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Complementarities in Corporate Governance - A Survey of the Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan. (1999). Heinrich, Ralph P.
In: Kiel Working Papers.
RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:947.

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  1. Hybridization and heterogeneity across national models of corporate governance. (2002). Aguilera, Ruth ; Jackson, Gregory.
    In: economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter.
    RePEc:zbw:econso:155804.

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  2. A Model of Corporate Governance As a System. (1999). Heinrich, Ralph P.
    In: Kiel Working Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:931.

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References

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  26. Past and future of the bankruptcy law in Brazil and Latin America. (2005). Funchal, Bruno ; Araujo, Aloisio ; PessoadeAraujo, Aloisio ; de Araujo, Aloisio Pessoa .
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  27. Corporate governance and manager turnover: An unusual social experiment. (2005). Qiu, Jiaping ; aivazian, varouj ; Ge, Ying .
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  28. An approach to bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies. (2004). Mayes, David.
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  29. Cross-Shareholdings, Outside Directors, and Managerial Turnover: The Case of Japan. (2004). Abe, Naohito ; Jung, Taehun .
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  30. Análisis y Recomendaciones para una Reforma de la Ley de Quiebras (Analysis and Recommendations for Reform of the Bankruptcy Law). (2004). Mery, Rafael ; Fischer, Ronald ; Bonilla, Claudio ; Tagle, Jose ; Luders, Rolf .
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  31. Endogenous Credit Constraints and Factor Market Rigidities: the case of Bankruptcy. (2004). Bonilla, Claudio ; Fischer, R..
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  32. SISTEMAS LEGAIS DE INSOLVÊNCIA, INCENTIVOS E MERCADO DE CRÉDITO: UMA ABORDAGEM INSTITUCIONAL. (2004). Ana Carla Abr, .
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  33. Competition in Japan. (2004). Porter, Michael E. ; Sakakibara, Mariko .
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  34. Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy. (2003). von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig ; Roland, Gérard ; Berglof, Erik ; BERGLF, Erik.
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  35. As leis de falência: uma abordagem econômica. (2003). Araujo, Aloisio ; PessoadeAraujo, Aloisio ; de Araujo, Aloisio Pessoa .
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  36. Credit, Wages and Bankruptcy Laws. (2003). Mariotti, Thomas ; Biais, Bruno.
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  37. Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control. (2001). Hart, Oliver ; Bebchuk, Lucian.
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  38. Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy. (2001). Bebchuk, Lucian.
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  39. Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control. (2001). Hart, Oliver ; Bebchuk, Lucian.
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  40. Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy. (2001). Bebchuk, Lucian.
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  41. How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company?. (2001). Felli, Leonardo ; Cornelli, Francesca.
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  42. Income Smoothing and Discretionary R&D Expenditures of Japanese Firms*. (2000). Kwak, Wikil ; File, Richard G ; Mande, Vivek.
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  43. Different Approaches to Bankruptcy. (2000). Hart, Oliver.
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  44. Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy. (2000). Bebchuk, Lucian.
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  45. Different Approaches to Bankruptcy. (2000). Hart, Oliver.
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  46. Systemic Financial Distress and Auction-Based Bankruptcy Reorganization. (2000). Hausch, Donald B. ; Ramachandran, S..
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  47. Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Evidence from Russia. (2000). Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina ; Sonin, Konstantin ; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane.
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  48. Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style. (2000). Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina ; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane.
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  49. How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company. (2000). Felli, Leonardo ; Cornelli, Francesca.
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  50. Complementarities in Corporate Governance - A Survey of the Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan. (1999). Heinrich, Ralph P.
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  51. Bankruptcy reorganization through markets : Auction-based Creditor Ordering by Reducing Debts (ACCORD). (1999). Hausch, Donald B. ; Ramachandran, S..
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  52. Is corporate governance ineffective in emerging markets?. (1999). Gibson, Michael S..
    In: Finance and Economics Discussion Series.
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  53. Corporate Governance. (1999). Tirole, Jean.
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  56. Beneficial firm runs. (1998). Longhofer, Stanley D..
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  59. Absolute priority rule violations, credit rationing, and efficiency. (1997). Longhofer, Stanley D..
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  60. Credit rationing, bankruptcy cost, and the optimal debt contract for small business. (1997). Yan, Ying.
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  65. Debt as a control device in transitional economies : the experiences of Hungary and Poland. (1995). Gray, Cheryl W. ; Baer, Herbert L..
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  66. Signaling in Financial Reorganization: Theory and Evidence from Canada. (1995). Martel, Jocelyn.
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  67. Bankruptcy rules and debt contracting: on the relative efficiency of absolute priority, proportionate priority, and first-come, first-served rules. (1994). Longhofer, Stanley D..
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  68. More on the Impact of Bankruptcy Reform in Canada. (1994). Martel, Jocelyn.
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  69. Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests. (). Stromberg, Per.
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