The Borda-Condorcet Social Evaluation Function

Carmen Herrero () and Antonio Villar
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Carmen Herrero: Universidad de Alicante & IVIE

No 19.02, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a social evaluation function that combines the ideas of Borda and Condorcet by computing the support that each alternative receives on average, when confronted with any other in a series of tournaments. Even though the evaluation follows Condorcet’s tournament approach and evaluates social alternatives in terms of pairwise comparisons, it ponders the outcomes of those comparisons differently, depending on how each alternative fares with respect to the others (a Borda count ingredient). The evaluation appears as the stable distribution of an iterative process in which each alternative competes randomly with any other, and results in a vector of positive numbers that tell us the relative social support of the different options

Keywords: Social evaluation function; Borda rule; Condorcet rule; stable distribution; tournaments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2019-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:19.02

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