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The complementary nature of trust and contract enforcement. (2021). Netzer, Nick ; Huffman, David ; Fehr, Ernst ; Bartling, Björn.
In: ECON - Working Papers.
RePEc:zur:econwp:377.

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Cited: 2

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  1. Employee trust and performance constraints in public sector organizations. (2024). Vlaicu, Razvan ; Keefer, Philip.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:81:y:2024:i:c:s0176268024000053.

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  2. Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On. (2023). Malcomson, James ; MacLeod, Bentley W.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15881.

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References

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  1. “Period” takes on values 1 to 15, or 1 to 10 in Colum (4) indicating the respective period. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 47 Table A2: Effort Levels as Function of Trust and Time Period in the Different Contracting Environments WEAK MEDIUM STRONG All periods All periods All periods Periods < 11 (1) (2) (3) (4) HT 0.76 2.05*** 3.07*** 2.55*** [0.50] [0.50] [0.37] [0.42] Period-0.11*** -0.00-0.04 0.01 [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] HT x Period-0.08** -0.08*** -0.12** -0.01 [0.04] [0.02] [0.05] [0.08] Constant 3.42*** 2.29*** 3.59*** 3.35*** [0.21] [0.30] [0.20] [0.23] Observations 1031 1046 1042 694 Notes: Panel regression estimates with random effects for principals.
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Cocites

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  2. Reciprocity with uncertainty about others. (2022). Wu, Wenhao ; Sohn, Jin-Yeong.
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  3. Competition between friends and foes. (2022). Mill, Wladislaw ; Morgan, John.
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  4. On the equivalence of optimal mechanisms with loss and disappointment aversion. (2022). Benkert, Jean-Michel.
    In: Economics Letters.
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  5. The complementary nature of trust and contract enforcement. (2021). Netzer, Nick ; Huffman, David ; Fehr, Ernst ; Bartling, Björn.
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:econwp:377.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. The Incentive Costs of Welfare Judgments. (2021). Daske, Thomas.
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  7. Ex-post implementation with social preferences. (2021). Zik, Boaz.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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  8. Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading. (2021). Crawford, Vincent.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  9. The Complementary Nature of Trust and Contract Enforcement. (2021). Fehr, Ernst ; Bartling, Björn ; Huffman, David B ; Netzer, Nick ; Huffmann, David B.
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  10. Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: Gamification and the Coase Theorem. (2020). Daske, Thomas.
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  11. Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: Gamification and the Coase Theorem. (2020). Daske, Thomas .
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  12. Building friendship with Boss: Strategic prosocial behaviors in the agency model. (2020). Tsai, Yi Hao ; Ho, Shirley J.
    In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
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  13. Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory. (2020). Battigalli, Pierpaolo ; Dufwenberg, Martin.
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  14. Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: Gamification and the Coase Theorem. (2019). Daske, Thomas.
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  16. Public good provision mechanisms and reciprocity. (2019). Nicolo', Antonio ; Kozlovskaya, Maria .
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  17. Modelling kindness. (2019). Kirchsteiger, Georg ; Dufwenberg, Martin.
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  18. Communication as Gift-Exchange. (2018). Patel, Amrish ; Le Quement, Mark.
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  19. Strong implementation with partially honest individuals. (2018). Savva, Foivos.
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  20. Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs. (2018). Patel, Amrish ; Dufwenberg, Martin ; Jang, Dooseok .
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  22. Imitation perfection - a simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement. (2017). Wambach, Achim ; Mass, Helene ; Gretschko, Vitali ; Fugger, Nicolas .
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  23. Externality Assessments, Welfare Judgments, and Mechanism Design. (2017). Daske, Thomas.
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  24. Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?. (2017). Netzer, Nick ; Gesche, Tobias ; Bartling, Björn.
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  25. Robust mechanism design and social preferences. (2017). Ockenfels, Axel ; Ruckert, Desiree ; Pollak, Andreas ; Bierbrauer, Felix.
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  26. Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?. (2016). Netzer, Nick ; Bartling, Björn.
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  27. An externality-robust auction: Theory and experimental evidence. (2016). Netzer, Nick ; Bartling, Bjorn.
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