License auctions and market structure

Heidrun C. Hoppe, Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu ()
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Heidrun C. Hoppe: Universität Bonn = University of Bonn

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Abstract: We analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licenses. Under plausible conditions, we show that auctioning more licenses need not result in a more competitive final outcome, contrary to what common sense suggests. This is due to the nature of competition among incumbents, which sometimes exhibits free-riding. We illustrate some results with examples drawn from the recent European license-auctions for third generation (3G) mobile telephony.

Date: 2006-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

Published in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2006, 15 (2), pp.371-396. ⟨10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00104.x⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: License Auctions and Market Structure (2006)
Working Paper: License Auctions and Market Structure (2000)
Working Paper: License Auctions and Market Structure (2000)
Working Paper: License Auctions and Market Structure (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754153

DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00104.x

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