Return enhancing, cash-rich or simply empire-building? An empirical investigation of corporate real estate holdings

Julan Du, Charles Leung and Derek Chu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: No, we find no evidence for a return-enhancing role for corporate real estate holdings, which is consistent with the previous literature. Instead, our study based on a sample of U.S. listed corporations suggests that corporate real estate holdings are a form of managerial “empire building”. Corporations with weaker corporate governance and a lower degree of financial constraint tend to have higher real estate holdings, whereas higher real estate holdings are associated with lower returns to shareholders. The impact of corporate governance on corporate real estate holdings seems to be stronger in manufacturing-related industries. Implications and future research directions are discussed.

Keywords: corporate real estate; empire-building; corporate governance; financial constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 G11 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02
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Journal Article: Return Enhancing, Cash-rich or simply Empire-Building? An Empirical Investigation of Corporate Real Estate Holdings (2014)
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