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Heterogeneity and Unanimity: Optimal Committees with Information Acquisition. (2018). Zhao, Xin.
In: Working Paper Series.
RePEc:uts:ecowps:52.

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Cited: 2

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Cites: 24

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Cocites: 50

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  1. First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition. (2021). Yamashita, Takuro ; Pham, Hien ; Larionov, Daniil.
    In: TSE Working Papers.
    RePEc:tse:wpaper:126165.

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References

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