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Contracting with Externalities. (1998). Segal, Ilya.
In: Public Economics.
RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9802002.

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  1. Competition in Loan Contracts. (2001). Rajan, Uday ; Parlour, Christine A..
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:5:p:1311-1328.

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