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Access Statistics for Andrea Attar

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Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard	0	0	0	42	0	0	0	158
Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences	0	0	0	22	0	0	0	113
Common agency games with separable preferences	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	78
Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness	0	0	0	47	0	0	0	119
Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples	0	0	0	6	0	2	3	18
Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	18
Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples	0	0	0	35	0	0	2	48
Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle	0	0	0	42	0	1	1	135
Competing Mechanisms: Communication under Exclusivity Clauses	0	0	0	18	0	0	1	17
Competitive Nonlinear Pricing under Adverse Selection	0	0	0	33	0	1	2	30
Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	21
Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: the Role of Menus	0	0	0	31	1	1	2	43
Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	30
Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection	0	0	0	46	0	0	3	124
Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	7
Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	18
Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals	0	0	0	15	0	0	0	6
Financial contracting along the business cycle	0	0	0	43	0	0	1	152
Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games	0	0	0	46	0	0	0	141
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms	0	1	1	19	0	1	5	20
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms	0	0	0	26	0	1	4	32
Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms	0	0	0	6	0	0	1	18
Mediated Renegotiation	0	0	8	8	1	1	7	7
Moral Hazard: Messages, Delegation and Efficiency	0	0	0	79	0	0	0	281
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets	0	0	0	28	0	1	1	47
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets	0	0	0	32	1	1	2	71
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets	0	0	0	19	0	1	1	74
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants	0	0	0	76	0	2	2	180
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants	0	0	1	37	0	1	3	82
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	27
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market	0	0	1	76	0	0	1	294
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market	0	0	1	32	0	0	1	183
Multiple lenders, strategic default and debt covenants	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	79
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons	0	0	1	63	0	0	2	213
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons	0	0	0	174	0	0	0	532
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons	0	0	0	44	0	0	1	215
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons	0	0	1	36	0	0	2	144
Non-Exclusive Competition under Adverse Selection	0	0	0	87	0	0	0	135
Nonexclusive competition and adverse selection	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition	0	0	0	39	0	0	0	58
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition	0	0	0	59	0	0	0	56
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition	0	0	0	42	0	0	0	45
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing	0	0	0	20	0	0	1	31
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing	0	0	0	53	0	0	0	79
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing	0	0	0	18	1	1	2	33
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing	0	0	1	31	0	0	2	52
On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	19
On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games	0	0	0	33	0	1	3	60
On a Class of Smooth Preferences	0	0	0	25	0	0	0	36
On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25
On competitive nonlinear pricing	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	26
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts	0	0	0	14	0	0	0	77
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	30
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	14
On multiple agent models of moral hazard	0	0	0	28	0	0	0	99
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard	0	1	2	78	0	2	5	254
On the Role of Menus in Sequential Contracting: a Multiple Lending Example	0	0	0	29	0	0	0	46
Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games	0	0	0	19	0	0	0	40
Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A Comment	0	0	0	46	0	0	0	38
Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A comment	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	34
Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents: a comment	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	81
Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	7
Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection	0	0	0	12	0	1	1	24
The Social Costs of Side Trading	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	6
The Social Costs of Side Trading	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	37
The Social Costs of Side Trading	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	21
The Social Costs of Side Trading	1	1	1	21	1	1	1	22
The Social Costs of Side Trading	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	14
The Social Costs of Side Trading	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	12
Trading under Asymmetric Information: Positive and Normative Implications	0	0	0	51	1	1	1	99
Total Working Papers	1	3	18	1,996	6	22	73	5,429

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard	0	0	0	37	0	0	0	140
Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences	0	0	0	34	0	0	0	140
Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness	0	0	0	13	0	1	1	73
Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples	0	0	0	5	0	0	1	22
Concurrence non exclusive et sélection adverse	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	18
Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	25
Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume	0	0	0	231	1	6	8	636
Credit cycles in a Neo-Austrian economy	0	0	0	52	0	0	0	166
Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection	0	0	0	10	0	4	6	64
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants	0	0	1	5	1	2	3	39
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market	0	0	0	39	0	0	1	190
Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions	0	0	0	59	0	0	0	142
Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons	0	0	1	85	0	0	1	330
Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection	0	0	0	42	1	2	16	200
On a class of smooth preferences	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19
On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition	0	0	1	7	1	1	2	56
On competitive nonlinear pricing	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	27
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts	0	0	0	28	0	0	1	137
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard	0	0	0	65	0	0	1	217
Private communication in competing mechanism games	0	0	2	5	0	0	2	35
The Social Costs of Side Trading	0	0	0	6	0	1	1	13
Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games	0	0	0	23	0	2	2	122
Total Journal Articles	0	0	5	752	4	20	49	2,811

Chapter	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Chapter	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Trading under asymmetric information: Positive and normative implications	0	0	0	9	1	1	2	37
Total Chapters	0	0	0	9	1	1	2	37

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Statistics updated 2024-12-04