- “Period” takes on values 1 to 15, or 1 to 10 in Colum (4) indicating the respective period. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 47 Table A2: Effort Levels as Function of Trust and Time Period in the Different Contracting Environments WEAK MEDIUM STRONG All periods All periods All periods Periods < 11 (1) (2) (3) (4) HT 0.76 2.05*** 3.07*** 2.55*** [0.50] [0.50] [0.37] [0.42] Period-0.11*** -0.00-0.04 0.01 [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] HT x Period-0.08** -0.08*** -0.12** -0.01 [0.04] [0.02] [0.05] [0.08] Constant 3.42*** 2.29*** 3.59*** 3.35*** [0.21] [0.30] [0.20] [0.23] Observations 1031 1046 1042 694 Notes: Panel regression estimates with random effects for principals.
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