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Pandemic Recession And Helicopter Money: Venice, 1629-1631. (2022). Ugolini, Stefano ; Masciandaro, Donato ; Goodhart, Charles.
In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp22179.

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  15. All in all: from 1619 a duopolistic public banking system was born in Venice, where the liabilities of the two banks were treated as equivalent (Dunbar 1892, p.324, Ugolini 2017, p. 44), including the seizure exemption privilege (Soresina 1889 p.8), meaning that in no case did judicial courts have the power to seize their deposits.
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  19. Appendix A: Money and State Banks of Issue in Venice The Republic of Venice issued both commodity money (coins) and, starting from 1587, scriptural money (bank deposits) (Dunbar 1892, p. 309 and p. 321), while private bankers were active even before then (Usher 1934, Lane 1937), precisely from 1164 (Fratianni and Spinelli 2006, p.269).
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  20. Appendix B: Pandemic Recession, Helicopter Money and Political Pressure What happened in Venice in the period 1629-1631 can be also described using a model, using and modifying the theoretical settings introduced in Masciandaro and Passarelli (2019), Masciandaro (2020) and Favaretto and Masciandaro (2021).
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  104. In 1593 Banco liabilities became legal tender (Anonimo 1847, p.366, Roberds and Velde 2014, p.21) and its deposits in 1630 represented 80% of the overall volume of exchange settlements in Venice (Sissoko 2002, p.8, Roberds and Velde 2014, p.21). During these years the two legal tenders – coins and bank transfers – were imperfect substitutes, with a premium (“agio”) for payments in transfers relative to those in coins (Dunbar 1892, p.318, Inclimona 1913 p. 149, Fratianni and Spinelli 2006, p.271, Ugolini 2018, p.7), as well as between large and small coins (Sargent and Velde, 1977b, p.23). The conversion rate between the different types of money was determined on the market, and its setting was even more complicated by the fact that Venice adopted a bimetallic monetary standard (Cessi 1937).
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  105. In May 1619 the government created a new public bank (Soresina 1889 p.9, Siboni 1892, p. 288, Inclimona 1913 p.152, Bindseil 2019, pp.215-7) – the Banco del Giro – with floating (short-term) public debt and coins on the asset side (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.24) and the Giro transfers in the liability side, which represented convertible money up to 1630. In general the Republic issued both floating and funded (long-term) debt, where the role of floating debt was rather limited (Pezzolo 2003, p.61). In general the state’s creditors were likely to become floating debt holders, using the transfer mechanism. This mechanism had been first introduced in the 13th century when the Grain Office and Salt Office had started providing transfers for their creditors, and also the Fodder Office used it from 1608 to 1614 (Pezzolo 2003a, p.63, Roberds and Velde 2014, p.24, Ugolini 2018, p.6).
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  106. In respect to governance, as in the case of the Rialto bank, the officers in the new public bank were concessionaires (Soresina 1889 p.13, Dunbar 1892 p.325, Inclimona 1913 p.152, Roberds and Velde 2014, p. 23); the main officer was called the Depositario, (Soresina 1889 p.8, Dunbar 1892, p.324 and 335), with a three months mandate (Soresina 1889 p.9).
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  107. In theory, the Banco di Rialto was supposed to represent a case of quasi-narrow banking, given that it was obliged by law to accept only deposits in coins, and cash was always to remain available at the request of depositors (Anonimo 1847, p.564; Dunbar 1892, p.321), defining tendentially a policy of 100% reserves (Sissoko 2002, p.7 and p.10); transfers had to be made simultaneously between creditors and debtors (Dunbar 1892, p.321, Roberds and Velde 2014 p.20). In practice, however, because the coins into which the Banco’s liabilities were formally convertible had been withdrawn from circulation in 1588, bank liabilities were de facto inconvertible into the new circulating coins (Roberds and Velde 2014, pp.21-2; Ugolini 2017, pp.225-6). Coins were the main item in the asset side of the Rialto bank, notwithstanding – to a certain extent - also private commercial debt was allowed (Ugolini 2017, p.44). Moreover the
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  108. In this respect the Giro bank can be defined as a state bank of issue (Sissoko 2002, p. 11, Fratianni and Spinelli 2006, p.272). The core of this mechanism lay in the relationships between the Giro Bank and the State Mint, via the role of floating debt holders, that we will describe below. Briefly the Giro bank establishment in 1619 can be considered the final step in a process aimed at increasing the transferability of floating debt transfers, transforming them into means of payment (Sissoko 2002, p.9, Fratianni and Spinelli 2006, p.272).
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  109. In Venice both investment credit and consumer credit were available (Mueller 1977, p.294), given that traditionally the private bankers permitted a depositor to overdraw her account (Mueller 1977, p.159) while making the sum immediately available for payments via transfers, whose effects were the same as those of modern cheques (Mueller 1977, p.159, 227).
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  111. Inhabitants expect that when a pandemic occurs their incomes can be hit. Containment measures save lives, but in parallel impose limitations on several economic activities. People suffer because lockdown measures and quarantines reduce their incomes and expenditures (Baker et al. 2020a, Carvalho et al. 2020, Cox et al. 2020). At the same time, inhabitants expect that the policymaker will help those of them who are suffering with an injection of a lump-sum fiscal transfer to mitigate the pandemic costs (Acemoglou et al. 2020, Argente et al. 2020, Brotherhood et al. 2020, Glover et al. 2020).
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  118. Keynes J.M., 1923, A Tract on Monetary Reform, MacMillan and Co., London.
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  126. Lattes A., 1880, Il Fallimento nel Diritto Comune e nella Legislazione Bancaria della Repubblica di Venezia, Tipografia M. Visentini, Venezia.
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  137. Masciandaro D. and Passarelli F., 2019, Populism, Political Pressure and Central Bank (In)dependence, Open Economies Review, 31(3), 691-705.

  138. Masciandaro D., 2020, Covid-19 Helicopter Money: Economics and Politics, Covid Economics, 23-45.
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  139. Monetary externalities can depend on the association between central bank seigniorage and monetary stability risks. The more traditional channel is the relationship between seigniorage and inflation tax (Buiter 2007), that increases both national inflation (Friedman 1969, Aizenman 1992) and, via exchange rate devaluation, international inflation (Hamada 1976). Moreover, monetary externalities can also include banking (Bianchi, 2010) and financial (Stein 2012, Cesa Bianchi and Rebucci 2017) imbalances, or more generally it is a device to take into account the risk of monetary policy multiple equilibria and their costs (Gliksberg 2009, Airaudo and Bossi 2017).
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  140. Monnet E. and Velde F.R., 2020, Money, Banking and Old-School Historical Economics, CEPR Discussion Paper Series, n.15348.

  141. Moreover, in their period of coexistence the two public banks were interconnected in some coin exchange operations (Soresina 1889 p.9); while the reciprocal clearing of their liabilities was forbidden, given the need to maintain separation between the two banks (Soresina 1889 p.13). The duopolistic setting ended in 1637, when the Banco di Rialto was shut down (Soresina 1889 p.8, Dunbar 1892, p.324, Roberds and Velde 2014, p. 25, Fratianni and Spinelli 2006 p.271, Ugolini 2017 p.44), with the Banco del Giro remaining the only public Bank in Venice.
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  142. Moreover, we could introduce heterogeneity in the propensity to consume, that can influence the effect of the fiscal transfer in stimulating consumption (Andreolli and Surico 2021).
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  143. Muellbauer J., 2014, Combatting Eurozone Deflation, Vox, CEPR, June 10.
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  145. Mueller R.C., 1977, The Procuratori di San Marco and the Venetian Credit Market, New York, Arno Press.
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  147. Nowakowski, A., 2021, Do Unhappy Citizens Vote for Populism?. European Journal of Political Economy, 68, 101985.

  148. Orphanides A., 2016, Fiscal Implications of Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies, IMFS Working Paper Series, n.105, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt.

  149. Overdrafts were recognized as legitimate by the state (Mueller 1977, p.214), and deposit transferability was available; for example a loan between two citizens could be based on a bank deposit, given that bankers accepted deposits, letting their depositors settle credit-debt relationships by transferring deposits between each other (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.15). In Venice private credit-debt relationships were also possible, for example through temporary loans, insurance contracts (Tenenti 1953, p.61), or investment in foreign exchange transactions, that were common also among people of modest wealth (Cecchini 2018, p.58). The association between asset holding and credit availability can be further confirmed from the fact that normally the premium between a bank transfer and the coin was positive (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.24) , i.e. the ducato di banco (bank ducat) had a superior value than a ducato d’argento (silver ducat) (Anonimo 1847, p.365 used the two denominations).
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  159. Pezzolo L., 2007, Government Debts and Credit Markets in Renaissance Italy, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Working Paper Series, n.5 Pezzolo L., 2018, Public Banks and State Finance in Florence and Venice, in L. Costabile and L. Neal (eds), Financial Innovation and Resilience, Chapter 7, Springer, 147-164.

  160. Pezzolo L., 2021, Una Finanza in Guerra, 1645-1669, in Ortalli G., Gullino G., Ivetic E. (eds.), L’Inestinguibile Sogno del Dominio: Francesco Morosini, Venezia, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti,
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  162. Puga D. And Trefler D., 2014, International Trade and Institutional Change: Medieval Venice’s Response to Globalization, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(2), 753-821.

  163. Pullan B., 1960, Poverty, Charity and the Reason of State: Some Venetian Examples, Bollettino Istituto Storia della Società e dello Stato Veneziano, 2, 26-27.
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  164. Pullan B., 1964, Wage-Earners and the Venetian Economy, 1550-1630, Economic History Review, 16(3), 407-426.

  165. Quinn S. and Roberds W., 2007, How Amsterdam Got Fiat Money, Journal of Monetary Economics, 66, 1-12.
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  166. Quinn S. and Roberds W., 2007, The Bank of Amsterdam and the Leap to Central Bank Money, American Economic Review, 97(2), 262-265.

  167. Rapp R.T., 1976, Industry and Economic Decline in Seventeenth-Century Venice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts.
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  168. recognized in the traditional literature (Keynes 1923, Bresciani-Turroni 1937, Friedman and Schwartz 1963), and that has been discussed again recently (Doepke and Schneider 2006, Colbion et al. 2012). Also in early modern Venice the ruling elites constantly demanded a stable currency (Al-Bawwab 2021). Allowing for this kind of heterogeneity would lead to a straightforward prediction: the smaller the mass of inflation risk-adverse citizens, the stronger the political pressure to engage in fiscal monetization.
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  169. Regarding commodity money, the mint of Venice was active since 814, issuing coins that progressively came to dominate Mediterranean trade from the thirteenth century (Stahl 2000, Day 2003). Coinage was essential for trade reasons; but at the same time the mint produced relevant revenues for the Republic (Stahl 2001, p.42). Evidently in preindustrial times the economics of minting (Sargent and Velde 1997a and 1997b, Redish and Weber 2011) was essential to address the never-ending trade-off between monetary stability and seigniorage.
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  170. Regarding scriptural money, on April 1587 (Roberds and Velde 2014 p.19) the Most Serene Republic of Venice definitively established its first public bank, after a process started on December 1584 (Soresina, 1889, p.7): the Banco di Rialto (Bindseil 2019, pp.207-10). Until then the government provided public money by issuing gold, silver and copper coins through its minting activity (Roberds and Velde 2014 p.19).
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  171. Regarding the Banco’s governance, the bank manager was a public concessionaire (Ugolini 2017 p.36), who was called “Depositario” (escrow agent) (Anonimo 1847, p.364), or “Governatore”11 (governor) (Soresina, 1889, p.8), chosen and paid by the government, given a list of submitted proposals (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.20). The government was the guarantor of the deposits (Pezzolo 2018, p.153); yet the governor was required to post a bond as guarantee and was considered responsible for the full satisfaction of any bank obligation at the end of his mandate – upon request, in cash - (Ugolini 2017, p. 42), under pain of confiscation 11 Some authors used the name “Depositario” to define the governor of the Rialto bank (Sandi 1756, Ferro 1778, Anonimo 1847) while others (Soresina 1889, p.5, Luzzatto 1954, p.231) used “Governatore”, claiming that “Depositario” has been used for the first time later, when the Giro bank was established.
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  172. Regarding the respective business roles of the two public banks, while the Rialto bank was a deposit bank, the Giro bank was a device to make the public debt easily transferable, turning it into a means of payment (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.22), and “paying deposits at the call of the depositor, like the existing Banco di Rialto” (Dunbar 1892, p.325), with the possibility of deposit overdrawing (Dunbar 1892, p.325), i.e. to make loans. The account holders were floating debt holders; the Giro bank was allowed to accept deposits of private individuals only from 1643 (Sissoko 2002, p.11).
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  173. Reis R., 2015, Comment on: “When Does a Central Bank’s Balance Sheet Require Fiscal Support?”, by M. Del Negro and C. A. Sims, Journal of Monetary Economics, 73 (C), 20–25 Reis R., 2020, The Fiscal Footprint of Macroprudential Policy, Deutshe Bundesbank, Discussion Paper Series, n.31.

  174. Reis, R., 2013, Central Bank Design, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(4), 17-44.

  175. Rialto bank eventually centralized the clearing mechanism for payments in Venice (Dunbar 1892, p.323, Fratianni and Spinelli 2006, p.271).
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  176. Roberds W. and Velde F.R., 2014, Early Public Banks, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper Series, n.3. Sandi V., 1756, Magistrato sopra il Banco Giro, in: Storia Civile Veneziana, v.2, p.3, Venezia.

  177. Sargent T. And Velde F.R., 1997a, The Big Problem of Small Change, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper Series, October, n.8. Sargent T. And Velde F.R., 1997b, The Evolution of Small Change, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, December, mimeo.
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  178. Sargent T.J and Wallace, N., 1981, Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic, Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Fall, 1-17.

  179. Sargent T.J. and Velde F.R., 2002, The Big Problem of Small Change, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
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  180. Sargent T.J., 1982, The Ends of Four Big Inflations, in R.E. Hall (ed.), Inflation, Chicago, Chicago University Press.

  181. Second, the less the policymaker is involved in supporting the economy during the pandemic recession through fiscal transfers, the more likely are negative second-round effects on the wellfunctioning of the economic and financial system after the pandemic (pandemic externalities) (Acharya and Steffen 2020, Anderson et al. 2020, Deb et al. 2020, Bloom et al. 2021). Third, the fiscal policy financing introduces the possibility of monetary stability risks (monetary externalities). Therefore the policymaker will choose its economy policy design maximizing a welfare function with three terms (Masciandaro and Passarelli 2019, Masciandaro 2020): (1) Where U(β,δ,τ), F(β) and M(β,δ) are respectively the citizen utility, the pandemic externalities and the monetary externalities, while τ, β, and δ represent the key economy policy variables: taxation, fiscal spending and fiscal monetization. Then the first step is to explore how citizens behave.
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  182. Segura A. and Villacorta A., 2020, Policies to Support Firms in a Lockdown: A Pecking Order, Covid Economics, 25, 90-121.
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  183. Siboni G., 1892, Il Banco Giro di Venezia: A Proposito di Alcune Recenti Pubblicazioni, Giornale degli Economisti, 5, 287-295.
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  184. Sims C.A., 2003, Fiscal Aspects of Central Bank Independence, http://sims.princeton.edu/ytfp/Munich/CBInd.pdf.
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  185. Sissoko C., 2002, The Political Economy of Private Paper Money: Institutional Development in Europe up to 1800, ssrn.com, mimeo.
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  186. Sissoko C., 2007, The Disappearance of Deposit Banks: An Explanation, ssrn.com, mimeo.
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  187. Smith D.J. and Al-Bawwab R.A., 2017, Constraining Elites: The Self-Enforcing Constitution of the Patricians of Venice, Political Economy Research Institute, Middle Tennessee State University, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2851157.
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  188. Soresina A., 1889, Il Banco Giro di Venezia, Fratelli Visentini, Venezia.
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  189. Stahl A.M., 2000, Zecca: The Mint of Venice in the Middle Ages, Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press.
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  190. Stahl A.M.,2001, The Venetian Mint in the Age of the Black Death, Material Culture and Cultural Materialism, Brepols Publishers.
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  191. Stein J.C., 2012, Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1), 57-95.

  192. Temin P., 2013, The Roman Market Economy, Chapters Two and Eight, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
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  193. Tenenti A., 1953, Naufrages, Corsaires et Assurances Maritimes à Venice 1592-1609, Paris.
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  194. The convertibility promise on Giro bank deposits was based on the fact that in the State Mint an amount of commodity money served as a fund to back the operations of the Giro (Dunbar 1982, p.326), although the backing was not 100%. In fact on June 1619 the Senate authorized on the one hand the creation of 150,000 ducats’ worth of coin reserves earmarked at the Mint for the Giro, and on the other hand 500,000 ducats’ worth of Giro balances to pay its creditors (Soresina 1889 p.12-13, Roberds and Velde 2014, p.23) - i.e. the holders of the Giro transfers. Moreover, a flow of the Mint commodity money was earmarked to repay Giro scriptural money using coins: the decree of foundation of the Banco actually ordered monthly transfers of 10,000 ducats from the Mint to the Giro for repayments (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.24) up to the limit of 50,000 ducats (Soresina 1889 p.15).
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  195. The crisis of the War of Chioggia (1378-81) can be considered a turning point, given that this fiscal emergency led the Venetian government to implement a debasement policy, altering the standard of its coins (Stahl 2000). The early fifteenth century saw reforms to both gold and silver mints (Stahl 2000, Day 2003). The debasement strategy was a policy that governments frequently implemented in response to negative macroeconomic shocks (Kindleberger 1991).
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  196. The existence of a positive premium between public banking money (scriptural money) and coins (commodity money) was almost a constant in the Venetian experience (Siboni 1892, p. 291, Magatti, 1914, p. 285-289); only sometimes were they at par (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.17). The premium drivers are likely to have been on the one hand the credit availability attached with public bank money (Dunbar 1892, p.330), and on the other hand the quality of the available commodity money (Dunbar 1892, p.331). Moreover, the scriptural money at the time was safer for obvious security reasons (Dunbar 1892, p.309 and p.321). The premium can be considered a relative price between scriptural money and commodity money, associated with the relative quantity/quality of the two monies.
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  197. The Giro bank seems to have had some flexibility in the choice of coins in which to repay (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.24). Progressively convertibility difficulties arose, with delaying payments going hand in hand with further creation of liabilities (Dunbar 1892, p.327). As we already know, authorizations to convert liabilities into coins were suspended in 1630 (Siboni, 1892, p.290, Dunbar 1893 p.211, Inclimona 1913 p.154-155) during the pandemic, eventually transforming the Giro bank into the first example of a purely fiduciary state-issued legal-tender money (Ugolini, 2018, p.7), acting as a clearinghouse for the community (Sissoko 2002, p.10).
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  198. The policymaker maximizes the social-welfare function (1), setting her strategy on taxation,  , fiscal transfer, *  , and fiscal monetization policy, *  . Being a social planner in action, fiscal and monetary policy are optimally coordinated (among others, from Abel 1987 to Bianchi et al. 2020), including the degree of fiscal monetization (among others, Chari and Kehoe 1999, Punzo and Rossi 2019). Regarding the institutional setting, we have here a fiscal dominance regime (Sargent and Wallace 1981): monetary policy is not independent. Focusing on the optimal level of fiscal monetization, *  , its social optimal value is:     i − = 1 * . (7) The optimal level of monetization, *  , will increase: a) the more taxation is distortionary; b) the more the cost of debt servicing is high; c) the more monetary externality aversion is low. Given the decision in terms of fiscal monetization, the final step is its implementation.
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  199. The Rialto bank was created by the government to correct a market failure: the private sector per se was unable to supply an efficient and safe payment service (Roberds and Velde 2014 p.15), given that the Venetian payment system has been characterized by a series of bank failures (Ugolini 2018, p.5). In 1584 It has been calculated that only seven private banks out of one hundred and three were able to avoid bankruptcy procedures (Lattes 1880, p.40, Dunbar 1892, p.312); in such procedures banks were not considered at all as special firms (Lattes 1880, ,p.47), i.e. activities needing special bankruptcy procedures. Yet a banking supervision body was
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  200. The venality of offices was in part a device for public funding: the purchaser of the office paid a given amount (the principal) – or made a temporary loan posting a guarantee – while the government paid him a salary (the interest) (Pezzolo 2007, p. 8). The Bank was to be formally liquidated every three years (Dunbar 1892, p.321), in order to reduce the possibility of losses larger than the governor’s personal assets, while the private bankers were required to liquidate every six years (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.21). Moreover, the costs of the bank establishment were to be met by public resources – i.e. import taxes (Dunbar 1892, p.312). Summing up, the Banco di Rialto was a quasi-narrow bank, acting also as a clearing house, and governed through a public concession managed by a hybrid player, being the governor in charge, a mix between a public manager and a private banker.
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  201. Then, “as long as the monthly flow was sufficient to accommodate depositors’ requests, the bank’s liabilities remained convertible (….); the State (….) adjusted the monthly flows of cash from the Mint to service the redemption requests” (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.24).
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    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp22179.

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  3. Pandemic Recession and Helicopter Money: Venice, 1629--1631. (2022). Ugolini, Stefano ; Masciandaro, Donato ; Goodhart, Charles.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2201.07181.

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  4. Pandemic Recession and Helicopter Money: Venice, 1629–1631. (2021). Ugolini, Stefano ; Masciandaro, Donato ; Goodhart, Charles.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03522231.

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  5. Pandemic recession, helicopter money and central banking: Venice, 1630. (2021). Ugolini, Stefano ; Masciandaro, Donato ; Goodhart, C. A. E., .
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:108555.

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  6. Pandemic Recession, Helicopter Money and Central Banking: Venice, 1630. (2021). Ugolini, Stefano ; masciandaro, donato ; Goodhart, Charles A.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15715.

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  7. Liquidity, the Mundell-Tobin Effect, and the Friedman Rule. (2020). Altermatt, Lukas ; Wipf, Christian.
    In: Diskussionsschriften.
    RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp2013.

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  8. Convergence, financial development, and policy analysis. (2020). Wang, Pengfei ; Miao, Jianjun ; Lin, Justin.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:69:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01181-z.

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  9. Liquidity constraints, international trade, and optimal monetary policy. (2020). Ho, Wai-Ming ; Wai-Ming, HO.
    In: The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:bpj:bejmac:v:20:y:2020:i:2:p:29:n:1.

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  10. Heterogeneity, monetary policy, Mirrleesian taxes, and the Friedman rule. (2019). Gahvari, Firouz ; Micheletto, Luca.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:67:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-018-1108-x.

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  11. Convergence, Financial Development, and Policy Analysis. (2019). Wang, Pengfei ; Miao, Jianjun ; Lin, Justin Yifu.
    In: Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:bos:wpaper:dp-307.

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  12. Convergence, Financial Development, and Policy Analysis. (2019). Miao, Jianjun ; Wang, Pengfei ; Lin, Justin Yifu.
    In: Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-307.

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  13. The natural interest rate in OLG modelling: A rehabilitation. (2018). van Suntum, Ulrich.
    In: CAWM Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:103.

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  14. Money Creation: Tax or Public Liquidity?. (2018). Reichlin, Pietro.
    In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
    RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:50:y:2018:i:5:p:1073-1094.

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  15. Time-Inconsistent Discounting and the Friedman Rule: The Role of Non-Unitary Discounting. (2018). Futagami, Koichi ; Hori, Takeo.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics and Business.
    RePEc:osk:wpaper:1804.

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  16. A Study in Monetary Macroeconomics. (2017). Homburg, Stefan.
    In: OUP Catalogue.
    RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780198807537.

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  17. Optimal Taxes Under Private Information: The Role of the Inflation Tax. (2017). Waller, Christopher ; Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2017-014.

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  18. Superneutrality of Money under Open Market Operations. (2015). Homburg, Stefan.
    In: Review of Economics.
    RePEc:lus:reveco:v:66:y:2015:i:3:p:289-302.

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  19. Superneutrality of Money under Open Market Operations. (2015). Homburg, Stefan.
    In: Hannover Economic Papers (HEP).
    RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-541.

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  20. Superneutrality of Money under Open Market Operations. (2015). Homburg, Stefan.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5219.

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  21. Инфляция активов и кредитная экспансия в экономике с перекрывающимися поколениями. (2014). Трофимов Г. Ю., .
    In: Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ).
    RePEc:scn:cememm:v:50:y:2014:i:4:p:89-103.

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  22. The Chicago Tradition and Commercial Bank Seigniorage. (2014). Varelas, Erotokritos ; Soldatos, Gerasimos T..
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:57721.

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  23. The Chicago Tradition and Commercial Bank Seigniorage. (2014). varelas, erotokritos ; Soldatos, Gerasimos.
    In: Research in World Economy.
    RePEc:jfr:rwe111:v:5:y:2014:i:1:p:29-38.

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  24. The Friedman rule in an overlapping-generations model with nonlinear taxation and income misreporting. (2014). Micheletto, Luca ; Gahvari, Firouz.
    In: Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies.
    RePEc:hhs:uufswp:2012_009.

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  25. The Friedman rule in an overlapping-generations model with nonlinear taxation and income misreporting. (2014). Micheletto, Luca ; Gahvari, Firouz.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:119:y:2014:i:c:p:10-23.

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  26. The Friedman Rule in a Model with Endogenous Growth and Cash‐in‐Advance Constraint. (2012). Gahvari, Firouz.
    In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
    RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:44:y:2012:i:5:p:787-823.

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  27. Fertility and money in an OLG model. (2012). Fanti, Luciano.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:pie:dsedps:2012/145.

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  28. Monetary policy and redistribution: What can or cannot be neutralized with Mirrleesian taxes. (2012). Micheletto, Luca ; Gahvari, Firouz.
    In: Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies.
    RePEc:hhs:uufswp:2012_005.

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  29. The optimal inflation target in an economy with limited enforcement. (2012). Bullard, James ; Azariadis, Costas ; Antinolfi, Gaetano.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2012-044.

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  30. Monetary Policy and Redistribution: What can or cannot be Neutralized with Mirrleesian Taxes. (2012). Micheletto, Luca ; Gahvari, Firouz.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3711.

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  31. Nonoptimality of the Friedman Rule with Capital Income Taxation. (2011). Petrucci, Alberto.
    In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
    RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:43:y:2011:i:1:p:163-183.

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  32. Inflation and investment in monetary growth models. (2009). Rzońca, Andrzej ; Hołda, Marcin ; Ciżkowicz, Piotr ; Rzoca, Andrzej ; Cikowicz, Piotr ; Hoda, Marcin .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:19307.

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  33. Agglomeration economies in the Netherlands. (2009). Westerhout, ED.
    In: CPB Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:cpb:discus:124.rdf.

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  34. Optimal Nonlinear Taxation in an Overlapping-Generations Setting with Money as an Asset. (2008). Yakita, Akira.
    In: FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis.
    RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200803)64:1_19:ontiao_2.0.tx_2-p.

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  35. An overlapping-generations model with search. (2008). Zhu, Tao.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:142:y:2008:i:1:p:318-331.

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  36. Employment targeting. (2008). Bnassy, Jean-Pascal.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:320-323.

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  37. The optimal inflation target in an economy with limited enforcement. (2007). Bullard, James ; Azariadis, Costas ; Antinolfi, Gaetano.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2007-037.

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  38. The Friedman rule: Old and new. (2007). Gahvari, Firouz.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:54:y:2007:i:2:p:581-589.

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  39. An Overlapping-Generations Model with Search. (2007). .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ecl:corcae:07-09.

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  40. Life expectancy, money, and growth. (2006). Yakita, Akira.
    In: Journal of Population Economics.
    RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:19:y:2006:i:3:p:579-592.

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  41. Employment targeting. (2006). Benassy, Jean-Pascal .
    In: PSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00590456.

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  42. A theory of low inflation in a non Ricardian economy with credit constraints. (2005). .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590788.

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  43. The real effect of inflation in liquidity constrained models. (2005). .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590556.

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  44. The real effect of inflation in liquidity constrained models. (2005). Ragot, Xavier.
    In: PSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00590556.

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  45. The liquidity trap, the real balance effect, and the Friedman rule. (2005). Ireland, Peter.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedbwp:05-3.

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  46. Fiscal Policy and Optimal Monetary Rules in a non Ricardian Economy. (2003). Benassy, Jean-Pascal.
    In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
    RePEc:red:issued:v:6:y:2003:i:3:p:498-512.

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  47. Seigniorage and public good in an OLG model with cash-in-advance constraints. (2002). Wigniolle, Bertrand ; Michel, Philippe ; Crettez, Bertrand.
    In: Research in Economics.
    RePEc:eee:reecon:v:56:y:2002:i:4:p:333-364.

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  48. The Economic Effects of Inflation Tax Instruments in an Overlapping-Generations Economy with Production. (2002). Shi, Jianhuai .
    In: Annals of Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2002:v:3:i:2:p:433-451.

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  49. On the optimality of activist policies with a less informed government. (2001). Benassy, Jean-Pascal.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:47:y:2001:i:1:p:45-59.

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  50. On the Optimality of Activist Policies with a Less Informed Government. (1999). .
    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
    RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp186.

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