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A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis. (2018). Lamy, Laurent ; Jehiel, Philippe.
In: Journal of Political Economy.
RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/696273.

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  1. A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions. (2023). Penta, Antonio ; Ollar, Mariann.
    In: The Review of Economic Studies.
    RePEc:oup:restud:v:90:y:2023:i:5:p:2517-2554..

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  2. A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions. (2021). Penta, Antonio ; Ollar, Mariann.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:1248.

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  3. Equivalence of canonical matching models. (2020). le Maire, Daniel ; Kennes, John ; Roelsgaard, Sebastian T.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:169-182.

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  4. The electoral migration cycle. (2019). Revelli, Federico.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:59:y:2019:i:c:p:461-482.

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  5. An efficient ascending auction for private valuations. (2018). Baranov, Oleg.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:177:y:2018:i:c:p:495-517.

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