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Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition

D. Abreu, P.K. Dutta and Lones Smith

Working papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics

Keywords: game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1992
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Working Paper: Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition (1997) Downloads
Journal Article: The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition (1994) Downloads
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