Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds

Franz Dietrich and Kai Spiekermann ()
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Kai Spiekermann: London School of Economics (LSE)

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Does pre-voting group deliberation increase majority competence? To address this question, we develop a probabilistic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Simulations and theoretic arguments confirm this. But there are five systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always by increasing failure (1). Our analysis recommends deliberation that is 'participatory', 'even', but possibly 'unequal', i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but possibly privileges some persons

Keywords: jury theorems; group deliberation; social choice theory; majority voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2022-04, Revised 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Related works:
Working Paper: Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds (2024)
Working Paper: Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds (2024)
Working Paper: Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds (2024)
Working Paper: Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds (2024)
Working Paper: Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:22011r

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