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Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency. (1994). Reinganum, Jennifer ; Daughety, Andrew.
In: Game Theory and Information.
RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9403009.

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Cited: 48

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  2. Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible. (2023). Friehe, Tim ; Gabuthy, Yannick ; Ayouni, Mehdi.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
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  3. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT WITH SECOND?ORDER UNCERTAINTY. (2021). Park, Jeehyeong ; Beshkar, Mostafa.
    In: International Economic Review.
    RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:62:y:2021:i:4:p:1433-1452.

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  4. Reverse payments, patent strength, and asymmetric information. (2021). Manganelli, Antongiulio.
    In: Health Economics.
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  5. Optimism and pessimism in bargaining and contests. (2020). Yang, Erya.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
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  6. Fee shifting and accuracy in adjudication. (2020). Saraceno, Margherita ; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0144818819303151.

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  7. Malice in pretrial negotiations. (2019). Guha, Brishti.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:58:y:2019:i:c:p:25-33.

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  8. Litigation and the timing of settlement: evidence from commercial disputes. (2017). Grajzl, Peter ; Zajc, Katarina.
    In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
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  9. Dispute Settlement with Second-Order Uncertainty: The Case of International Trade Disputes. (2017). Park, Jee-Hyeong ; Beshkar, Mostafa.
    In: CAEPR Working Papers.
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  10. Understanding the Time to Court Case Resolution: A Competing Risks Analysis Using Belgian Data. (2017). Grajzl, Peter ; Bielen, Samantha ; Marneffe, Wim.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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  11. Resource Constraints and the Criminal Justice System: Evidence from Judicial Vacancies. (2016). Yang, Crystal S.
    In: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.
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  12. Patent Litigation Insurance. (2015). Duchene, Anne.
    In: Working Papers.
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  13. The dynamics of one-sided incomplete information in motor disputes. (2015). Bermudez, Lluis ; Santolino, Miguel ; Ayuso, Mercedes.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
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  14. Litigation and the Timing of Settlement: Evidence from Commercial Disputes. (2015). Grajzl, Peter ; Zajc, Katarina.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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  15. Implementation by Gradual Revelation. (2015). Celik, Gorkem.
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  16. An Economic Analysis on Overbilling Incentives and Auditing Programs. (2014). Kuo, Chris .
    In: Journal of Business Ethics.
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  17. Litigation and settlement under judicial agency. (2012). Usman, Murat ; Koçkesen, Levent ; Kokesen, Levent .
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
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  18. The Social Cost of Blackmail. (2011). Yerokhin, Oleg.
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  19. The Social Cost of Blackmail. (2011). Yerokhin, Oleg.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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  20. Early Settlement and Errors in Merger Control. (2011). Lyons, Bruce ; Garrod, Luke.
    In: Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP).
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  21. Die Steuerungswirkungen unterschiedlicher Prozesskostenregelungen: Ein Ãœberblick zum Stand von Theorie und Empirie. (2011). Schwab, Christian ; Tang, Hin-Yue Benny .
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  22. Litigation and Settlement under Judicial Agency. (2011). Usman, Murat ; Koçkesen, Levent ; Kokesen, Levent .
    In: Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers.
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  23. The Social Cost of Blackmail. (2011). Yerokhin, Oleg.
    In: Review of Law & Economics.
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  24. The unexpected effects of caps on non-economic damages. (2010). Bustos, Alvaro ; Avraham, Ronen .
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
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  25. Determinants of the decision to appeal against motor bodily injury judgements made by Spanish trial courts. (2010). Santolino, Miguel.
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  26. Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties. (2010). LANGLAIS, Eric ; Cortade, Thomas ; CHOPARD, Bertrand.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
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  27. Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation. (2010). Linnemer, Laurent ; Choné, Philippe ; Chone, Philippe.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  28. Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation. (2010). Kirstein, Roland ; Gerhard, Hans .
    In: Review of Law & Economics.
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  29. Contingent Fees, Signaling and Settlement Authority. (2009). Leshem, Shmuel .
    In: Review of Law & Economics.
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  30. Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties. (2008). LANGLAIS, Eric ; Cortade, Thomas ; CHOPARD, Bertrand.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  31. Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse. (2008). LANGLAIS, Eric.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  32. Effizienzaspekte alternativer Streitbeilegung. (2008). Kirstein, Roland.
    In: FEMM Working Papers.
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  33. Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties. (2008). Langlais, Eric ; Cortade, Thomas ; Chopard, Bertrand.
    In: Working Papers.
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  34. Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties. (2008). LANGLAIS, Eric ; Cortade, Thomas ; CHOPARD, Bertrand.
    In: EconomiX Working Papers.
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  35. Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening. (2008). Linnemer, Laurent ; Choné, Philippe.
    In: Working Papers.
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  36. Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening. (2008). Linnemer, Laurent ; Choné, Philippe ; Chone, Philippe.
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  37. Negative Expected Value Suits in a Signaling Model. (2007). Pecorino, Paul ; Farmer, Amy.
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  38. Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence dune asymétrie dinformaion sur laversion au risque des parties. (2006). LANGLAIS, Eric.
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  39. Dispute Rates and Contingency Fees: An Analysis from the Signaling Model. (2005). Pecorino, Paul ; Fanner, Amy.
    In: Southern Economic Journal.
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  40. The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League Baseball. (2004). Stango, Victor ; Pecorino, Paul ; Farmer, Amy.
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  41. Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation. (2004). Rickman, Neil ; heyes, anthony ; Tzavara, Dionisia .
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
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  42. Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining and Two-Sided Incomplete Information. (2003). Wittman, Donald ; Friedman, Daniel.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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  43. LITIGATION WITH SYMMETRIC BARGAINING AND TWO-SIDED INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. (2003). Wittman, Donald ; Friedman, Daniel.
    In: Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series.
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  44. The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. (2002). Chang, Pao-Li.
    In: Working Papers.
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  45. Settlement Disputes: Evidence from a Legal Practice Perspective. (2001). Cumming, Douglas.
    In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
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  46. The dynamics of pretrial negotiation in France:: Is there a deadline effect in the French legal system?. (1999). Deffains, Bruno ; Doriat, Myriam.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
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  47. Who should be worried about asymmetric information in litigation?. (1999). Osborne, Evan .
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
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