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Fiscal performance of minority governments: New empirical evidence for OECD countries

Niklas Potrafke

Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: I use new data on central and general governments for 23 OECD countries over the period 1960-2015 (unbalanced panel) to examine fiscal performance under minority governments. The results do not suggest that minority governments had higher fiscal deficits and public expenditure than majority governments-corroborating many previous studies. An innovation of my study is to examine fiscal policies of minority governments that enjoy organized support of opposition parties. The results do not show that minority governments that enjoy organized support of opposition parties increased public expenditure to a larger extent than majority governments. If anything, fiscal deficits were somewhat higher under single-party minority governments with organized support of opposition parties than under majority governments especially. Minority and majority governments had quite similar fiscal performance in OECD countries.

Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Party Politics (2019)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Fiscal Performance of Minority Governments: New Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Fiscal Performance of Minority Governments: New Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries (2019) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:78253

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