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- Appendix Figure A.11.— Age and Experience at Retirement 0 20 40 60 Age -20-10 0 10 20 Years After Retirement 0 20 40 60 Experience -20-10 0 10 20 Years After Retirement Notes: Each dot represents the average age (left panel) or experience (right panel) of judges with the same number of years relative to retirement. Data comes from biographical data on judges (1950-2007). Appendix Figure A.12 shows that the relationship between rate of dissent or concurrence and ideology score among retired judges does not appear to be driven by outliers.
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- Appendix Figure A.2.— Distance to Panel Median and Distance to Center of Judge Pool .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 Distance to Median of Panel 0 .2 .4 .6 Distance to Center of Judge Pool Notes: x-axis: Absolute value of the distance to the center of the judge pool. y-axis: Absolute value of the distance to the panel median. Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database. Sample is restricted to panels where scores are available for all three judges.
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- Appendix Figure A.9.— Ideology of Vote and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center of Judge Pool – predicted pattern from quartic regression -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06 Predicted Vote Ideology -.8 -.4 0 .4 .8 Score Relative to Center of Judge Pool Notes: Data comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample). Predicted ideology of vote (from Table A.7 column 1) is plotted for evenly spaced bins of ideology score (demeaned by the center of the judge pool) from left to right. The dependent variable is ideology of a vote, which is coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and-1 for liberal. Average of predicted ideology of votes is displayed for each bin. We next check if the S-shape in the voting pattern is present when splitting the sample according to whether the decision affirmed the lower court opinion. Appendix Table A.8 reports the regression coefficients.
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- APPENDIX TABLE A.1 Ideology of Opinion and Ideology Scores of Panel Members (1) Opinion Ideology Median of Panel Ideology Score 0.121*** (0.0354) Left of Panel Ideology Score 0.0499 (0.0720) Right of Panel Ideology Score 0.0373 (0.0448) Center of Judge Pool 0.251* Ideology Score (0.133) N 7677 R-sq 0.008 Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Data comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample). Sample includes three-judge panels where there are no tied or missing scores. The main independent variable is the (non-demeaned) ideology score of a judge. The dependent variable is ideology of opinion, which is coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and-1 for liberal.
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- Average of predicted ideology of votes is displayed on the y-axis for each bin. Data comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample). B.5 Robustness regarding retired judges Appendix Figure A.11 shows that age and experience vary smoothly at the time of retirement.
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- Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database.
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- Sunstein, C. R., D. Schkade, L. M. Ellman, and A. Sawicki (2006). Are Judges Political?: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary. Brookings Institution Press. A Additional Empirical Results This section presents some empirical results supporting the assumptions and intermediate results from the model. A.1 Histogram of Ideology Scores An assumption in the model is that the distribution of ideology scores of judges is bell-shaped. Appendix Figure A.1 shows it roughly is for both Distance to Center of Judge Pool and Distance to the Supreme Court. Appendix Figure A.1.— Distribution of Relative Ideology Scores 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 Density −1 −.5 0 .5 1 Ideology Score relative to Center of Judge Pool 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
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