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Contractual resolutions of financial distress. (2012). Rossi, Stefano ; Gennaioli, Nicola.
In: Economics Working Papers.
RePEc:upf:upfgen:1316.

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Cited: 7

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Cites: 51

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  1. Stock price related financial fragility and growth patterns. (2017). Assmuth, Pascal.
    In: Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:2017108.

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  2. SME Access to Intermediated Credit: What Do We Know and What Dont We Know?. (2015). Udell, Gregory F.
    In: RBA Annual Conference Volume.
    RePEc:rba:rbaacv:acv2015-06.

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  3. Stock price related financial fragility and growth patterns. (2015). Assmuth, Pascal.
    In: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:bie:wpaper:539.

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  4. Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders: Relying on the Information of Others. (2013). Garella, Paolo ; Fluet, Claude.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1332.

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  5. Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs contractual innovation. (2012). Perotti, Enrico ; Gennaioli, Nicola.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:1329.

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  6. Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates and Monitoring: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. (2012). Roszbach, Kasper ; Ongena, Steven ; Cerqueiro, Geraldo .
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0257.

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  7. Standardized Enforcement: Access to Justice vs. Contractual Innovation. (2012). Perotti, Enrico ; Gennaioli, Nicola.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:652.

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