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Minimal Belief Revision leads to Backward Induction. (2004). Perea, Andres.
In: Research Memorandum.
RePEc:unm:umamet:2004032.

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  3. [11] Perea, A. (2003a), Forward induction and the minimum revision principle, Maastricht University.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  4. [12] Perea, A. (2003b), Rationalizability and minimal complexity in dynamic games, Maastricht University.

  5. [13] Perea, A. (2004), Proper rationalizability and belief revision in dynamic games, Maastricht University.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

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  9. [17] Stalnaker, R. (1998), Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction, Mathematical Social Sciences 36, 31-56.

  10. [2] Asheim, G.B. and A. Perea (2004), Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games, Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.

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  12. [4] Balkenborg, D. and E. Winter (1997), A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction, Journal of Mathematical Economics 27, 325-345.

  13. [5] Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi (1999), Hierarchies of conditional beliefs, and interactive epistemology in dynamic games, Journal of Economic Theory 88, 188-230.

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    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  17. [9] Pearce, D.G. (1984), Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection, Econometrica 52, 1029-1050.

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  43. Minimal Belief Revision leads to Backward Induction. (2004). Perea, Andres.
    In: Research Memorandum.
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