Norms, Incentives and Information in Income Insurance

Assar Lindbeck and Mats Persson ()
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Mats Persson: Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), Postal: Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

No 1058, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we ask under what conditions norms can enhance welfare by mitigating moral hazard in income insurance. We point out a particular role of norms, namely to compensate for insurers’ difficulties in monitoring the behavior of insured individuals. Thus, the functioning of social norms depends crucially on information, in particular on what norm enforcers are able to observe about an insured individual’s behavior. Information is also decisive when distinguishing between social norms and internalized norms. We study how optimal insurance arrangements, the behavior of insured individuals, and welfare are influenced by norms. We also examine the optimal strength of norms. Generally speaking, the paper is a study of the interaction between norms and economic incentives.

Keywords: Norms; Moral hazard; Insurance; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H55 H75 I13 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2015-02-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-soc
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