/2004 – 01/2006. Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Pre-reform period: Transitions from E=03/2004 –08/2005; Transitions from U=03/2004 – 01/2006. Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Pre-reform period: Transitions from E=03/2004 –08/2005; Transitions from U=03/2004 – 01/2006. Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Pre-reform period: Transitions from E=03/2004 –08/2005; Transitions from U=03/2004 – 01/2006. Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Pre-reform period: Transitions from E=03/2004 –08/2005; Transitions from U=03/2004 – 01/2006. Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Pre-reform period: Transitions from E=03/2004 –08/2005; Transitions from U=03/2004 – 01/2006. Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Pre-reform period: Transitions from E=03/2004 –08/2005; Transitions from U=03/2004 – 01/2006. Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Pre-reform period: Transitions from E=03/2004 –08/2005; Transitions from U=03/2004 – 01/2006. Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Pre-reform period: Transitions from E=03/2004 –08/2005; Transitions from U=03/2004 – 01/2006. Anticipation period: Transitions from E=09/2005 – 01/2006. Post-reform period: 02/2006 – 12/2007. For a list and definition of control variables, see Table 3. Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Puhani, Patrick A., 2012, The Treatment Effect, the Cross Difference, and the Interaction Term in Nonlinear "Difference-in-Difference" Models, Economics Letters 115(1), 85-87.
- Retirement for women Note: * Individuals born before Nov. 17 1950 and who were severely handicapped on Nov. 16 2000 can retire at age 60 without deductions. n.a. = not available.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Schirle, Tammy, 2008, Why have the labor force participation rates of older men increased since the mid-1990s?, Journal of Labor Economics 26(4), 549-594.
Schmieder, Johannes F., Till von Wachter, and Stefan Bender, 2012, The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates of 20 Years, Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(2), 701-752.
- Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations. 0.0 0.4 0.8 1/2002 4/2002 7/2002 10/2002 1/2003 4/2003 7/2003 10/2003 1/2004 4/2004 7/2004 10/2004 1/2005 4/2005 7/2005 Transitionrate E-U Months 40 to 44 years old 45 to 51 years old 52 to 56 years old 57 to 64 years old 43 2.3 Monthly unemployment stays (U-U) as a share of observations observed in unemployment at the beginning of the ongoing month (seasonally adjusted) Note: Seasonally adjusted by deducting calendar month-specific average deviations from the overall mean transition rate from the observed values.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations. 0.0 1.5 3.0 4.5 3/2004 6/2004 9/2004 12/2004 3/2005 6/2005 9/2005 12/2005 3/2006 6/2006 9/2006 12/2006 3/2007 6/2007 9/2007 12/2007 Transitionrate Months Job exits (E-U) Job findings (U-E) 41 Figure 2 Transition rates by control and treatment group from 01/2002 to 08/2005 2.1 Monthly employment stays (E-E) as a share of observations observed in employment at the beginning of the ongoing month (seasonally adjusted) Note: Seasonally adjusted by deducting calendar month-specific average deviations from the overall mean transition rate from the observed values.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations. 81.0 87.0 93.0 99.0 1/2002 4/2002 7/2002 10/2002 1/2003 4/2003 7/2003 10/2003 1/2004 4/2004 7/2004 10/2004 1/2005 4/2005 7/2005 Transitionrate U-U Months 40 to 44 years old 45 to 51 years old 52 to 56 years old 57 to 64 years old 44 2.4 Monthly job findings (U-E) as a share of observations observed in employment and unemployment at the beginning of the ongoing month (seasonally adjusted Note: Seasonally adjusted by deducting calendar month-specific average deviations from the overall mean transition rate from the observed values. Transition rate for 57 to 62 year-olds not available because of too few transitions.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations. 89 91 93 95 97 99 3/2004 6/2004 9/2004 12/2004 3/2005 6/2005 9/2005 12/2005 3/2006 6/2006 9/2006 12/2006 3/2007 6/2007 9/2007 12/2007 Transitionrate Months Job stays (E-E) Unemployment stays (U-U) 40 1.2 Monthly job separations (E-U) and findings (U-E) as a share of observations observed in employment resp. unemployment at the beginning of the ongoing month (seasonally adjusted, age 40-64, male and female) Note: Seasonally adjusted by deducting calendar month-specific average deviations from the overall mean transition rate from the observed values.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Source: SIAB 7510 and own calculations. 97.0 98.0 99.0 100.0 1/2002 4/2002 7/2002 10/2002 1/2003 4/2003 7/2003 10/2003 1/2004 4/2004 7/2004 10/2004 1/2005 4/2005 7/2005 Transitionrate E-E Months 40 to 44 years old 45 to 51 years old 52 to 56 years old 57 to 64 years old 42 2.2 Monthly job separations (E-U) as a share of observations observed in employment at the beginning of the ongoing month (seasonally adjusted) Note: Seasonally adjusted by deducting calendar month-specific average deviations from the overall mean transition rate from the observed values.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- State U describes individuals who receive unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld I). Jung and Kuhn (2014) discuss that this definition of U differs from the one applied in analyses for the United States, where unemployment is associated with search rather than benefit receipt. In those few instances, when the data suggest simultaneous employment and unemployment spells, we follow the data producers' recommendations and code employment as this is the more reliable information (see Jaenichen et al. 2005). State O describes individuals who left the labor market, who exited from their last spell, or who have gaps of more than 12 weeks between E and U spells.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- The prolongation of unemployment benefit durations as of January 2008 affected those entering unemployment on or after January 1, 2008 and aged 50 or 58 at that time, or those still receiving unemployment benefits from a prior entry to unemployment on January 1, 2008 and aged at least 50 or 58 at that time.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
van Ours, Jan C. and Milan Vodopivec, 2006, How Shortening the Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits Affects the Duration of Unemployment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, Journal of Labor Economics 24(2), 351-378.
vom Berge, Philipp, Marion König, and Stefan Seth, 2013, Stichprobe der Integrierten Arbeitsmarktbiographien (SIAB) 1975-2010, FDZ Datenreport 01/2013, IAB Nürnberg. 26 Table 1 Maximum duration of unemployment benefit receipt (in months) by age and period Note: The cut in durations as of February 2006 affected those unemployed since February 1, 2006.