The political economy of public research, or why some governments commit to research more than others

Andrea Filippetti () and Antonio Vezzani ()

No 257, Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' from Department of Economics - University Roma Tre

Abstract: Regardless a generalised consensus about the economic benefits of public research, it has been following different patterns across countries. Why do some governments invest in public research more than others? By relying on political economy literature, we frame investment in public research as a choice shaped by the political institutions of countries. We find robust relationships between public-funded research and political institutions. Countries with parliamentary forms of government, proportional electoral rules and bicameralism legislatures spend more in research; the presence of encompassing civic society organizations also encourages public research. Majoritarian-like reforms which reduce representation might discourage forward government commitment harming the longterm economic growth.

Keywords: public research; political economy; R&D; consensual democracy; public choice; civil organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O38 P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Published in The Working papers -Dipartimento di Economia Università degli studi di Roma Tre

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Related works:
Journal Article: The political economy of public research, or why some governments commit to research more than others (2022)
Working Paper: The political economy of public research, or why some governments commit to research more than others (2020)
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