On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

F.J. Ruge-Murcia

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemloyment rate.

Keywords: INFLATION; CENTRAL BANKS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E30 E50 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-22

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